Robert Webb, Individually, and for All Other Persons Similarly Situated Terry Sterkenburg Timothy Driscoll Lesa Coontz Frank Wallmuller Russell Howard Leslie Igou Joseph Uhrich Robert Friedly Kent Hall Peggy Knox Bill Lohr Jesse Fuller Jane Doe v. Ada County, State of Idaho Vaughn Killeen, Individually and in His Capacity of Sheriff of Ada County Gary Glenn Vern Bisterfelt John Bastida, Ada County Commissioners, Each Sued in His Individual and Official Capacities, and Richard Vernon, Individually and in His Capacity as Director of the Idaho Department of Corrections and Their Successors in Office, Robert Webb, Individually, and for All Other Persons Similarly Situated Terry Sterkenburg Timothy Driscoll Lesa Coontz Frank Wallmuller Leslie Igou Joseph Uhrich Robert Friedly Kent Hall Peggy Knox Bill Lohr Jesse Fuller Jane Doe Russell Howard v. Ada County, State of Idaho Vaughn Killeen, Individually and in His Capacity of Sheriff of Ada County Gary Glenn Vern Bisterfelt John Bastida, Ada County Commissioners, Eac

Citations: 285 F.3d 829; 2002 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2941; 2002 Daily Journal DAR 3601; 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 350; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 6025Docket: 00-35338

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; April 3, 2002; Federal Appellate Court

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Robert Webb and several plaintiffs filed a civil rights class action against Ada County, Idaho, alleging unconstitutional conditions in the Ada County Jail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court found the jail's overcrowding unconstitutional, leading to a partial summary judgment that favored Webb. Following this, Webb was awarded $244,308.00 in attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for his legal representation in the case. 

On appeal, Webb contested the district court's decision to award only a fraction of the post-judgment attorney's fees he requested. The court affirmed that the fees were compensable under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) since they were directly incurred in enforcing court-ordered relief related to violations of Webb's rights. However, it vacated and remanded part of the fee award, citing errors in the PLRA hourly rate determination and a lack of adequate justification for significant reductions in Webb’s requested fees.

The appeals involve multiple parties, including Ada County officials sued in both individual and official capacities, and the case was argued in March 2002, with the decision filed in April 2002. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, including Circuit Judges Alarcon and Silverman and District Judge Brewster, presided over the case.

After the district court's judgment, Webb's attorneys worked to enforce court orders linked to a consent decree, leading Webb to request attorney's fees for these services. The district court awarded him $9,495.00, recognizing partial success in his post-judgment efforts. Webb appealed, challenging the awarded amount. In **Webb v. Ada County, Idaho**, the appellate court affirmed the award but remanded for the district court to apply the rate cap provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to post-judgment fees incurred after the statute's effective date.

On remand, Ada County contested the post-judgment fees, claiming they were not compensable under the PLRA as they were not directly related to proving an actual violation of Webb's constitutional rights. The district court rejected this argument, ruling that the fees were indeed tied to enforcing court-ordered relief for constitutional violations. Upon applying the PLRA, the district court reduced the fees to $6,036.25 and awarded an additional $17,290.50 for services rendered since the initial fee award.

Both Ada County and Webb appealed the fee award, with their appeals consolidated. Ada County contended that the district court wrongly awarded fees for services after the PLRA's effective date. The appellate court reviews fee awards for abuse of discretion and legal interpretations de novo. The PLRA restricts attorney's fees in prisoner actions, stipulating that fees can only be awarded if they were directly and reasonably incurred in proving a constitutional violation or enforcing court-ordered relief.

Ada County argued that Webb failed to prove any constitutional violations post-judgment and thus should not receive fees for monitoring and enforcing the decree. The court disagreed, stating that Ada County's interpretation of the PLRA would invalidate the provision allowing fees incurred in enforcing relief. Under the PLRA, fees related to enforcement of previously established violations are compensable, even if no new violations are demonstrated.

Congress intended for plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees incurred in enforcing judgments when their constitutional rights have been violated. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), relief encompasses all forms approved by the court, including consent decrees. Webb's attorney fees related to post-judgment enforcement of the district court's orders and the consent decree are compensable under the PLRA. Ada County's claim that Webb is not entitled to these fees overlooks the district court's findings that the consent decree addressed violations of Webb's rights.

Subsequent to the PLRA's enactment, Ada County sought to terminate the consent decree, arguing it was noncompliant with PLRA requirements. The PLRA mandates the immediate termination of consent decrees unless the court finds that ongoing relief is necessary to address current violations of federal rights and that such relief is appropriately tailored. The district court denied Ada County's motion, confirming that the consent decree was necessary and appropriately limited to remedy the federal rights violations found prior to its approval.

Webb's attorney fees were justified as they were incurred in enforcing and monitoring the court's judgment and the consent decree, as well as in litigating requests for fees under the PLRA. The district court's ruling that these fees were compensable under the PLRA was upheld.

Regarding Webb's appeal, Ada County contests jurisdiction, claiming Webb's appeal was filed beyond the 30-day limit set by Fed. R.App. P. 4(a). Determining jurisdiction is essential as the 30-day period begins from the final judgment on Webb's motion to alter or amend, which was entered on August 18, 2000. Ada County argues the appeal period should start from the earlier order on June 26, 2000, suggesting that it was the relevant order under Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(iv).

When a district court denies a party's Rule 59 motion for a new trial, it does not need to issue a separate document labeled 'judgment' to initiate the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal, as established in *Hollywood*. The Rule 58 requirement for a separate document aims to prevent confusion regarding the conclusion of litigation, which is not a concern for denials of new trial motions. In this case, the district court's June 26, 2000, order partially granted and partially denied Webb's Rule 59(e) motion and instructed the parties to submit a proposed amended judgment within 14 days, distinguishing it from the *Hollywood* scenario. Webb's appeal was timely because the 30-day period commenced with the amended judgment filed on August 18, 2000.

Regarding the merits of Webb's appeal, he claims the district court erred in calculating attorney's fees. The review standard for attorney's fees is abuse of discretion, while legal analysis elements are reviewed de novo. A fee award only constitutes an abuse of discretion if it relies on an incorrect legal interpretation or a clearly erroneous factual finding. Webb argues that the district court improperly applied the PLRA's rate cap to fees associated with motions for contempt and discovery sanctions, asserting these should not be limited by the PLRA since they were awarded under 18 U.S.C. 401 and Fed. R.Civ. P. 37. However, these fees were related to Webb's underlying 1983 action, and the PLRA's intent was to minimize costs related to prisoner lawsuits, making it unlikely Congress intended only certain fees to be subject to the cap. The district court's application of the PLRA rates to these fees was not an abuse of discretion. Additionally, the district court applied the PLRA rate cap to all fees incurred after the PLRA's effective date, which Webb contests, claiming some were related to case merits rather than post-judgment monitoring.

Webb argues that the PLRA rate cap should not apply to fees related to the merits of a case, claiming it adversely affects attorneys' compensation expectations. He references the Supreme Court's decision in Martin v. Hadix, which established that the PLRA cap does not retroactively apply to post-judgment monitoring work performed before its effective date but does apply to such work thereafter. Webb contends that Martin's ruling does not negate his argument because it pertains only to post-judgment monitoring fees, not merits-related fees. However, the Martin Court concluded that the PLRA informed attorneys of adjusted hourly rates, making any expectation of pre-PLRA compensation unreasonable after April 26, 1996. The Court clarified that attorneys could choose not to perform services at the new rates, indicating the PLRA's future effect. Webb distinguishes his case by asserting that his counsel was ethically bound to continue representation until a final decision on the merits, but the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct allow withdrawal under financial burden. The attorneys did not seek to withdraw, and there is no evidence they were prohibited from doing so. The Martin decision's reasoning regarding the PLRA's non-retroactive effect applies broadly, confirming that fees incurred after the PLRA's effective date are subject to its rate cap. Thus, the district court properly applied the PLRA cap to all fees post-effective date. Additionally, Webb contends the district court used an incorrect hourly rate for attorney fees. He requested a baseline rate of $75, referencing the Judicial Conference's authorization, but the court set rates of $65 for in-court and $45 for out-of-court time, which are the rates for court-appointed counsel in Idaho. The PLRA restricts fees to a maximum of 150% of the hourly rate established under section 3006A for such counsel.

Under 18 U.S.C. 3006A, court-appointed counsel is compensated at a maximum of $60 per hour for in-court time and $40 per hour for out-of-court time, with the possibility of a higher rate of up to $75 per hour if determined justified by the Judicial Conference. Although the Judicial Conference approved the $75 rate for most districts, it was not implemented in the District of Idaho due to insufficient congressional funding. The district court rejected Webb's argument that $75 should be the baseline rate, interpreting the PLRA's payment provisions as linked to actual appropriations rather than future potential rates. This interpretation was deemed erroneous, as the PLRA specifies payment at the rate "established" under 18 U.S.C. 3006A, regardless of funding issues.

Webb challenged the district court’s substantial reduction of his requested post-judgment attorney's fees, asserting that the court failed to adequately explain its decisions regarding the reduced hours claimed for various motions. The court had awarded significantly fewer hours than requested, labeling some claims as "technical" and "excessive" without sufficient justification. While the district court has discretion in these matters, it must provide some rationale for its decisions to allow for meaningful appellate review. As the court did not adequately explain its reductions, a remand was ordered for a more thorough record.

Additionally, the district court awarded Webb's attorneys a higher rate of $125 per hour for work performed before the effective date of the PLRA on post-judgment matters, which Webb contended was inconsistent with the lower rate applied for work on the merits in a prior case.

The district court set an hourly rate of $125 for post-judgment attorney's fees, determining that the related issues were not complex and did not warrant the previous rate of $140 per hour from the merits phase of Webb I. The court considered prevailing community rates for similar legal work before the PLRA's enactment. It explained its rationale and exercised proper discretion in differing the rates for pre-PLRA post-judgment matters, referencing relevant case law. 

Webb contested the award of interest to Ada County on an overpayment of attorney's fees, arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 1961 restricts interest accrual to the date of judgment entry. However, the court found this argument unpersuasive since the interest was awarded due to a recalculation of an overpayment, not from a judgment. The court noted that Ada County was entitled to compensation for the deprivation of its funds due to the initial miscalculation.

The court affirmed that Webb's post-judgment attorney's fees are compensable under the PLRA but vacated and remanded parts of the attorney's fee award for recalculation using a baseline of $75 and for a detailed explanation of any reductions in compensable hours. Webb was granted attorney's fees for the appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and § 1997e(d)(1), with the amount to be determined by the district court. The final ruling affirmed part of the decision, vacated part, and remanded for further action, with each party bearing its own costs on appeal.

Honorable Rudi M. Brewster, Senior United States District Judge, is overseeing a case where Ada County is contesting the award of post-judgment attorney's fees to Webb. The fees in question arise from actions including contempt and sanctions motions, compliance monitoring with a consent decree, and various legal briefs related to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). 

Rule 4(a) stipulates that a notice of appeal in a civil case must be filed within 30 days after judgment unless specific exceptions apply, and that the timeframe for appeal can extend if certain motions are timely filed, including motions to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59. Rule 59(e) requires such motions to be filed within 10 days of the judgment entry.

The PLRA restricts attorney's fees in prisoner actions, stating that fees cannot exceed 150% of the hourly rate for court-appointed counsel. This cap applies only to fees incurred after the PLRA's effective date of April 26, 1996. The contested fees relate to work performed before this date, thus necessitating the application of pre-PLRA standards for determining reasonable hourly rates, as outlined in the case Chalmers.

Additionally, under Section 1961, interest on money judgments in civil cases is mandated from the date of judgment entry. A chart provided indicates discrepancies between the hours Webb claimed for various motions and those awarded by the court, showing a total of 144 hours requested but only 45 hours awarded, reflecting a 31% approval rate.