Succession of Blackwell

Citations: 713 So. 2d 625; 98 La.App. 3 Cir. 50; 1998 La. App. LEXIS 1135; 1998 WL 228146Docket: No. 98-50

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; May 6, 1998; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Linda Sue Clements Blackwell Sparks filed a lawsuit to nullify a judgment that granted her deceased husband James C. Blackwell's biological children possession of his estate. Following James's death on April 8, 1995, his biological daughter Linda Blackwell DeRosier was appointed administratrix of his intestate estate. In August 1996, the biological children petitioned for possession, claiming to be the sole heirs and asserting that further administration was unnecessary. They acknowledged a purported will presented by Sparks but did not seek to probate it, instead deciding to proceed under intestacy laws. 

On August 22, 1996, the court signed the judgment of possession in favor of the defendants. Sparks later filed a petition for nullity, arguing that the judgment should be annulled because it was based on intestate succession despite the existence of the purported will, the defendants failed to present the will or seek its probate, and they excluded Robyn Lynn Blackwell, the adopted daughter and legal heir, from the judgment. The defendants appealed the decision to nullify their possession of the estate, but the court affirmed the nullification.

Defendants responded to plaintiffs’ petition by asserting peremptory exceptions of res judicata and no cause of action, both of which were denied. The trial judge subsequently set aside a prior judgment of possession from August 22, 1996. Defendants appealed, citing several errors by the trial court: denial of their exception of no cause of action, improper admission of a will copy into evidence without proof of authenticity, setting aside a judgment without evidence of fraud or ill practices, and denial of their request for sanctions and attorney’s fees. 

Regarding the no cause of action exception, defendants argued that the plaintiffs' petition lacked adequate facts to support a claim of fraud or ill practices necessary for annulling the judgment under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2004. An appellate court must examine the petition's face to determine if sufficient facts exist to establish a legal cause of action, accepting all allegations as true and resolving doubts in favor of the petition's sufficiency. Article 2004 allows for annulling a judgment obtained through fraud or ill practices if the annulment action is initiated within one year of discovering such fraud.

The court highlighted that actionable fraud includes circumstances that deprive the litigant of legal rights and make judgment enforcement unconscionable. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants improperly managed the succession, were aware of the original will, failed to request its production, pursued an ex parte judgment despite knowing of plaintiffs' intentions to contest, and excluded a legal heir from the succession. The court found that these allegations, if true, support a valid cause of action for annulment under Article 2004, concluding that defendants’ first argument lacked merit.

Defendants challenge the trial court's admission of a copy of a purported will and the annulment of the August 22, 1996 judgment of possession. They argue the court erred by allowing the copy into evidence without proof of authenticity, but the court permitted its admission solely to indicate the existence of a document claiming to be a will, clarifying that this did not determine its validity. The court's decision regarding this limited purpose is deemed correct. 

Additionally, defendants assert that the annulment was improper due to a lack of proof of fraud or ill practice. However, Louisiana law (La. Code Civ. P. art. 2004) allows annulment without actual fraud, and the court can consider equity to determine if a party was hindered from asserting claims. Annulment is valid if enforcing the judgment would be inequitable. 

The case highlights that a nullity action is separate from an appeal and does not question the original judgment of possession. Evidence indicates that defense counsel was informed of the purported will on June 6, 1996, and that DeRosier, the decedent's daughter, doubted the will's validity. The court noted the defendants had kept relevant parties informed throughout the process, and while DeRosier's affidavit indicated awareness of the will, it did not mention Robyn’s adoption claim. Despite conflicting evidence regarding heirs, the trial court faced a challenging decision, leading to the conclusion that its annulment decision was not clearly erroneous.

The defendants argue that the trial court made an error by not imposing sanctions on the plaintiffs for alleged abuse of process and misleading statements in their petition to annul a judgment of possession. They claim that the plaintiffs' nullity action was merely a tactic to obstruct eviction proceedings. The defendants specifically object to statements in paragraphs four and five of the plaintiffs’ petition, asserting these were intended to harass and unnecessarily prolong litigation. These paragraphs detail communications regarding a Last Will and Testament and the lack of action from the plaintiffs’ attorney to produce the original will for probate.

The affidavit of the plaintiffs’ administratrix reinforces the defendants' claim, stating that repeated requests for the original will went unanswered, prompting the move toward intestate succession. The defendants emphasize the necessity of the original will being offered for probate to ensure it exists and can be contested.

Ultimately, the court found no clear error in denying the sanctions, determining that the plaintiffs' representations did not demonstrate an intent to mislead under Louisiana law. It concluded that both parties were exaggerating their positions and that the plaintiffs’ action for nullity was legitimate, based on claims of fraud or ill practice, rather than frivolous or solely for harassment.

The trial court's denial of the plaintiffs' request for sanctions under La. Code Civ. P. art. 863 was upheld, affirming the judgment. The costs of the appeal are assigned to the defendants: Glenda Faye Blackwell, James Richard Blackwell, Judy Beth Blackwell Little, and Linda Kay Blackwell DeRosier. The decedent had four biological children from a prior marriage and adopted Robyn Lynn Blackwell on May 26, 1987, who is recognized as a legal heir. La. Code Civ. P. art. 863 outlines the requirements for pleadings and the consequences for false certifications, allowing the court to impose sanctions for violations. The defendants argue that the plaintiffs did not state a valid cause of action to annul a judgment from August 22, 1996, as they failed to allege sufficient facts demonstrating fraud or ill practice, which is necessary under La. Code Civ. P. art. 2004 for annulment. The appellate court's review focuses solely on the petition's face to assess the sufficiency of the claims, accepting all allegations as true and resolving doubts in favor of the petition's validity. Article 2004 states that actions to annul a judgment must be filed within one year of discovering the fraud or ill practices.

The courts have established that the relevant provision extends beyond actual fraud or wrongdoing, as seen in Schoen v. Burns. Actionable fraud or ill practice is recognized when (1) the circumstances show a deprivation of the litigant's legal rights, and (2) enforcing the judgment would be unconscionable and inequitable, as illustrated in Douglas v. Louisiana Gin Co. Inc. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants improperly handled the intestate succession despite being aware of a purported Last Will and Testament, that they did not request the original will, pursued an ex parte judgment of possession despite being informed of an impending contest, and omitted a legal heir from the succession. These allegations support a cause for annulment under La.Code Civ. P. art.2004. 

The defendants argue against the trial court's decision to annul the August 22, 1996 judgment of possession, claiming errors in admitting a copy of the purported will into evidence due to lack of authenticity proof. The trial court allowed the copy to demonstrate the existence of a will but did not determine its validity for probate. The court's decision to admit the document for this limited purpose was deemed appropriate. Although the defendants claimed that the trial court annulled the judgment without proof of fraud or ill practice, the law reflects that such annulments are not restricted to instances of actual wrongdoing. It is acknowledged that the inquiry into the trial court's decisions includes equitable considerations, particularly if a litigant was prevented from asserting claims or defenses. Annulment may be justified if enforcing the judgment is inequitable. Importantly, an action for nullity serves as a distinct remedy, separate from an appeal, and the sufficiency of evidence supporting the judgment of possession is not within the scope of this nullity action.

On June 6, 1996, defense counsel received a fax containing a purported will and information regarding Robyn's alleged adoption by the decedent. This led to correspondence dated July 22, 1996. DeRosier, the decedent's daughter and administratrix, testified she saw the purported will soon after her father's death but doubted its validity due to a lack of prior knowledge about a will and unfamiliarity with the signature. The defendants maintained that they kept Sparks informed during the process of seeking a judgment of possession, and DeRosier’s affidavit acknowledged the existence of the purported will but did not mention Robyn’s alleged adoption status. The defendants’ petition for judgment of possession claimed they were the sole heirs and that no children were adopted during the decedent's marriage to Sparks. The trial court faced a challenging decision, ultimately finding that the circumstances fell within the equitable considerations of the law, leading to the conclusion that annulling the August 22, 1996 judgment of possession was not clearly erroneous.

Regarding sanctions and attorney's fees, the defendants argued that the trial court mistakenly declined to impose sanctions against the plaintiffs for alleged abuse of process and misleading statements in their petition to annul the judgment. The defendants claimed the plaintiffs used the nullity action to obstruct eviction proceedings and pointed to specific statements in the plaintiffs’ petition as intended to harass and cause undue delay. The referenced statements indicated that the matter was treated as intestate succession despite the existence of a valid will, and that the attorney for the petitioners did not request the original will prior to a specified communication.

Brandon received a letter on August 20, 1996, and a Judgment of Possession was signed on August 22, 1996. Despite having a copy of the Last Will and Testament, no official filing was made regarding it, nor was a search for the original will requested. An Affidavit of Administratrix indicated that Mrs. Sparks, through her attorney, Ronald D. Brandon, faxed a purported will that was said to be with Linda C. Blackwell Sparks, the decedent's surviving spouse. A request was made for the original will to be probated, first by letter on July 22, 1996, and again on August 14, 1996, after receiving no response. The defense counsel stressed the necessity of the original will for probate and its potential contestation by the decedent's heirs.

The court ultimately found no clear error in denying the defendants' request for sanctions against the plaintiffs and their counsel, stating that the plaintiffs' petition did not exhibit intent to mislead, as per La. Code Civ. P. art. 863. Both parties were seen as misrepresenting each other's actions. The plaintiffs' action to annul the August 22, 1996 Judgment of Possession was deemed not frivolous and based on claims of fraud or ill practice. Consequently, the trial court's decision to deny sanctions was upheld, and all costs from the appeal were assigned to the defendants. The decedent had four biological children and one legally adopted daughter, Robyn Lynn Blackwell, who is also a legal heir. La. Code Civ. P. art. 863 outlines the certification requirements for pleadings and potential sanctions for violations.