Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; April 29, 2002; Federal Appellate Court
Marco Burton appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence following his conditional guilty plea to illegal possession of firearms and narcotics. He claims his arrest lacked probable cause and that the subsequent search of his house was warrantless and unjustified under the Fourth Amendment. The Court affirms the District Court's decision but bases its ruling on different grounds. It finds that Burton's arrest was justified by probable cause. Additionally, even if the arrest were not justified, the warrantless seizure of his vehicle was permissible under the automobile or Place exceptions to the warrant requirement. The Court also concludes that the search warrant for Burton's home was supported by probable cause, despite a potentially unreasonable protective sweep conducted earlier.
On January 26, 1999, the Philadelphia Police Department and DEA Task Force were investigating the Darien Street Drug Organization, using a confidential informant to purchase drugs from Melvin Santiago, a suspected drug distributor. During the informant’s attempt to buy drugs, he and the Task Force inadvertently interrupted a significant drug transaction between Santiago and Burton, leading to Burton's arrest. The informant was equipped with a microphone, allowing the Task Force to monitor conversations. Upon arriving at Santiago’s residence, the informant was initially unable to meet him but later observed stacks of money being counted inside the house, which contributed to the probable cause determination for the search warrant.
An informant, after being denied entry to a residence, learned from individuals outside that Santiago was involved in a significant drug deal. Following a wait, the informant negotiated a purchase of an ounce of cocaine from Santiago, who directed an associate to facilitate the sale elsewhere to avoid interference with the ongoing transaction. After the sale, the informant observed Marco Burton leaving the residence with a plastic bag, which he placed in the trunk of a black Nissan Maxima before making a phone call and driving away.
Task Force officers tracked the Maxima, and Officer Dennis Bauer, on patrol, engaged Burton as he exited the vehicle. Burton appeared to reach for a concealed object, prompting Bauer to draw his firearm and instruct him to stop. After a tense moment, Burton complied and was subjected to a pat-down search. He was evasive about his identity and offered no documentation for the car, claiming he had recently acquired it. He was placed in a police vehicle while the Task Force investigated further.
During this time, Officer Bauer observed Maurice Smith acting suspiciously from a second-floor window of Burton's stated residence. Smith eventually spoke with Task Force agents and identified Marco as living there. Upon Smith's consent, agents briefly surveyed the house and discovered drug paraphernalia, including a scale and substances suspected to be cocaine. After Burton had been detained for some time, a drug-sniffing dog was requested to inspect the Maxima.
A trained drug-sniffing dog alerted to the trunk of a vehicle, a Maxima, prompting the Task Force to seek search warrants for both the vehicle and a residence at 2543 North Garnet Street. Philadelphia Police Officer Daniel McEwen provided a signed affidavit detailing the investigation, the seizure of a suspect named Burton, and the dog's alert. Based on this affidavit, search warrants were granted, leading to the discovery of $45,608 and a Ruger 9mm handgun in the Maxima's trunk, along with significant quantities of cocaine and firearms in the North Garnet residence. Burton was indicted on multiple charges, including drug possession with intent to distribute and firearms offenses, and pleaded guilty conditionally to preserve his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence.
On appeal, Burton argues that the search warrants were invalid due to reliance on illegally obtained evidence, claiming he was arrested without probable cause, which tainted the subsequent searches. He requests that the court disregard specific paragraphs of the affidavit that detail the dog-sniffing and the evidence found after the allegedly unlawful search of his residence. The government contends that Burton was not formally arrested until the dog alerted to the car, asserting that the initial encounter was a lawful Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion. The District Court supported the government's position, concluding that the nature and duration of the seizure did not escalate to an arrest.
The District Court's determination regarding the least intrusive means of verifying an officer's suspicion is not necessary to address, as the Task Force had probable cause to arrest Burton based on information from a confidential informant and direct observations made on Darien Street. The presence of probable cause negates the need to evaluate the legality of the Terry stop. Additionally, the Task Force had valid grounds for conducting a search of the vehicle under the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement and the "Place exception" for temporary seizures, meaning the results of the canine inspection were not tainted by any illegality stemming from Burton's arrest.
The Task Force's observations provided probable cause for arresting Burton without a warrant in a public place, as law enforcement is permitted to do when they have probable cause that a felony has been committed. Probable cause is described as a flexible standard dependent on the specifics of the situation, requiring merely that the officers have trustworthy information sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe a crime has occurred or is occurring.
In this instance, the Task Force knew from the informant that a substantial drug deal was occurring at a specified location, where a significant amount of cash was observed being counted, and the involvement of a known drug dealer was confirmed. The clandestine nature of the transaction and the informant's successful cocaine purchase from the dealer’s associate further supported the inference of a drug transaction, thereby establishing the necessary probable cause for the arrest.
A reasonably prudent observer would conclude that a significant drug transaction was occurring involving Santiago and two men at 2851 Darien Street. Although Burton's association with known drug dealers alone does not establish probable cause, the cumulative evidence supported a reasonable inference of a felony. This assessment is informed by the Task Force's experience with similar transactions, indicating that from a law enforcement perspective, Burton appeared involved in drug activity.
Burton contends that Officer Bauer lacked sufficient knowledge to establish probable cause for his arrest; however, it is established that an arresting officer can rely on the instructions of other officers who possess the necessary facts. The Task Force had enough information to justify probable cause for Burton's arrest, making his subsequent seizure by Officer Bauer reasonable.
Regarding the search of Burton's vehicle, he has not sufficiently linked his arrest to the canine sniffing or demonstrated that the evidence obtained was "fruit of the poisonous tree." He claims a temporal relationship among the arrest, seizure, and search, but the Supreme Court's exclusionary rule is based on whether evidence was obtained through exploitation of an initial illegality. The court applies a two-pronged inquiry: (a) the proximity of the illegal arrest to the evidence obtained, and (b) whether intervening circumstances sufficiently dissociate the evidence from the initial illegality.
The key points address the legal framework surrounding the admissibility of evidence obtained following potentially illegal police conduct. The first consideration is the degree of attenuation between the illegal conduct and the evidence in question, as noted by Justice Powell in Brown v. Illinois, emphasizing its fact-specific nature. The second consideration is the existence of an independent source for the evidence, as discussed in Murray v. United States. Under the independent source doctrine, evidence discovered lawfully, without being tainted by illegal actions, is deemed admissible.
In the case involving Burton, the argument arises concerning the legality of a canine sniff on his vehicle, the Maxima, following his arrest. The court finds it challenging to link the canine sniff to the alleged illegal arrest since Burton had vacated the vehicle prior to his seizure. Although there is speculation that the seizure of Burton might effectively have included the Maxima, the court notes that Burton did not claim he intended to use the vehicle at the time of his arrest, which weakens this argument.
Even if the canine sniff were considered a result of the illegal arrest, the evidence (money and a gun) would not be suppressed due to the Task Force having probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband, established by their observations of Burton's actions. The automobile exception allows for searches without a warrant when there is probable cause to suspect contraband, as established in Pennsylvania v. Labron and further supported by principles in Maryland v. Dyson and United States v. Ross.
The court concludes that when the Task Force intercepted Burton, they had sufficient probable cause to search the Maxima. However, rather than conducting an immediate search, they opted to secure the vehicle until a drug-sniffing dog could confirm the presence of contraband. This cautious approach aligns with Fourth Amendment standards, as the court states there is no constitutional difference between seizing a vehicle for a warrant and conducting an immediate search when probable cause exists, referencing Chambers v. Maroney.
The Task Force seized the Maxima pending a canine inspection without immediately searching it, which established an independent authority for the seizure distinct from the authority to arrest Burton. The presence of independent sources for the evidence means that excluding it would disadvantage the police, contrary to the exclusionary rule's goal of maintaining the status quo absent an illegality. The seizure was justified as Burton conceded the Task Force had reasonable suspicion to stop him; this suspicion extended to the vehicle potentially containing evidence of criminal activity. The Supreme Court's precedent allows for temporary seizure based on reasonable belief of contraband, as demonstrated in Place, where a ninety-minute seizure was deemed unreasonable due to lack of diligence. Here, the Task Force's thirty to forty-five-minute seizure was reasonable given their diligence in bringing a canine unit. Therefore, the search of the Maxima was lawful under both the automobile exception and the Place exception, affirming that the evidence should not be suppressed.
Regarding the search of Burton's house, the Government acknowledged the lack of a warrant for the initial "protective sweep," which is generally deemed unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. However, it noted that consensual searches are a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.
The Government contends that Smith had common authority over the property in question, thereby validly consenting to its search, referencing Illinois v. Rodriguez, which allows for warrantless searches based on reasonable, albeit incorrect, beliefs about common authority. Burton argues against this, indicating that Smith's admission of only occasionally staying at the property and its ownership by "Marco" undermines the validity of his consent and claims that the initial warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. He insists that any evidence gathered, specifically drug paraphernalia noted in the McEwen affidavit, should be excluded from consideration for a subsequent warrant.
However, it is concluded that even without the contested evidence, the Magistrate Judge had sufficient grounds to find probable cause for issuing a search warrant based on the remaining evidence in the McEwen affidavit, so the second search's findings need not be suppressed. Legal precedent indicates that if a warrant is validly issued based on probable cause, even if some information is tainted, the warrant itself remains intact. The validity of the McEwen affidavit, minus the disputed information, is assessed for probable cause, which requires a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found at the specified location. The inquiry emphasizes the connection between criminal conduct and the location rather than the individual involved, establishing that probable cause for an arrest does not inherently translate to probable cause for searching the arrestee's residence, though the two can be related. Notably, direct evidence linking a residence to criminal activity is not necessary to establish probable cause.
An affidavit does not require direct evidence linking a location to a crime for a search warrant to be issued; probable cause can be established through circumstantial evidence. Factors that support probable cause include the type of crime, the nature of items sought, and the suspect's opportunity for concealment. In this case, the McEwen affidavit, even after removing a challenged paragraph, sufficiently established probable cause to search 2543 North Garnet Street. Courts have consistently held that evidence related to drug dealing is often found where dealers reside, as they are likely to conceal illicit items at home. The inference that drug dealers store evidence at their residences is based on three premises: the suspect is a drug dealer, the location is associated with the dealer, and contraband related to drug activities is present. The evidence met these premises, particularly as the Task Force had probable cause to arrest Burton for drug-related offenses. Specific facts include observations of large cash amounts and Burton's connections to known dealers. The affidavit indicated that Burton lived at the address in question, corroborated by statements from both Burton and a third party, and supported by the fact that he parked his vehicle near the property. Additionally, a canine sniff of his car bolstered the inference of recent drug transactions.
The proximity of the defendants' residences to the crime scene supports the inference that these homes may contain evidence. Burton's travel from Darien Street to North Garnet Street suggests that his home was the destination for illegal drug proceeds. The common understanding that drug dealers typically store evidence at home is reinforced by the fact that Burton went directly home after the transaction. His evasive behavior regarding his address indicates potential deception, further implying the presence of contraband at his residence. Officer McEwen's affidavit, based on his experience, suggests that 2543 North Garnet Street was likely a stash house for drugs and related evidence, a conclusion supported by the Task Force's prior findings. The affidavit provided sufficient grounds for a valid search warrant, leading to the affirmation of Burton’s conviction. The District Court's decision to deny Burton's motion to suppress evidence is upheld. Additionally, the testimony indicates an unidentified male passenger was in the vehicle with Burton, but his role is unclear. The District Court's jurisdiction is established under 18 U.S.C. 3231, with appellate jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. 1291. A canine officer's alert to the vehicle's trunk further supports the investigation's findings.
A canine alert led to the discovery and seizure of drugs during a security sweep at 2543 N. Garnet Street, where officers found drug paraphernalia in plain view. The police did not search Burton's vehicle before obtaining a warrant; he had parked it on the street and exited before his arrest. Walking a narcotics-detection dog around the outside of the vehicle is not considered a search, as established in relevant case law. Although the government did not argue that Burton was arrested prior to the canine sniff, they could have contended that a search of the vehicle’s interior was permissible as part of a search incident to arrest, referencing New York v. Belton. The Supreme Court had previously accepted a case addressing this issue but did not reach a decision. The current decision does not resolve this question.
