Michael Wayne Jennings v. Jeanne Woodford, Warden of the California State Prison at San Quentin
Docket: 00-99008
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; May 10, 2002; Federal Appellate Court
Michael Wayne Jennings was convicted in February 1984 by a Contra Costa County jury of first-degree murder, forcible rape, first-degree burglary, and robbery, with the jury imposing the death penalty due to a special circumstance involving the murder occurring during the commission of the other crimes. Jennings appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition, contesting both his conviction and sentence. He argued that his trial counsel was ineffective under the Strickland standard for failing to investigate or present mental health defenses and for having multiple conflicts of interest. The court found that the state did not show a reasonable tactical reason for the trial counsel's failure to explore Jennings’ significant mental health issues, which could have led to a non-first-degree conviction. As a result, the court determined that Jennings was deprived of effective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase, necessitating the reversal of his death sentence and conviction. The case was remanded with instructions to grant the writ unless the state opts to retry Jennings. The factual background included the brutal murder of 63-year-old Violet Newman, who sustained extensive injuries indicative of a violent struggle.
Substantial circumstantial evidence linked Michael Wayne Jennings to the crime, including his long-standing acquaintance with the victim, Ms. Newman, and the discovery of strapping tape with his thumb and palm prints in her home, which matched tape found in his truck. The truck also contained rope matching ligature marks on the victim and a piece of her answering machine along with her blood. As a secretor, Mr. Jennings had a successful vasectomy years prior, yet aspermatic semen consistent with his blood type was found on the victim. A phone call was made from the victim's home to a friend of Mr. Jennings shortly after the murder, and Mr. Jennings reported taking a whirlpool bath hours later, despite the victim owning a whirlpool tub. Additionally, he lost a knife matching the dimensions of the victim's stab wounds that night and volunteered details about the crime that were not public knowledge.
During the investigation, Mr. Jennings attended a bachelor party where he used methamphetamine and consumed alcohol, but no witnesses could confirm his alibi for the entire night. A mix-up regarding daylight savings time undermined his defense's ability to establish his alibi when the call to Ms. Boechne was placed. His trial counsel did not present evidence of his mental health issues, which could have contextualized his behavior during the crime.
The jury deliberated from February 7 to February 9, 1984, resulting in a guilty verdict. The penalty phase concluded on February 27, 1984, leading to a death penalty verdict the following morning. The California Supreme Court upheld the judgment, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. After his state habeas corpus petition was denied, Mr. Jennings sought federal habeas relief. The district court granted summary judgment to the respondent on most claims, but allowed an evidentiary hearing for three claims related to ineffective assistance of counsel, his competency to assist counsel at trial, and being improperly shackled during the trial.
Following a ten-day evidentiary hearing, Judge Ingram denied Mr. Jennings' habeas relief, prompting him to file a timely Notice of Appeal. The district court issued a certificate of probable cause concurrently. The appeal focuses on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, specifically regarding trial counsel's inadequate investigation of mental health, drug abuse, and family background, as well as conflicts of interest.
Due to the timing of the appeal, the procedures under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) apply. A generalized Certificate of Probable Cause (CPC) is insufficient for jurisdiction; instead, a Certificate of Appealability (COA) must be issued for specific issues. The appeal is treated as an application for a COA under Fed. R.App. P. 22(b)(2). A COA may be granted if the petitioner demonstrates a substantial showing of a constitutional right's denial.
The standard for a COA is low, requiring that the issues are debatable among reasonable jurists or that different resolutions are possible. In capital cases, the potential penalty is a significant factor in COA considerations. The court leans towards granting a COA in case of doubt.
Upon review, a COA is issued regarding Mr. Jennings' claims that trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and present critical evidence about his psychological and family history, which could have influenced the jury's findings on intent for first-degree murder and provided mitigating evidence during sentencing. Such omissions could constitute a denial of effective assistance of counsel, as evidenced by precedents demonstrating ineffectiveness in similar circumstances. The court concludes that these issues are debatable, warranting the issuance of a COA.
A certificate of appealability (COA) is granted regarding Mr. Jennings' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's alleged conflicts of interest, based on the standard set in *Cuyler v. Sullivan*. Mr. Jennings must show that his counsel was actively representing conflicting interests that adversely affected performance. He alleges conflicts arose from his attorney's partnership with a conflicted attorney and previous representations of key witnesses, which could have divided loyalties. The court acknowledges that whether these conflicts were sufficiently related to justify an "active" conflict is debatable among reasonable jurists, thus meeting the COA threshold.
Conversely, a COA is denied concerning Mr. Jennings' claim about the district court's decision to allow psychiatrist Dr. James Missett to testify, as he fails to demonstrate a substantial showing of a constitutional right denial related to limited cross-examination of Dr. Missett regarding his small claims suits.
The standard of review for habeas corpus petitions is de novo, with ineffective assistance claims being a mixed question of law and fact, while factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Since Mr. Jennings appealed before the effective date of AEDPA in 1996, its stricter standards do not apply to the merits of this case, although AEDPA governs the issuance of a COA.
Mr. Jennings argues that his counsel's failure to investigate potential mental defenses constituted ineffective assistance, asserting that the absence of such an investigation deprived him of his Sixth Amendment rights during both trial phases. The respondent counters that the decision to pursue an alibi defense, influenced by Mr. Jennings' insistence on his innocence, negated the need for investigating mental defenses. Mr. Jennings contends that evidence of his mental health issues could have led to a lesser conviction, thereby avoiding a death penalty scenario. The court agrees with Mr. Jennings on this point and does not need to examine ineffectiveness claims related to the penalty phase.
In McMann v. Richardson, the Supreme Court established that the right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance. In Strickland v. Washington, the Court introduced a two-prong test for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) the attorney's performance must be below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) this deficiency must have prejudiced the defendant, creating a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for the errors. The Court emphasized that the first prong does not come with exhaustive guidelines, allowing for a broad interpretation of counsel's duties, including loyalty, avoiding conflicts of interest, advocating for the client, and maintaining communication. The review of an attorney's performance must be deferential, considering the circumstances at the time of the alleged errors, and there is a strong presumption that the attorney acted within a reasonable range of professional assistance.
Strickland clarified that proving ineffective assistance requires more than demonstrating that the attorney's performance was subpar; the defendant must also prove actual prejudice, defined as a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different without the attorney’s errors. The Court reinforced the necessity for attorneys to conduct reasonable investigations or justify decisions not to investigate adequately. This principle was reiterated in Williams v. Taylor, where the failure to investigate crucial records led to a finding of both ineffectiveness and prejudice.
An attorney's failure to investigate can constitute constitutionally deficient performance in capital cases, impacting both the guilt and penalty phases. Precedents such as *Bloom v. Calderon* and *Ainsworth v. Woodford* highlight the necessity of thorough investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence. Mr. Jennings contends that attorney Michael Oliver provided ineffective representation during the guilt phase by neglecting to investigate mental health and drug abuse issues that could undermine the intent necessary for a first-degree murder conviction and the death penalty.
Mr. Jennings’ previous attorney, Carol Babington, initially engaged a psychiatrist for a preliminary assessment of his competency, which did not rule out potential mental defenses. However, Mr. Oliver failed to follow up on this groundwork, claiming Babington indicated Jennings was 'Okay' and did not pursue further investigation or consult with the psychiatrist until after the guilt phase. He neglected to review Jennings' extensive medical records, investigate potential child abuse in Jennings' background, or seek expert evaluations regarding the impact of methamphetamine use, despite being aware of Jennings' reported heavy drug use and a syringe found in his vehicle.
Oliver also did not follow up on significant information regarding Jennings’ mental health, including a suicide attempt and a prior involuntary psychiatric commitment, nor did he investigate Jennings' history of molestation. He merely verified a vasectomy when reviewing medical records and failed to consider any mental defenses due to his focus on an alibi defense, which he admits was undermined by a mistake. This lack of investigation calls into question the reasonableness and informed nature of Oliver's strategic decisions, as mandated by the Strickland standard.
The district court found Mr. Oliver’s decision not to investigate Mr. Jennings' potential mental health defenses reasonable, as it determined that the defense attorney had no prior indication of mental issues, thus justifying his lack of further inquiry. This conclusion relied on the case of Hendricks v. Calderon, where extensive mental health evaluations revealed no basis for a defense, allowing the attorney to forego additional investigation. However, the district court incorrectly compared Hendricks to Jennings' situation. Unlike Hendricks, where the attorney engaged experts and found no mental disorders, Mr. Oliver's brief two-hour assessment by Dr. Hjortsvang was not comprehensive nor intended to rule out mental defenses. Mr. Oliver abandoned the mental defense in favor of an alibi without sufficient investigation.
Additionally, the district court misinterpreted the legal standards set forth in Turner v. Duncan and Seidel v. Merkle. It noted that Mr. Oliver’s failure was less severe than in Turner, as he had a psychiatrist's opinion deeming Jennings competent. However, this does not adequately address whether Jennings received effective representation under the Sixth Amendment. The court also distinguished Seidel's case based on the attorney's prior knowledge of mental issues, but this fails to acknowledge that Mr. Oliver had sufficient grounds to investigate Jennings' mental state further. Ultimately, Mr. Oliver was required to thoroughly explore whether a mental health defense could have been more advantageous than the alibi he chose early on, especially given that he was aware of Jennings' mental health and drug problems.
Mr. Oliver was aware of significant mental health and substance abuse issues regarding his client, Mr. Jennings, who was a long-term methamphetamine addict and exhibited behaviors indicative of severe psychological distress, including a suicide attempt and self-harm. Despite this knowledge, including an ex-wife's statement about his mental instability and a history of involuntary psychiatric commitment, Mr. Oliver failed to investigate these matters adequately. The legal context at the time of Jennings' trial in 1983, particularly the California Supreme Court ruling in People v. Mozingo, established that failure to explore potential mental defenses could constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The Mozingo case highlighted that a lack of investigation could prevent informed strategic decisions, potentially harming the defendant's case. Mr. Oliver, despite being alerted to the inadequacy of his investigation by the prosecution, incorrectly claimed he had fulfilled his duties, even admitting he only reviewed limited medical records. The evidence suggests that a reasonable attorney in his position would have recognized the necessity for a thorough investigation into Mr. Jennings' mental health and substance use history, especially given the gravity of the charges he faced. The district court's conclusion that Oliver made a tactical decision not to investigate was deemed clearly erroneous.
Mr. Oliver's failure to conduct a thorough investigation and consult with his client led to an ineffective legal defense, as per Strickland's first prong. Instead of making an informed tactical decision, he opted for a weak alibi defense without adequate groundwork. The analysis extends to whether a proper investigation would have likely changed the trial's outcome. A reasonable probability, as defined by Strickland, is one that undermines confidence in the verdict rather than requiring a higher likelihood of an alternative outcome.
At the district court's evidentiary hearing, witnesses testified about what Mr. Oliver could have uncovered. Although Dr. Hjortsvang passed away before the hearing, his declaration highlighted the importance of information he lacked during his initial evaluation. Dr. Karen Gudiksen provided insights from a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation, contrasting it with Dr. Hjortsvang's brief examination. She identified critical evidence that could have negated the intent required for a first-degree murder conviction, supporting a lesser charge instead.
Dr. Gudiksen reviewed extensive records and found a significant family history of mental illness, abuse, and self-harm in Mr. Jennings' past. Her evaluation indicated that Mr. Jennings experienced psychotic symptoms, including hallucinations and delusions, exacerbated by heavy methamphetamine use leading up to the crime. She concluded that Mr. Jennings was suffering from schizoaffective disorder at the time of the offense, impairing his capacity to form the intent necessary for the alleged crimes.
Dr. Hjortsvang's declaration outlined the critical information unavailable to him during his initial evaluation of Mr. Jennings in 1982, which included Mr. Jennings' life history, family and friend declarations, jail medical records, and insights from other experts. He asserted that this information was vital for accurately assessing Jennings' mental state at the time of the crime and indicated that had he possessed it earlier, his conclusions might have differed. Dr. Hjortsvang believed that evidence of amphetamine psychosis could have been utilized as a defense during the guilt phase.
In response, Dr. James Missett, a psychiatrist called by the state, reviewed Mr. Jennings' records without conducting a personal examination. He characterized Dr. Hjortsvang's evaluation as thorough but disagreed with Dr. Gudiksen's diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder and amphetamine psychosis, as well as the assertion that Jennings lacked the capacity to deliberate or form intent during the crime. Importantly, neither expert's testimony, including that of Dr. Missett, was presented to a jury for consideration of Jennings' mental state.
The document references the case of Bloom v. Calderon, where trial counsel inadequately prepared a psychiatric defense, resulting in insufficient evaluation time for the expert. The appeal revealed significant evidence of mental illness and dysfunction that had not been explored, echoing Dr. Hjortsvang's situation. The court found that Bloom's counsel's negligence in securing and preparing the psychiatric expert constituted ineffective assistance, drawing parallels to Jennings' case where similar deficiencies were evident.
In Sanders v. Ratelle, the court criticized the use of the term "strategic" to describe ineffective counsel's actions, noting that trial counsel inadequately addressed the defendant's mental state, which was crucial for negating premeditation and malice in a first-degree murder case. In Seidel v. Merkle, the court found counsel ineffective for not investigating the defendant's psychiatric history, despite clear indications of mental illness. The court emphasized the responsibility of counsel under Strickland to conduct reasonable investigations or justify the absence of such investigations as strategic decisions. Specifically, it was highlighted that while jury instructions for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter were requested, no supporting evidence or arguments were presented.
In Mr. Jennings' case, similar deficiencies were noted, particularly as counsel, Mr. Oliver, secured instructions for second-degree murder and manslaughter but failed to present evidence to challenge the intent required for a first-degree murder conviction. The court concluded that a competent attorney, having adequately investigated, would likely have pursued a mental defense strategy, especially given the weak and uncorroborated alibi. The jury's lengthy deliberation indicated potential reasonable doubt regarding Mr. Jennings' intent. The court found it probable that, with adequate mental health and drug abuse evidence presented, the jury might have reached a verdict of second-degree murder or manslaughter, undermining confidence in the original outcome. Ultimately, Mr. Oliver's failure to investigate relevant psychiatric evidence constituted prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel.
Mr. Oliver's ineffective assistance significantly harmed Mr. Jennings by preventing him from effectively contributing to his defense and failing to present a case that could have negated the mental state required for a first-degree murder conviction. The court reverses Mr. Jennings' conviction due to this ineffectiveness during the guilt phase and does not address his claims related to the penalty phase or Mr. Oliver's conflicts of interest. The district court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus is reversed, Mr. Jennings' conviction is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to grant the writ unless the State provides a new trial within a reasonable timeframe. The excerpt also references California's definitions of murder degrees and manslaughter, noting that Oliver's inadequate defense could have been improved with proper investigation into Jennings' mental health and the alibi defense.
