United States v. William C. Campbell

Citations: 491 F.3d 1306; 100 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5877; 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 16722Docket: 06-13548

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; July 13, 2007; Federal Appellate Court

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William C. Campbell, former mayor of Atlanta, appeals his convictions and sentences for tax fraud, raising two key issues: the alleged disqualification of his chosen counsel, claiming it violated his Sixth Amendment rights, and the reasonableness of his 30-month concurrent prison sentences. The appeal originates from a July 13, 2007 ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, affirming both the convictions and sentences.

The indictment against Campbell, issued two and a half years after he left office, included charges of racketeering under RICO, accepting cash payments in connection with City business transactions, and tax fraud. Specifically, Campbell was accused of soliciting undocumented payments from individuals and businesses for favorable treatment, including a significant $55,000 transaction for computer system contracts and payments linked to a liquor license approval. He also allegedly hired an assistant to manage personal matters, including collecting corrupt payments, and concealed these transactions as campaign contributions used for personal expenses. Mail and wire fraud were committed alongside under-reporting income to the IRS from 1997 to 1999. 

The case's corruption scope was substantial, with multiple officials and business associates implicated, many of whom pleaded guilty or were convicted. Campbell's request to add attorney Craig A. Gillen to his defense was opposed by the government due to potential conflict of interest stemming from Gillen's law partner representing a key witness against Campbell. The district court upheld this disqualification. Ultimately, Campbell was acquitted of RICO and bribery charges but convicted on tax fraud counts.

Campbell was found guilty by a jury of mail fraud related to campaign contribution solicitation, despite not being separately charged for that crime. Following a sentencing hearing, he received a 30-month prison term, 12 months of supervised release, and a $6,000 fine. Campbell appealed this decision, challenging the district court's disqualification of his attorney, Gillen, claiming it violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. He argued that the court's interest in public confidence was insufficient to justify the disqualification, particularly since Gillen had not represented another party involved and Campbell had waived any potential conflict. The standard of review for disqualification is abuse of discretion, allowing the court a range of choices as long as it does not clearly err in judgment. While the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to counsel, this right is not absolute and may be limited in cases of actual conflicts of interest. If an attorney in a firm has a conflict, it is imputed to all attorneys within that firm, potentially leading to disqualification. The court will assess whether Gillen’s partner, Parker, had any actual or serious potential conflict that necessitated Gillen's disqualification.

Disqualification of a defense attorney is warranted when the subject matter of their prior representation is substantially related to their current representation, as it may create divided loyalties that hinder effective defense. If an attorney's conflict of interest could lead to improper use of privileged communications or deter rigorous cross-examination to protect those communications, disqualification is appropriate to maintain the integrity of the judicial system. In this case, Parker, who previously defended Greene on related corruption charges, had an actual conflict of interest that justified his disqualification, as did Gillen. Although Campbell had the option to waive this conflict, the district court was not obligated to accept such a waiver, especially since Greene refused to waive attorney-client privilege, presenting a stronger case for disqualification compared to previous rulings. The district court properly considered and rejected Campbell's proposed alternatives to disqualification, demonstrating that its decision was well-reasoned and within its discretion.

Following the trial, the district court sentenced Campbell to 30 months in prison (concurrent for each count), 12 months of supervised release, and a $6,000 fine. The court issued a detailed sentencing order addressing Campbell’s objections to the pre-sentence investigation report and relied on the 1998 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines to establish a base offense level of 13 based on the amount of tax loss to the government.

The district court applied a total increase of six levels to Campbell's offense level, based on three factors: two levels for failing to report income over $10,000 from criminal activity, two levels for using sophisticated means to conceal his fraud, and two for obstruction of justice. The court rejected the government's requests to increase the base offense level for abuse of a position of trust and disruption of governmental function. It also denied Campbell's request for a downward departure due to his public service, stating that such service is typically not relevant for determining departures. Consequently, Campbell's total offense level was set at 19, placing him in criminal history category I, which resulted in a recommended prison sentence of 30 to 37 months.

In its sentencing order, the district court considered additional factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553, focusing on those of particular importance, including Campbell's attempts to minimize his crimes and the need to deter public officials from criminal conduct. Despite these considerations, the court imposed only the minimum sentence within the Guidelines range. The court acknowledged Campbell's achievements as mayor and his commitment to his children while also taking into account sentences imposed on other defendants in the same investigation, along with general sentencing patterns for tax offenses.

Campbell challenged the district court's calculation of the Guidelines range and the reasonableness of his sentences, arguing they were procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The review for reasonableness is deferential, focusing on whether the sentence meets the purposes outlined in § 3553(a). The burden of proof lies with the party challenging the sentence, and while sentences within the Guidelines range are not presumed reasonable in this circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that a properly calculated sentence within this range is likely to be reasonable.

A sentence can be assessed for procedural or substantive unreasonableness following the decision in Booker. A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if it does not adhere to Booker’s requirements, irrespective of the sentence imposed. Campbell argues that the district court's use of conduct from acquitted charges was excessively unconstitutional, yet he does not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence for the district court's factual findings. He acknowledges precedent allowing consideration of such conduct in sentencing. Campbell contends that the reliance on acquitted conduct breached his constitutional rights, citing limits inferred from Booker and Blakely. However, it is noted that while constitutional limits exist regarding acquitted conduct, they do not prohibit its consideration if the sentence aligns with the jury's verdict, as established in Duncan, which reaffirmed that Booker does not undermine existing precedents. Campbell, convicted of tax fraud under 26 U.S.C. § 7206, received concurrent 30-month sentences and a $6,000 fine, which do not exceed statutory maximums. The court concludes that the district court’s reliance on acquitted conduct did not violate Campbell’s rights and demonstrated leniency. Additionally, Campbell alleges that the district court failed to properly consider the mandates of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and claims an erroneous calculation of the Guidelines range. The court reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error and interprets its application of the Guidelines de novo.

Campbell contests the district court's tax loss calculation affecting his base offense level, asserting it was not a reasonable estimate. However, he fails to provide legal authority for this claim, rendering it insufficient for appellate review. Additionally, he argues that the evidence did not support a finding that he used sophisticated means to conceal his tax fraud. The district court determined that Campbell's use of campaign accounts and third-party credit cards was a deliberate effort to hide his fraud, contrary to Campbell’s assertion that the evidence only showed unusual spending patterns. The court found that his methods were as sophisticated as those in prior cases and noted that the absence of offshore accounts or fictitious entities did not diminish the sophistication of his concealment. 

Furthermore, Campbell challenges the sufficiency of evidence for a willful obstruction of justice finding. Testimony from Gabe Pascarella indicated that Campbell actively sought to conceal evidence during the government's investigation. Pascarella's account was deemed credible by the district court, which preferred it over Campbell's uncorroborated affidavit. The court concluded that Campbell intended to conceal material evidence, fulfilling the criteria for obstruction of justice.

The district court's decision to increase Campbell's base offense level for obstruction of justice was upheld, with the court finding Campbell's procedural reasonableness arguments to lack merit. The court confirmed that the district court properly considered the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and that the imposed sentences were not greater than necessary, despite uncertainty about whether they fully met sentencing purposes. 

Campbell's claims for overturning his sentences, based on his status as a first offender, public service, and comparative sentencing statistics, were rejected. The court noted that Campbell, despite being convicted only once, faced three separate counts of tax fraud over three years and actively impeded the government's prosecution. His position as a lawyer and former federal prosecutor while serving as mayor further undermined his argument against recidivism. 

Campbell's assertion that his sentences disrespected the jury trial system was also dismissed, as the district court's decisions were based on his failure to acknowledge his wrongdoing, not the jury's acquittal on more severe charges. The potential maximum penalties for the charges he faced were highlighted, demonstrating that his actual sentences were lenient. 

After reviewing the record and applicable sentencing factors, the court found Campbell's sentences to be substantively reasonable and affirmed both his convictions and sentences. The district court's disqualification of Campbell's counsel was also deemed appropriate.