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Johnson v. Clark
Citations: 710 So. 2d 316; 97 La.App. 3 Cir. 1351; 1998 La. App. LEXIS 372; 1998 WL 100403Docket: No. 97-1351
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; March 5, 1998; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Defendants appeal a jury verdict that awarded tort damages to independent contractor Amar Ronald Johnson, who was injured while hauling asphalt for James Corporation. Johnson, primarily engaged by James, was injured on July 6, 1998, when an employee's tanning roller struck him while he was parked on the roadside. He suffered significant injuries, resulting in a double cervical fusion and other treatments. Johnson and his wife filed a lawsuit for damages alongside a worker's compensation claim. The jury found Johnson to be an independent contractor but ruled against him on a key interrogatory regarding his work status. They awarded damages totaling $269,000, including medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering. Barbara Johnson was awarded $4,000 for loss of consortium. The Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) for inadequate general damages, which the trial judge granted, increasing the general damages to $100,000, while denying the Defendants' motions for JNOV and a new trial. Clark, James, and Audubon are appealing this decision. The trial court's jury instructions regarding Mr. Johnson's eligibility to sue for tort damages as an independent contractor are under scrutiny. The defendants contend that the trial judge erred in explaining how Johnson's independent contractor status affects his ability to recover damages related to alleged negligence by Mr. Jessie Clark. Specifically, the judge highlighted that Johnson's status as an independent contractor does not automatically bar his claim for damages; rather, it is essential to consider several factors, including: 1. **Independent Contractor**: The parties agree on Johnson's status as an independent contractor, thus this point requires no further discussion. 2. **Substantial Part of His Work Time**: The term "substantial" is clarified not in a strictly mathematical sense but as the opposite of insubstantial or immaterial. 3. **Manual Labor**: Defined as work where the physical component is more significant than the mental aspect. 4. **Services Related to the Principal’s Business**: The jury must evaluate whether Johnson's work is integral to James Corporation’s trade or business, using a holistic approach that considers all relevant factors without allowing any single factor to be determinative. The judge emphasizes that understanding these elements is crucial for the jury's deliberation on Johnson's ability to recover damages. Key factors to consider include: 1) the nature of James Corporation's business; 2) whether the work was specialized; 3) if the work was routine or customary; 4) whether James Corporation typically employed its own workers or contracted out; 5) the availability of equipment and personnel for the work; 6) industry norms regarding contracting out similar work; 7) if independent contractor Ronald Johnson operated as a separate business entity with his own insurance costs factored into the contract; and 8) whether James Corporation was engaged in the contract work at the time of the incident. James Corporation asserts an affirmative defense, carrying the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Johnson was an independent contractor who performed substantial manual labor integral to James Corporation's business at the time of the accident. The defendants challenge the jury instructions, claiming they misstate the relevant law, specifically citing La.R.S. 23:1061 and the case of Kirkland v. Riverwood International USA, Inc. They argue that Johnson's claim falls under La.R.S. 23:1021(6), which defines "independent contractor" and specifies conditions under which independent contractors are covered by the statute, particularly focusing on the need for a substantial part of their work time to involve manual labor. Plaintiffs contend that the relevant legal provision pertains solely to independent contractors engaged in work integral to the principal's "trade, business, or occupation." They reference the Louisiana Supreme Court case Lushute v. Diesi, which established that an independent contractor's exclusive remedy lies in worker's compensation when a significant portion of their labor involves manual tasks related to the principal's business. Although this interpretation has faced criticism for lacking statutory backing, it remains upheld in subsequent cases, such as Brown v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. and others. Consequently, the courts appear bound by Lushute's precedent. The trial court correctly instructed the jury on determining whether the contractor's work was part of the principal's business, aligning with the criteria set forth in the Lushute decision and further clarified in Kirkland. The jury instructions adequately addressed the pertinent legal issues and provided appropriate legal principles, as mandated by Cuccia v. Cabrejo and Todd v. Sauls. Therefore, the court did not err in its jury instructions or the related interrogatories. The Defendants argue that Johnson's work was integral to James Corp.'s trade, business, or occupation, asserting that the jury erred in not concluding that Johnson's exclusive remedy was compensation. The court properly instructed the jury to evaluate whether Johnson's work fell within James Corp.'s operations, referencing criteria established by the supreme court in Kirkland, which includes: the nature of the principal's business, whether the work was specialized, if the work was routine, whether the principal typically used employees for such work, the principal's capability to perform the work, standard practices in the industry, the independence of the claimant's employer, and the timing of the principal’s engagement in the work. Testimony from Hubert Boudreaux, James Corp.'s office manager, indicated that James manufactures and lays asphalt but does not own dump trucks, relying instead on independent contractors for hauling. Although James had previously owned trucks, they had been out of use for two years prior to trial, and all trucking was performed by independent truckers who provided their own vehicles and paid their own expenses. Truckers are compensated based on the distance hauled, do not receive payment for return trips unless asphalt is unneeded, and must show proof of liability insurance but not Workers’ Compensation insurance. James' workers’ compensation premiums are based solely on hours worked by its employees, excluding truckers' hours. Boudreaux confirmed the essential role of truckers in the operations of James, which both manufactures and lays asphalt. Glyndon Brown, manager at the Opelousas asphalt plant, corroborated Boudreaux's testimony, noting that while truckers are essential for hauling asphalt, James does not formalize relationships with them through written contracts. Truckers are responsible for finding their own replacements and are guided by Brown on delivery locations but not on the operation of their vehicles. Ronald Johnson, a trucker who primarily hauls for James, indicated that he seeks work from other businesses when James has no assignments or does not offer sufficient pay. He also independently manages his vehicle's maintenance and expenses and confirmed that James does not dictate how truckers perform their jobs. Based on this testimony and the Kirkland factors, the jury's conclusion that Johnson's work was not integral to James's business was upheld. Regarding the jury charge on loss of earning capacity, the Defendants argued that the trial judge improperly denied their request for a specific instruction. The relevant legal principles emphasize that trial courts must provide material and relevant jury instructions, and failing to do so can constitute reversible error. Courts are not obligated to adopt the exact language proposed by the parties, provided the instructions given adequately address the issues at hand. An appellate court should only reverse a jury's verdict based on erroneous instructions if the overall guidance was so flawed that it prevented a lawful and fact-based verdict. Counsel for the Defendants objected to the jury instructions regarding loss of earning capacity, arguing they lacked clarity on critical factors for assessment. On appeal, the Defendants referenced the case of Pierce v. Milford, which outlines that lost earning capacity cannot be precisely quantified and must consider several factors: the plaintiff's pre-accident condition, work history, earnings, potential earning ability absent the accident, remaining work life, inflation, and employment opportunities before and after the accident. The trial judge maintained that the jury instructions were adequate and comprehensive, allowing for a lawful verdict. The appellate review concluded that the instructions fairly addressed the relevant issues. The Defendants also challenged the trial judge's decision to grant the Plaintiffs' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) regarding general damages. Initially, the jury awarded $20,000, which the judge later increased to $100,000. Citing Manville v. Citizen, the appellate court referenced the standard for reviewing a JNOV, determining if reasonable individuals could disagree on the jury's award being excessively high or low. If disagreement is possible, the JNOV was improper, and the jury's award should stand; if not, the JNOV was justified, leading to a reassessment of damages by the trial court. The court will evaluate if reasonable judgment could differ on the jury's awards for loss of earning capacity and general damages. Defendants contend that Johnson's preexisting cervical degeneration would have necessitated similar surgeries and resulted in comparable disabilities within five years, regardless of the accident. Approximately ten months before the accident, Johnson experienced a pulling sensation on the right side of his face, prompting him to consult Dr. John Jackson in New Orleans due to concerns about a stroke. Dr. Jackson referred Johnson to neurosurgeon Dr. Roger Smith. In his deposition, Dr. Smith noted Johnson's medical history, including a back injury in 1981 that led to a prolonged absence from work. Johnson reported intermittent spinal pain and cervical pain beginning one to two years prior to his September 26, 1994, examination, during which he presented with sudden numbness on the left side of his face and tongue, facial weakness, and blurred vision. Diagnostic tests revealed moderate disc space narrowing and spurring at C5-6 and C6-7 but did not establish a link between these cervical findings and Johnson's facial symptoms. Dr. Smith observed no muscle spasms, weakness, or numbness in the arms or legs, nor did Johnson report right-sided arm pain. Smith refrained from opining on the necessity of future neck surgery based on Johnson's condition at that time. Dr. Stephen Nason examined Johnson the day after his accident, noting significant swelling and tenderness in Johnson's injured leg, particularly around the thigh and knee, with a small amount of fluid accumulation inside the knee joint. Johnson had limited mobility in the knee and experienced bruising and abrasions on his shin, along with tightness in the calf muscles. Nason reviewed prior x-rays and found no bone injuries or joint abnormalities. He advised Johnson to use a knee brace, apply ice for 48 hours, use crutches to elevate the leg, and prescribed anti-inflammatory, muscle relaxant, and pain medications. During a follow-up visit, Nason observed reduced swelling but continued limited knee movement. He recommended physical therapy, which led to considerable improvement over two weeks, allowing Johnson to bend his knee to 120 degrees. Despite further reduction in swelling, Johnson still struggled to bear weight on the leg, and his pain had shifted to the outer thigh and hip area, attributed to irritation of the tensor fascia. Nason discontinued physical therapy but suggested home soaking for continued relief. By August 17, Johnson was walking, though his knee occasionally gave out. Nason provided a supportive brace and continued to monitor Johnson's progress through November 1996. Although Johnson showed improvement, Nason anticipated ongoing discomfort and the need for medication to manage inflammation, noting that increased activity would likely result in more pain for Johnson in the future. On July 28, 1995, Dr. James Robert Rivet began treating Johnson for neck, right shoulder, and arm pain, noting significant arthritic changes at the C5-6 and C6-7 vertebrae based on X-ray results. Johnson reported prior consultations with Drs. Jackson and Smith regarding potential disc issues that might necessitate surgery in the future. During the examination, Rivet observed tenderness in the cervical region and bilateral muscle spasms. He ordered a myelogram and subsequent CAT scan, which revealed severe arthritic changes and disc degeneration. Rivet concluded that an accident had exacerbated Johnson's preexisting condition, leading to a recommendation for surgery, which was performed on August 8, 1995. During the surgery, herniated discs were found pressing on spinal roots. Post-surgery, Johnson no longer experienced right arm symptoms but developed numbness in his left arm, attributed to the procedure. Although the fusion stabilized after three months, Johnson continued to report left shoulder pain, numbness in his fingers, and headaches. Rivet diagnosed the headaches as occipital neuralgia, likely due to pressure from the cervical collar or chronic osteoarthritis, and performed an occipital neurectomy that successfully alleviated the headaches. Further nerve conduction studies indicated issues with the median nerve and denervation of two cervical nerve roots. A subsequent myelogram revealed continued arthritic pressure on the nerve roots, prompting Rivet to refer Johnson to Dr. Hurst for a second opinion. Dr. Hurst diagnosed carpal tunnel syndrome and recommended conservative management rather than additional surgery. Johnson’s carpal tunnel symptoms worsened, and by his last visit on December 9, 1996, he had not decided on carpal tunnel release surgery. Rivet advised avoiding heavy activities and anticipated ongoing discomfort in Johnson's neck and arms, necessitating medication for symptom relief. On December 12, 1997, Johnson underwent an independent medical examination by Dr. Frazer Gaar, who found abnormalities at C5-6 and C6-7, indicative of preexisting cervical degenerative disc disease, but no acute fractures or disc herniations. Dr. Gaar noted that degenerative changes develop over time and acknowledged that an accident could exacerbate such conditions. In January 1997, Johnson consulted Dr. Nason for carpal tunnel syndrome, resulting in surgery on January 28, 1997, which alleviated most symptoms but left some numbness. Dr. Nason recognized a possible link between peripheral nerve issues and central nervous system problems but could not definitively attribute Johnson's condition to any specific cause. He advised against driving heavy trucks or engaging in activities that could strain the neck. Dr. Robert Franklin, a rehabilitation specialist, began treating Johnson on September 30, 1996, addressing ongoing upper back and neck pain, along with headaches. He deemed Johnson unfit for any heavy work and recommended avoiding vibrational stresses. By March 1997, Johnson was permitted to engage in supervisory duties on his farm, with hopes of achieving maximum medical improvement for light-duty work. Franklin predicted ongoing pain and occasional medication use. Johnson testified about his pre-accident ability to work without issues and his aspirations to become a crop duster, which were thwarted by medical advice against flying. Following the accident, he sold his truck due to financial strain from medical bills and has since only been able to supervise farm work, experiencing constant pain and requiring medication. He expressed disappointment over his altered career prospects and lack of ability to return to preferred employment as a truck driver or pilot. Dr. John Grimes, a psychology professor and rehabilitation counselor, evaluated Ronald Johnson and determined he lacked the educational background for vocational or college training but was suitable for light-duty jobs such as driving, dispatching, security, janitorial work, or cashiering, with potential earnings of $5.00 to $6.50 per hour. Economist Donald Cornwell assessed Johnson's past lost earnings and future earning capacity, concluding that Johnson would lose approximately $43,798.30 in past earnings and between $201,000.00 and $342,091.27 in future earnings based on various hourly rates and work life expectancy. Conversely, economist Kenneth Boudreaux, representing the Defendants, calculated Johnson's past losses at $19,759.37 and argued that minimum wage employment would exceed Johnson's average earnings from 1991-1994, suggesting no loss of earning capacity. The Defendants referenced factors from Pierce for assessing loss of earning capacity, including Johnson's pre-accident condition and work history. The court found that reasonable people could differ on the jury's decision regarding loss of earning capacity, affirming the trial court's judgment and denying the Defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). However, the court noted that the jury's general damages award appeared unreasonably low but ultimately upheld the trial judge's discretion. The trial court's judgment was affirmed, with costs of the appeal to be borne by the Defendants. Principal contractors are liable for compensation to employees engaged in work that is part of their trade or business when they hire a contractor to execute that work. This liability extends to employees as if they were directly employed by the principal. The nature of the work—whether specialized, routine, or typically contracted out—does not exempt it from being part of the principal's business. If the principal pays compensation, they can seek indemnity from any party that would otherwise be liable for that compensation. The application of relevant legal precedents, particularly regarding the distinction between tort claims and worker's compensation claims, indicates that courts may selectively reference certain cases based on the context of the claim. Notably, while courts often follow the Lushute decision in tort cases, they tend to adhere to specific statutory requirements in worker's compensation cases without necessarily citing Lushute, leading to discrepancies that remain unaddressed by higher courts or the legislature.