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Yi Qiang Yang v. U.S. Attorney General

Citation: 494 F.3d 1311Docket: 06-15742

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; July 12, 2007; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Yi Qiang Yang, a native and citizen of China, entered the U.S. illegally on September 28, 2001. During an entrance interview, he expressed his desire to come to America for better opportunities and indicated he feared potential jail time for lacking a passport, though he claimed he would not be harmed upon return. Yang was charged with removal for not possessing a valid entry document and conceded to this charge while applying for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.

At his asylum hearing, Yang testified about a "traditional marriage ceremony" with Jiang Hui Ling on July 15, 2000, although they could not legally marry due to their ages—Yang was 20 and Ling was 17. Following their marriage, Ling became pregnant in February 2001, and fearing government repercussions for their illegal status, they sought refuge at Yang's grandmother's house. However, family planning officials discovered Ling, forcibly took her for an abortion, and Yang attempted to rescue her but was beaten by officials. He escaped but learned later that Ling had been forced to abort.

Yang left China on September 25, 2001, providing corroborating evidence for his asylum claim, including a State Department country report, a hospital note confirming Ling's abortion, a subpoena from local authorities, a receipt for wedding rings, and a letter from his uncle about their traditional wedding. Additional support came from an affidavit and letter from Ling, detailing their marriage, her pregnancy, and the abortion experience, emphasizing the strict family planning policies in China.

On July 3rd, a call from Mom prompted concern due to her illness, leading to a rushed visit. After learning of her serious condition, the respondent was left home alone while Mom was hospitalized. Subsequently, seven individuals identifying as Family Planning Office officials forcibly attempted to take the respondent away. Despite struggling and pleading, the respondent was taken to Lianjiang County Hospital, where a nurse administered an injection, resulting in severe pain and a miscarriage. Upon regaining consciousness, the respondent learned that their mother had tried to intervene against the officials.

In the immigration proceedings, the judge found that Yang failed to demonstrate entitlement to asylum, as he did not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The judge referenced a prior case, Matter of C-Y-Z, which allows for claims of persecution based on a spouse's forced abortion. However, Yang could not prove he had a legally recognized marriage in China, as he self-identified as single and did not provide evidence of traditional marriage recognition by the Chinese government. Consequently, the judge concluded that Yang's claim did not meet the necessary criteria.

The judge also deemed Yang's account of the encounter with family planning officials insufficiently serious to qualify as persecution. Additionally, Yang's credibility was questioned due to inconsistencies in his testimony, negating his claims of future persecution. The judge further ruled that Yang did not demonstrate that he had been tortured or would likely be tortured upon return to China, leading to the dismissal of his CAT claim. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the judge's decision, reiterating that a legally recognizable marriage is essential for spousal claims under Matter of C-Y-Z and affirming doubts about Yang's credibility based on his inconsistent statements.

The BIA determined that Yang's testimony about his encounter with family planning officials should be disregarded. Yang is petitioning for a review of the BIA's decision concerning his asylum and withholding of removal claims, arguing several points: 1) the BIA's differing treatment of lawfully married versus traditionally married couples infringes on the Equal Protection Clause; 2) the adverse credibility finding by the BIA lacks support from the record; 3) the BIA's classification of Yang and Ling's marriage as not a spousal relationship misinterprets the refugee statute, specifically 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42), and the C-Y-Z decision; 4) the conclusion that he was not persecuted for resisting China's population control program is not substantiated by the record.

Under 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1), asylum may be granted to individuals who meet the definition of a "refugee," which includes those unable or unwilling to return to their country due to persecution based on various factors. Yang did not challenge the BIA's denial of relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), effectively abandoning that issue.

The BIA's factual findings are assessed using the substantial evidence test, requiring affirmation if supported by reasonable and probative evidence. Yang's argument regarding equal protection cannot be addressed because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies by presenting it to the BIA. Consequently, the court lacks jurisdiction to consider this claim.

Regarding the adverse credibility finding, Yang contends that discrepancies between his initial airport interview and later statements do not necessarily undermine his credibility, referencing that other circuits have established reliability criteria for airport interviews.

The airport interview is recognized as a limited opportunity for asylum seekers to express their fears, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) must consider these limitations when assessing the credibility of an applicant's claims. In Balasubramanrim v. INS, inconsistencies between an airport statement and subsequent testimony cannot solely undermine credibility. Although Yang presented supporting evidence for his claims, he failed to demonstrate that the BIA's denial of asylum was not backed by substantial evidence.

Yang challenges the BIA's position that only legally married spouses qualify for protection under the family planning provisions of the refugee statute (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)). The BIA, in In re C-Y-Z, established that a spouse of a woman who faced forced abortion or sterilization could claim past persecution. However, in In re S-L-L, the BIA declined to extend this protection to unmarried partners. The reasoning was that legal marriage reflects a greater responsibility regarding family planning decisions, which complicates the evaluation of a non-married father's accountability and recognition by local authorities.

Yang argues that this legal marriage requirement is unreasonable, but the BIA’s interpretations receive Chevron deference if reasonable. Under Chevron, when Congress has not made an unambiguous statement, agency interpretations are given weight. The BIA's interpretation limiting the definition of "spouse" to those who are legally married was deemed reasonable, as Congress did not explicitly address this issue in the statute.

Legal marriage is characterized by a sanctity and long-term commitment that distinguishes it from other forms of cohabitation, with significant implications for responsibility regarding family planning decisions. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) noted that benefits associated with marriage are prevalent in various legal contexts, making reliance on marital status in asylum cases not arbitrary. Paternity is automatically presumed for children born to married couples, whereas establishing paternity for aborted children is more complex, particularly for asylum claims based on family planning refugee status where the parents lack a legal relationship.

The BIA stated that using marital status helps identify individuals whose reproductive and emotional well-being has been compromised due to forced abortions or sterilizations. Alternative rules would lead to practical challenges that the BIA aimed to avoid. Two circuit court rulings recognized couples who completed marriage formalities but could not legally marry due to age restrictions as married for asylum purposes; however, these rulings predated the BIA’s definitive S-L-L interpretation and thus hold minimal precedential weight.

Following a Chevron analysis, the BIA found the requirement for an applicant to be "legally married" to the mother of an aborted child reasonable. Consequently, a male must be legally married under his country’s laws to claim refugee status due to forced abortion. In this case, Yang’s traditional marriage to Ling was not legally acknowledged in China, disqualifying him from claiming refugee status.

Yang also argued that he qualifies as a refugee under the provision for those persecuted for resistance to coercive population control programs, despite not being legally married. The BIA clarified that while the C-Y-Z holding pertains to legally married couples, unmarried partners in committed relationships might also demonstrate persecution based on resistance to coercive family planning. Resistance encompasses various actions against government policies, and the Ninth Circuit has established that physical or vocal opposition to birth control officials can substantiate claims of resistance.

An applicant claiming persecution due to an unmarried partner’s abortion must demonstrate harm that amounts to persecution related to their resistance to family planning laws. This includes showing past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA outlined factors to assess the closeness of the relationship, such as shared children, cohabitation duration, public recognition as a committed couple, financial interdependence, and evidence of the relationship's ongoing existence.

In Yang's case, the BIA found he did not prove his claim of persecution related to his resistance against a coercive population control program or his partner's alleged forced abortion. Despite evidence of a close relationship and Yang resisting family planning officials, the evidence did not compel a conclusion of persecution. Yang experienced a physical altercation, was subpoenaed, and was sought by officials, but he was never detained or physically harmed. The State Department’s reports indicated that while fines were imposed for violating family planning laws in his province, there were no confirmed instances of physical force related to abortions. Therefore, Yang was not deemed to have suffered past persecution or to have a well-founded fear of future persecution upon return to China.

Consequently, his petition for asylum was denied as he failed to meet the necessary standards for both asylum and withholding of removal. The petition was dismissed in part and denied in part.