Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; August 28, 1998; Alabama; State Supreme Court
The Health Care Defendants, including The Children’s Hospital of Alabama and several physicians, petition the court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Circuit Court of Walker County to transfer medical malpractice claims against them to Jefferson County, asserting that all alleged malpractice occurred there, as stipulated in Ala.Code 1975, 6-5-546. The case involves Curt Howell, a minor who suffered serious injuries in 1992 and, after initial treatment in Walker County, was treated at Children’s Hospital in Jefferson County. Howell initially filed a complaint against a car owner and later amended it to include medical malpractice claims against health care providers, listing fictitious defendants related to Walker Regional Medical Center.
Despite a motion in June 1993 to transfer the case to Jefferson County being denied, the parties engaged in a lengthy discovery process. Howell's subsequent amendments continued to name only fictitious health care providers for negligence claims associated with Walker Regional Medical Center. After filing a fifth amendment in May 1997, the Health Care Defendants again moved to transfer the claims to Jefferson County, which was denied by the trial court as untimely. The Health Care Defendants argue that they made a timely objection to venue and that the trial court erred in its refusal to transfer the case, while Howell contends that any objections raised were not timely. A writ of mandamus is deemed appropriate for this venue dispute, as it allows for challenging the trial court's decision on transfer based on improper venue.
Prior to 1987, medical liability actions in Alabama were subject to general venue rules established in the Code of Alabama 1975, which specified venue based on defendant residency, business operations, or the location of injury. Notably, venue could be appropriate in multiple counties if several claims or parties were involved, as outlined in Rule 82(c) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants had specific timelines for challenging venue, with strict adherence required to avoid waiving such challenges.
In 1987, the Alabama Legislature enacted the Alabama Medical Liability Act, aimed at addressing rising medical service costs linked to medical liability litigation. This Act introduced a distinct venue provision, diverging from the general statutes. Under Section 6-5-546, actions against healthcare providers for breaches of care must be initiated in the county where the alleged act or omission occurred. If the alleged breaches occurred in multiple counties, the action must be filed in the county of the plaintiff's residence at the time of the incident for personal injury cases, or the decedent's residence for wrongful death cases. Additionally, courts have the discretion to transfer cases for convenience or justice, as well as to order separate trials for claims or parties.
Under Alabama Code § 6-5-546, medical liability actions must be filed in the county where the acts or omissions occurred. If such acts took place in multiple counties, the action must be initiated in the county of the plaintiff's residence at the time of the events. In Ex parte Kennedy, the court ruled that a medical liability action must be brought in the county where the alleged negligence occurred, prioritizing § 6-5-546 over conflicting provisions of Rule 82(c) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, medical malpractice claims were required to be severed from workers' compensation claims and transferred to the appropriate county.
In the current case concerning Howell, had he named a healthcare provider linked to negligence at Walker Regional Medical Center, venue would have been proper in Walker County due to both Walker County and Jefferson County defendants. However, Howell’s decision not to name healthcare defendants from Walker County necessitated a transfer of the healthcare claims to Jefferson County, as mandated by § 6-5-546. The healthcare defendants' motions to transfer were challenged by Howell as untimely, but the court found that the explicit timing provisions in § 6-5-546 override the general timing rules in Rule 12(h)(1) and Rule 82(d)(2)(C)(i). The statute allows for transfer of the case based on a showing of improper venue prior to trial commencement, requiring the court to grant such a motion. The court emphasized the necessity of interpreting the statute's language according to its plain meaning.
The Legislature intended for health care defendants to be able to challenge venue at any time before the trial, as stated in 6-5-546, to prevent the timing rules in Rule 12(h)(1) and Rule 82(d)(2)(C)(i) from undermining this benefit. Howell contends that the timing provisions of the aforementioned rules govern whether defendants waived their right to challenge venue, asserting that 6-5-546 only conflicts with Rule 82(c) and not with Rule 82(d). This argument is flawed because it fails to eliminate the conflict between the two; 6-5-546 requires that any showing of improper venue must occur before the trial, while Rule 82(d)(2)(C)(i) allows for such challenges even after the trial has started. Furthermore, Rule 82(d)(2)(A) allows for a discretionary transfer upon motion by any subset of defendants, contrasting with the mandatory transfer required by 6-5-546 if any defendant moves for it. Two interpretations of the phrase "at any time prior to the commencement of the trial" in 6-5-546 are discussed: if it only modifies the showing of improper venue, it does not eliminate conflict; if it applies to both the showing and the motion, it becomes meaningless. The Legislature is presumed to understand existing laws when enacting new legislation, implying that it would not include superfluous language. Thus, both interpretations lead to a conflict between the statute and the rules regarding venue challenges.
The court declines to reinterpret the timing provisions of Ala.Code 1975, 6-5-546, by adding language about the timing of venue challenges, as the Legislature has consistently omitted such language from various venue statutes. Instead, the court interprets the statute to allow health care defendants to file motions to transfer venue “at any time prior to the commencement of the trial.” This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent of the 1987 Act, which aimed to mitigate rising medical service costs due to medical liability litigation.
The Health Care Defendants filed their motions to transfer venue on September 16 and 17, 1997, before the trial began and prior to an acknowledgment by Howell's counsel that no health care defendants from Walker County would be included in the case. Consequently, the court finds that these motions were timely under 6-5-546. The court concludes that the Health Care Defendants have a clear legal right to have the claims against them transferred to Jefferson County, where the alleged malpractice occurred, and grants their petitions for writs of mandamus.
Additionally, the document references Rule 82(c) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for the joining of claims and parties in the proper venue, and Rule 12(h)(1) regarding the waiver of defenses related to jurisdiction and venue if not timely raised. Overall, the court supports the defendants' position and affirms the writs.
Rule 82(d)(2)(C)(i) was amended on September 1, 1987, altering the start of the 30-day period for a motion to transfer venue after voluntary dismissal from the date of the order to the date of service of notice of dismissal. Relevant Alabama Code provisions outline that personal actions may commence in the county of the defendant's residence or where the act occurred, while actions against unincorporated organizations can be initiated in any county where they do business. For foreign and domestic corporations, suit can be filed in any county where they conduct business, with specific requirements for personal injury cases regarding the location of the injury or the plaintiff’s residence.
The Legislature allows either party to move for a change of venue at any time before final trial, asserting that a fair trial cannot occur in the current county, which the court may grant under certain conditions. Howell contends that the Health Care Defendants were aware by August 12, 1997, that he would not name Walker County health care providers as defendants, as indicated in his expert-witness disclosures. The Health Care Defendants filed their motions to transfer shortly after this disclosure, which Howell argues was timely enough to prevent an implied waiver of venue rights. According to Rule 82(d)(4), only defendants named within 75 days of the transfer motion will be considered for venue determination, suggesting that the Health Care Defendants could have compelled Howell to name any Walker County health care providers during that timeframe. This timing would have clarified whether malpractice claims were alleged in multiple counties, impacting the transfer to Jefferson County.
The plaintiff had the discretion to include or exclude any Walker County health care provider as a defendant at any time. Howell's argument is undermined by the absence of a statutory or rule requirement mandating the plaintiff to name all defendants before trial starts. According to Rule 82(d)(2)(C)(i), Ala. R. Civ. P., a motion to transfer after a voluntary dismissal must be filed promptly if trial is set within 30 days of the dismissal or has already begun, and in other cases, within 30 days after the plaintiff notifies all parties of the dismissal. Interpreting the phrase "at any time prior to the commencement of the trial" to only pertain to venue issues would render it meaningless regarding Rule 12, Ala. R. Civ. P. Prior to the 1987 Act, plaintiffs could challenge venue by dropping claims anytime before trial, governed by Rules 12(d) and (h)(1). The Legislature is presumed to understand existing laws when enacting new statutes, thus the inclusion of "at any time" in 6-5-546 suggests intentionality. Venue challenges can be waived, distinguishing them from subject matter jurisdiction issues. The trial court can hold a hearing on venue matters under 6-5-546, issuing rulings after necessary continuances to resolve factual disputes. If a defendant fails to seek a writ of mandamus promptly, they forfeit further venue challenges; a mandamus petition is the appropriate method to contest venue decisions, with untimeliness leading to dismissal as shown in prior cases.
