Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; May 1, 2002; Federal Appellate Court
Timothy Johnston appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition by the District Court after being convicted of first-degree murder and armed criminal action in Missouri in 1991, resulting in a death sentence. Following his conviction, Johnston pursued a direct appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court and filed a pro se post-conviction relief motion under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15, which was later amended by appointed counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief in September 1996, and the Missouri Supreme Court upheld both the conviction and the denial of post-conviction relief. Johnston subsequently sought habeas corpus relief in the District Court, which was denied. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a certificate of appealability on seven issues raised by Johnston.
The court's review was governed by the standards outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Under these standards, habeas relief can only be granted if the state court's adjudication was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it contradicts Supreme Court precedent or reaches a materially opposite conclusion. The court highlighted that even if the state court's application of law seems erroneous, relief cannot be granted unless the decision is unreasonable. The Eighth Circuit applies a clear error standard to factual findings and reviews legal questions de novo.
Johnston contends that the Missouri trial court infringed upon his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide clear jury instructions in response to a question from the jury during deliberations. He argues that the Missouri Supreme Court's rejection of this claim constitutes an unreasonable application of established federal law, as the trial court's response may have led the jury to reach a guilty verdict without a unanimous finding on all essential elements of the first-degree murder charge.
During the trial, the jury was instructed that to convict Johnston of first-degree murder, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he caused his wife's death with awareness of his actions and after deliberation. The jury was also told that a unanimous agreement was necessary for their verdict. When the jury inquired whether unanimity was required on each element to reach a unanimous verdict, Johnston suggested a simple affirmative response, but the court, over his objections, instructed them to refer to the existing instructions. The jury returned a guilty verdict two and a half hours later.
The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the trial court's actions, stating that the jury was not misled to Johnston's detriment, as the instructions provided were clear. The District Court concurred, finding no ambiguity in the jury instructions. Johnston, citing case law, argues that the trial court's response created a "reasonable likelihood" of misapplication of the law by the jury, warranting habeas relief. However, he acknowledges that the instructions did not misstate the law, unlike the situation in the precedent case he referenced. He correctly cites the standard from Boyde for cases involving ambiguous jury instructions, which requires showing that the instruction created a likelihood of preventing consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.
Johnston's claim is unsupported by the facts of Boyde, as the Supreme Court determined that the jury instructions were not prone to erroneous interpretation. Both the District Court and the current ruling found that Johnston failed to identify any "clearly established federal law" indicating that the Missouri Supreme Court unreasonably concluded the trial court's guilt-phase instructions were unambiguous and did not hinder the jury's consideration of relevant evidence. Johnston's argument, based on the jury's question and the court's response, does not meet the AEDPA standard for relief. Additionally, Johnston's reference to Weeks v. Angelone is misguided; Weeks clarifies it is not a constitutional error for a judge to direct the jury to a specific instruction, thus failing to support Johnston's claims against the Missouri Supreme Court's decision.
As for ineffective assistance of counsel, the Missouri Supreme Court applied the Strickland standard, determining that counsel is ineffective only if their performance fell below reasonable competence and affected trial outcomes. During the penalty phase, Johnston's attorney presented testimony from eleven witnesses, including jail staff who attested to his good behavior and family members who discussed his troubled childhood and alcohol issues. Johnston contended that his counsel failed to investigate and present significant mitigating evidence, particularly from mental health experts evaluated before trial and a private psychiatrist consulted prior to his wife’s murder. The absence of this testimony led Johnston to argue he received ineffective assistance, resulting in prejudice against him.
The Missouri Supreme Court ruled that Johnston did not experience ineffective assistance of counsel, as his attorney's choices regarding witness testimony were deemed "informed and strategic." Johnston contended that the court misapplied the Strickland test by not recognizing that his counsel's decision to forgo presenting mental health and other expert testimony was unreasonable. At a subsequent Rule 29.15 hearing, Johnston's attorney acknowledged awareness of the mental health experts and their evaluations indicating Johnston's alcohol dependence, prior head injuries, and personality disorder, which contributed to his emotional disturbances. The attorney opted not to call these experts due to inconsistencies in their reports and references to other criminal behavior by Johnston, as well as concerns that the testimonies would not favorably impact the case.
Additionally, the attorney did not pursue further evaluations as he relied on the existing expert reports. He assessed the risks and benefits of calling these witnesses and ultimately decided against it, a choice supported by the Missouri Supreme Court's findings that it stemmed from a thorough investigation of the facts. The court concluded that such strategic decisions are rarely subject to challenge if informed by reasonable professional judgment. Johnston also argued that his attorney neglected to investigate other potential expert witnesses related to his alcohol abuse and childhood, but the court found no individual grounds for these additional claims to suggest a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Ultimately, the Missouri Supreme Court determined that the absence of this additional testimony would not have altered the sentencing phase, affirming its decision as consistent with established federal law. Consequently, Johnston is not entitled to habeas relief on these grounds.
Johnston contends that the Missouri Supreme Court erred in its factual finding regarding the cumulative nature of lay testimony that should have been presented at trial. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), state court factual determinations are presumed correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Johnston has failed to meet this burden, as the witnesses he claims should have testified would have reiterated information already provided by family members and city jail workers about his troubled childhood, drinking issues, and work history. The Missouri Supreme Court reasonably determined that this testimony was duplicative.
Johnston also compares his case to Williams v. Taylor, arguing that he is entitled to habeas relief based on established federal law. However, the comparison fails because, unlike in Williams, Johnston's attorney did not lack preparation; instead, he made a strategic decision not to present certain witnesses after interviewing them. Additionally, the Missouri Supreme Court properly applied the Strickland test to Johnston's claims, unlike the Virginia Supreme Court in Williams.
Consequently, the Missouri Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply the Strickland standard regarding Johnston's ineffective-assistance claim, nor did it err in concluding that much of the mitigating evidence Johnston sought to introduce was duplicative. Therefore, Johnston's claims do not satisfy the criteria for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
During the penalty phase, the State's witnesses testified about four instances of Johnston's violent behavior, which Johnston argues should not have been admitted under Missouri law. He claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this evidence, and this claim is also evaluated under the Strickland standard.
In habeas corpus proceedings, the court emphasizes that it does not reexamine state-court decisions on state-law issues, focusing instead on compliance with federal constitutional standards. Johnston argues for habeas relief based on the admission of evidence regarding prior unconvicted crimes, claiming his trial counsel's failure to object was a critical error. However, the Missouri Supreme Court dismissed his claim, affirming that the evidence was not objectionable under state law, thus concluding there was no Strickland prejudice from the lack of objection.
Johnston's second claim involves his counsel's failure to object to alleged improper statements made by the prosecutor during closing arguments. He asserts these remarks significantly impacted the jury's decision regarding his guilt and sentencing. The Missouri Supreme Court evaluated four specific statements and determined they were not improper, ruling that counsel's failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance. Johnston contends the court's findings misapplied federal law and misrepresented facts. However, the trial transcript indicates that counsel did object to several remarks, which are not part of his ineffective-assistance claim.
For the remaining statements, Johnston fails to provide precedent indicating their impropriety under federal law or demonstrate sufficient prejudice to warrant habeas relief. The court finds no relevant Supreme Court cases that align closely with Johnston's claims and concludes he has not shown any unreasonable factual determinations by the Missouri Supreme Court. Consequently, Johnston is denied habeas relief on these grounds.
Johnston contends that his confession regarding his wife's murder should have been suppressed due to its acquisition through the exploitation of evidence obtained from an illegal warrantless search of his home. The Missouri Supreme Court determined that while police were initially lawfully present in Johnston's home due to his invitation, the trial court incorrectly failed to suppress a .22 caliber rifle found under the sofa and a bloody pair of jeans located under his stepson's bed, as these items were not in plain view. Despite this, the court ruled that their admission did not necessitate a reversal of Johnston's conviction, as there was no reasonable probability that the errors influenced the trial's outcome. The court further refuted Johnston's claim that the illegally seized items tainted his confession, emphasizing that he mentioned the bloody jeans prior to being aware they had been found by police, thus indicating that the confession was not derived from the illegally obtained evidence. Johnston argues that the court's decision represents an unreasonable factual determination and conflicts with established federal law regarding confessions. He cites a detective's trial statement indicating disbelief in Johnston's account and inconsistency with witness testimonies to support his claim. However, the court found no contradictory evidence to undermine its conclusion that Johnston was not confronted with the discovery of the rifle or jeans prior to his confession. As a result, the court upheld that Johnston's confession was legally obtained. Johnston also claims that the District Court improperly denied his request for an evidentiary hearing on his § 2254 petition, asserting that under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), such a hearing is only permitted if he demonstrates his case meets specific exceptions, which he failed to do.
The initial consideration is whether the petitioner, Johnston, failed to develop his claim in state court. A petitioner is not deemed to have 'failed to develop' relevant facts if they diligently sought but were denied the opportunity to present evidence. Johnston requested an evidentiary hearing in the District Court to further develop two claims: the improper admission of illegally seized evidence during his trial's penalty phase, which he argues violated his constitutional rights, and the existence of additional mitigating evidence that his counsel failed to present. The District Court denied this request, concluding that no grounds of Johnston's petition required further evidentiary development and that he did not meet the standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).
The review of the District Court's decision is based on whether there was an abuse of discretion. It is accepted that Johnston diligently pursued his claims in state court. Although § 2254(e)(2) does not preclude an evidentiary hearing, such a hearing can be denied if it would not aid in resolving Johnston's claims. Even if Johnston's factual assertions are true, they must demonstrate that the Missouri Supreme Court acted contrary to or unreasonably applied established federal law for relief to be warranted.
Johnston asserts that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to support his claim regarding the admission of a revolver and ammunition during his trial. However, he acknowledges that the trial court excluded this evidence due to lack of connection to him, and the mere fact that the jury may have seen the items does not prove prejudice requiring a mistrial. The Missouri Supreme Court noted that sustaining the objection indicated the impropriety of the State's evidence attempt. Johnston has not clarified how the facts he wishes to establish would provide a basis for relief, and since the evidence was not actually admitted, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the evidentiary hearing request.
Johnston claims he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to support his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument, specifically regarding trial counsel's omission of mitigating evidence related to his mental health and diminished capacity. He contends that an MRI, which was denied during his state post-conviction proceedings, is crucial to substantiate his claim of ineffective assistance. However, the court determined that the existing record sufficed to resolve the claim without further hearings. Testimony during the post-conviction relief hearing indicated that Johnston's counsel consulted mental health experts and did not request an MRI, with one expert asserting no evidence of gross brain damage. The court ruled that the determination of whether Johnston suffers from brain damage is irrelevant to the effectiveness of his trial counsel's representation and that counsel's strategic decisions were reasonable. Consequently, the court affirmed the denial of Johnston's habeas corpus petition, rejecting his claims of misapplication of the Boyde test and due process violations related to the jury's inquiries, noting that the Missouri Supreme Court had upheld the trial court's actions.
Johnston presents a Hicks due process argument, which is rejected based on prior discussions regarding another claim. The State contends that an appeal on the denial of an evidentiary hearing is barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) due to a failure to exhaust state remedies; however, this argument is deemed meritless, referencing Parker v. Kemna, where a district court's denial was reviewed on its merits. Johnston's focus is on establishing prejudice from his counsel's performance, but without demonstrating that his trial counsel's representation was constitutionally inadequate, the court does not need to consider the prejudice question. Johnston has not proven that the Missouri Supreme Court unreasonably concluded his counsel met constitutional standards regarding mental health mitigating evidence.
Judge Heaney dissents, agreeing with the majority on guilt phase issues but advocating for a new penalty phase trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel during that stage. He notes the prosecution characterized Johnston as a violent individual deserving of the death penalty, highlighting multiple violent incidents before the jury. The prosecution made inflammatory statements, labeling Johnston as a "murderous animal" and "Satan," which, while not sufficient to violate due process, negatively influenced the jury's perception of him. He emphasizes that mitigating evidence, including Johnston's mental health issues and alcohol dependency, was not presented by his counsel, who instead offered testimony that did not adequately address or explain Johnston's violent behavior. Although the counsel's decision was deemed tactical, the key issue is whether their choices were reasonable under the circumstances.
Counsel's failure to introduce available evidence regarding Johnston's mental health and history of head injuries is critiqued. Dr. Sam Parwatikar, appointed for a pretrial evaluation, indicated that Johnston's medical records showed a history of head injuries, borderline personality disorder, and alcohol abuse, contributing to his inability to control anger and emotional distress at the time of the murder. The Missouri Supreme Court deemed counsel's decision not to call Dr. Parwatikar as appropriate, citing concerns over the negative implications of Johnston's violent past. However, it is argued that Dr. Parwatikar's conclusions about the effects of Johnston's documented conditions should not have been dismissed based solely on Johnston's account of the murder. Additionally, counsel did not present testimony from Dr. Sean Yutzy, who would have highlighted Johnston's head injuries and antisocial personality disorder, nor from Dr. Fred Gaskin, who diagnosed Johnston with alcohol dependency and a history of head trauma. Both doctors’ potential testimonies would have supported the argument that Johnston's mental state significantly impacted his behavior during the crime.
Dr. Gaskin concluded that Johnston's injuries were indicative of post trauma head syndrome or organic brain syndrome, leading to impaired brain function. The Missouri Supreme Court criticized Gaskin's conclusions as flawed, noting they relied solely on Johnston's personal account without independent corroboration. Despite this, there was no evidence to suggest Johnston was dishonest about his life events, and his history of head injuries and alcohol abuse was well established. During the trial, Johnston was portrayed negatively, and his counsel had a duty to present mitigating evidence to potentially influence the jury against the death penalty. The absence of a credible explanation for Johnston's violent behavior contributed to the jury's perception, and the testimony of three doctors could have provided that explanation. The failure to introduce this mitigating evidence was deemed unreasonable, as it likely affected the jury's decision, with a substantial chance that at least one juror might have opposed the death penalty, allowing for a possible life sentence instead. Consequently, a remand for a new penalty phase trial was recommended. During cross-examination, Dr. Parwatikar acknowledged Johnston's competency and past violent behavior, which led Johnston’s counsel to decide against calling him as a witness.
