ANTHONY MARSHALL SPEARS v. TERRY STEWART, DIRECTOR OF THE ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AND CHARLES GOLDSMITH, WARDEN, ARIZONA STATE PRISON EYMAN COMPLEX
Docket: 01-99000
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; March 19, 2002; Federal Appellate Court
The case involves Anthony Marshall Spears as the petitioner-appellee against Terry Stewart and Charles Goldsmith as respondents-appellants, heard by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court's opinion, amended on March 20, 2002, determined two key points regarding Arizona's compliance with federal habeas corpus requirements under Chapter 154 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA): (1) July 17, 1998, was identified as the relevant date for assessing Arizona's compliance, which included provisions for reasonable litigation expenses and adequate competency standards for appointed counsel; however, (2) Arizona's offer of counsel did not meet the criteria set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2261 in other respects. The panel denied petitions for rehearing, with a notable dissent from several judges concerning the court's decision to override the Chief District Judge's findings and asserting that Arizona had never effectively complied with the relevant procedures under Chapter 154. The panel criticized the state for failing to adhere to its own procedures and highlighted that no other state had successfully opted into the Chapter 154 framework. Additionally, the panel issued an advisory opinion on Arizona's now-defunct compliance procedures, despite acknowledging their irrelevance to the case at hand.
The excerpt highlights a legal dispute regarding a panel's decision that failed to acknowledge the repeal of a crucial Arizona provision. The advisory nature of the panel's opinion did not impact the petitioner or any identifiable future petitioners, leading to a lack of support for an en banc rehearing despite requests from both parties. The author criticizes the procedural rules that prevent disclosure of voting results among judges, asserting that the public deserves transparency regarding judicial decision-making. The author disagrees with colleagues who deemed the case unworthy of en banc review, emphasizing that the panel's advisory opinion, while seemingly insignificant, could mislead district courts and other jurisdictions about its legal status. The panel's actual decision was routine, asserting that Arizona failed to appoint counsel for Spears in a timely manner, thus aligning Spears's habeas case with standard capital defendant procedures. However, the panel's advisory comments suggested Arizona had opted into Chapter 154 of AEDPA, which has critical implications for federal habeas review and could lead to significant changes in how capital defendants' rights are managed. The author warns that adopting the panel's erroneous views could result in serious consequences for future cases.
Chapter 154 imposes strict time limits for federal courts to resolve capital habeas cases, regardless of their complexity or challenges in obtaining evidence, which could disrupt court dockets, particularly in states like Arizona and California with large capital case backlogs. This raises constitutional concerns regarding the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches. The panel's decision that Arizona opted into Chapter 154's expedited procedures is deemed an advisory opinion, as it was unnecessary for resolving the case of Spears, who was entitled to the one-year AEDPA statute of limitations instead due to noncompliance with Arizona's statutory requirements for appointing counsel. The panel's statements regarding Arizona's opt-in status did not affect the case outcome and should have been avoided, following precedent that advises against addressing significant statutory questions unnecessarily. The panel's comments are characterized as dicta, which are statements not essential to the court's ruling.
In United States v. Crespo de Llano, the Ninth Circuit clarified that its earlier statement regarding the review of a district court's determination of a confession's voluntariness as a clear error was merely dictum, as the court ultimately ruled the confession was not involuntary under any standard. The panel's determination that Arizona successfully opted into the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) capital review procedures is deemed advisory because it relies on a now-repealed provision of Arizona's statutory scheme. The panel's ruling is criticized for not acknowledging that the crucial provision requiring timely appointment of counsel for indigent capital prisoners had been eliminated prior to the appeal's decision. This omission is significant, as the panel erroneously concluded that Arizona's former statutory framework satisfied AEDPA's requirements despite overwhelming evidence of non-compliance and the practical failure of Arizona's system to provide timely counsel. The repeal of the 15-day appointment requirement meant that Arizona's procedures no longer met the essential timeliness standard required for AEDPA's opt-in framework. Consequently, the panel's reliance on this defunct provision to assert compliance with Chapter 154 is fundamentally flawed, as Arizona was not compliant at the time of the ruling and remains non-compliant today.
The panel's decision is criticized for endorsing a statutory scheme that Arizona has abandoned due to its inability to comply with its provisions, which did not impact the outcome of the petitioner's claim. Arizona's former statutory framework failed to meet the requirements of Chapter 154, primarily because it lacked effective timeliness provisions, did not guarantee reasonable compensation for post-conviction review counsel, and did not ensure the appointment of competent counsel in capital cases.
Specifically, Arizona's statute restricts attorney compensation to a maximum of $100 per hour for up to 200 hours, requiring attorneys to demonstrate "good cause" to receive more. This limit has been deemed insufficient for the demands of capital post-conviction representation, as evidenced by research indicating that such cases typically require more than 200 hours of preparation. Arizona did not provide evidence to counter these findings, failing to meet its burden to demonstrate compliance with opt-in requirements.
Moreover, Arizona's scheme lacks a minimum hourly rate for compensation, which violates Chapter 154's requirement for reasonable compensation. Past rulings have indicated that significantly low compensation is inadequate, and while the statute allows for appeals regarding unreasonable rates, this does not satisfy the requirement for reasonable compensation standards. Additionally, Arizona's framework does not establish mandatory competency standards for appointing post-conviction review counsel, which is necessary for compliance with federal law.
Appointments of counsel in Arizona must adhere to 'mandatory and binding' competency standards established by statute or rule, as emphasized in Ashmus V, 202 F.3d at 1167. However, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 6.8(d) allows for an exception where an attorney who does not meet the established qualifications can be appointed with the Supreme Court's consent, provided that the attorney's experience and record significantly exceed the minimum standards, and they associate with a qualified attorney. This creates a discretionary loophole that undermines the requirement for binding competency standards, as it allows courts to bypass the mandatory qualifications based on subjective assessments of an attorney's qualifications.
The discretion afforded by the Rule is problematic because it permits courts to interpret what constitutes 'significantly exceed' the listed qualifications, potentially leading to arbitrary decisions. Furthermore, the requirement for association with a qualified attorney does not guarantee competent counsel for indigent defendants, as the term 'association' can encompass a wide range of involvement, from nominal to substantial participation.
The Arizona statutory scheme is criticized for permitting the appointment of post-conviction lawyers without any experience in capital cases, which is essential given the unique nature of such cases. Comparatively, other jurisdictions, such as Virginia, have faced similar scrutiny for lacking requirements for capital case experience, which impacts their eligibility for Chapter 154 procedures. Ultimately, Arizona's approach fails to provide binding and mandatory standards for the appointment of competent counsel in post-conviction reviews for indigent capital prisoners, relying instead on subjective criteria deemed appropriate by the courts.
The document critiques a judicial panel's decision regarding Arizona's opt-in status under the capital punishment procedure established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). It argues that the panel should not have addressed this significant issue in an advisory manner when it was not essential to the case's resolution. The opinion highlights that the provision on which the panel relied had never been effectively implemented and was removed from Arizona's statutes, a fact overlooked in the panel's ruling. Additionally, Arizona's legal framework inadequately compensates post-conviction counsel and lacks a system for appointing qualified counsel for indigent capital defendants. Consequently, Arizona does not meet the requirements for opt-in status under Chapter 154. The dissent expresses concern that the advisory opinion could lead to confusion for future courts, emphasizing the need for en banc rehearing.
Judge Kozinski, joined by several colleagues, critiques the practice of advising to ignore parts of a ruling, as it fosters confusion and undermines the stability of circuit caselaw. The dissent acknowledges the discretionary nature of judicial decisions on what issues to address, arguing that judges are not obligated to avoid potentially unnecessary questions and may choose to resolve them for valid reasons, despite disagreement among judges regarding what is necessary in a case.
Judges are required to analyze various legal questions that may ultimately be irrelevant to the case outcome, with certainty only achieved once the opinion is finalized and all judges have contributed. The efficiency and stability of the judiciary can be questioned: should judges discard unnecessary work or retain it in opinions to alleviate future burdens for judges and litigants? Different circumstances may yield different approaches, and there is no universally correct answer. Citing case law, such as Braunling v. Countrywide Home Loans and United States v. Chon, the text illustrates instances where courts addressed multiple legal questions rather than dismissing initial inquiries. The Supreme Court criticized the lower court in Katz v. United States for bypassing an essential constitutional rights analysis, emphasizing that even if not determinative, such inquiries can lay the groundwork for establishing clearly defined rights. Labeling parts of an opinion as “advisory” does not negate their precedential value; jurisdictional questions must be resolved while the case is pending, and the binding nature of the panel's opinion persists regardless of dissenting views. The legitimacy of addressing non-essential issues remains a topic for collegial debate, but later panels cannot disregard prior opinions simply by categorizing them as dicta. Established jurisprudence mandates that issues explicitly addressed in opinions remain binding, reinforcing the importance of judicial consistency and respect for previous rulings.
The Supreme Court established in Railroad Companies v. Schutte that a case's authority on a specific point remains valid even if other findings ultimately resolve the matter. The court emphasized that all aspects of the judgment, including properly presented and deliberated questions, are integral to the decision. Judges disagreeing with published opinions should seek en banc review rather than undermining the opinions, as this complicates legal interpretation for practitioners. The panel's opinion in the case was thoroughly addressed, voted on, and remains law of the circuit unless reversed by the Supreme Court or an en banc panel. Dissenting opinions, such as that of Judge Reinhardt, do not change the established law. Additionally, various states have not opted into certain legal frameworks as noted in multiple cited cases.
Arizona's statutory framework mandated the appointment of post-conviction counsel within 15 days post-direct review, but in Spears's case, counsel was appointed 1 year and 8 months after his direct appeal. This delay was noted as a routine issue within Arizona's procedures. Initially, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4(c) required timely appointment of counsel for indigent defendants, but this requirement was removed in 2000. The current rule stipulates that while counsel must be appointed after the Supreme Court affirms a capital conviction, there is no specified timeframe for this appointment. Consequently, Arizona's existing laws do not guarantee a timely appointment of counsel, rendering it inadequate for the state to qualify for opting into Chapter 154. Challenges in appointing counsel within the mandated timeframe were acknowledged in responses to petitions for rehearing.
Charles Hedlund, Roger Murray, Richard Hurles, Danny Jones, Darrel Lee, Michael Gallegos, James McKinney, Robert Towery, Levi Jackson, Kenneth Laird, David Hyde, Thomas Kemp, and Kevin Miles experienced significant delays in obtaining post-conviction counsel, ranging from 1 year and 8 months to 2 years and 6 months. Chief Judge McNamee cited these delays in the case Spears v. Stewart, concluding that Arizona did not meet the timeliness requirements set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 6.8(c)(1) outlines qualifications for attorneys serving as lead counsel in post-conviction proceedings, requiring experience in felony appeals, including murder convictions, without limiting these to capital cases. The legislature explicitly referenced capital cases elsewhere in the statute, suggesting a deliberate distinction.
In an interlocutory appeal regarding Arizona's eligibility to opt into Chapter 154 of AEDPA, the court determined that Arizona's appointment process for indigent capital defendants complied with Chapter 154 as of July 17, 1998. However, it ruled that Arizona could not enforce these procedures for the petitioner, Anthony Marshall Spears, due to the failure to adhere to its own timeliness standards. Spears, convicted of first-degree murder in 1992, had his convictions affirmed in 1996, but no post-conviction counsel was appointed due to a lack of qualified lawyers. He filed his first federal habeas petition pro se in April 1997, fearing the consequences of delays on his federal relief efforts. His case, along with 16 others, was consolidated, and the district court ultimately dismissed the habeas applications without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies, stating that the limitations periods for the capital defendants were not running.
On August 22, 1997, the Arizona Supreme Court appointed Jess Lorona as counsel for a Petitioner seeking state post-conviction relief, following the affirmation of his conviction nearly a year and eight months prior. Lorona withdrew on November 26, 1997, prompting the court to recall the mandate in the case. After re-appointing Lorona on July 17, 1998, Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief on January 28, 1999, which was denied by the Arizona trial court. The Arizona Supreme Court subsequently denied his petition for review on May 23, 2000, and issued a warrant for his execution two days later. Petitioner filed a habeas petition on June 1, 2000, and was granted a stay of execution the following day. Respondent Terry Stewart moved to dismiss the habeas petition as untimely, citing Arizona's status as an "opt-in" state under 28 U.S.C. 2261, which imposes a 180-day limit according to 28 U.S.C. 2263. The district court denied this motion, concluding that Arizona's appointment mechanism for counsel in capital cases did not meet the opt-in criteria. An interlocutory appeal was certified to review this decision. The standard of review for legal conclusions regarding compliance with Chapter 154 of AEDPA is de novo, while factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Chapter 154 provides procedural benefits for states that have established a qualifying system for capital defendants' post-conviction representation, detailing specific requirements for such systems under 28 U.S.C. 2261, including the appointment process, compensation for counsel, and competency standards.
A capital defendant must file a federal habeas petition within 180 days following the final affirmation of their conviction and sentence by the state court or the expiration of the time to seek such review, as outlined in 28 U.S.C. 2263(a). The district court is required to make a decision on the habeas application within 180 days of filing, with a permissible extension of no more than 30 days (28 U.S.C. 2266(b)(1)(A, b)(1)(C)(i)). The court of appeals is mandated to resolve any appeal from the district court's decision within 120 days after briefing is completed (28 U.S.C. 2266(c)(1)(A)). An automatic stay of execution is granted to the petitioner, who may apply for this stay when counsel is appointed in compliance with 28 U.S.C. 2261. This stay remains in effect during all state-court and federal collateral proceedings, provided other procedural requirements are met (28 U.S.C. 2262).
Arizona's system for appointing post-conviction counsel is framed by two statutes—Arizona Revised Statutes (ARS) 13-4041 and 13-4013—and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 6.8, which together are intended to comply with federal requirements as of July 17, 1998. Upon the supreme court's affirmation of a capital conviction, it or the presiding county judge appoints qualified counsel for post-conviction relief. Counsel must be a member of the Arizona bar for at least five years and have three years of practice in state criminal appeals or post-conviction proceedings, without prior representation of the defendant unless expressly waived. The supreme court is responsible for maintaining a list of qualified attorneys and may impose stricter competency standards. It has the authority to refuse certification or remove an attorney from the list if deemed incapable of adequate representation. The court may also appoint counsel from outside the list under certain circumstances.
No counsel qualifies under specified subsections, and no qualified counsel is available. A capital defendant may personally appear before the trial court to waive counsel, and if the court finds this waiver to be knowing and voluntary, appointed counsel may withdraw without extending the petition filing deadline. If the trial court determines the defendant is not indigent, appointed counsel will no longer receive public funding. Counsel appointed for state post-conviction relief may earn a maximum of $100 per hour for up to 200 hours, regardless of whether a petition is filed. Additional compensation from county funds may be authorized upon a showing of good cause, with the attorney needing to demonstrate excessive hours worked. If the attorney disputes the compensation rate or hours deemed unreasonable, they may appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court. The trial court can also allocate additional funds for necessary investigative and expert services. The Arizona Supreme Court established Rule 6.8, setting standards for appointing counsel in capital cases, which includes requirements for attorneys regarding their experience and proficiency in criminal litigation and capital defense training. Specifically, counsel must have been a member of the State Bar of Arizona for at least five years, practiced criminal litigation for three years, and demonstrated the necessary skills for capital cases. For appellate or post-conviction representation, attorneys must have prior relevant experience in death penalty cases and complete continuing education in capital defense.
Exceptional circumstances allow for the appointment of an attorney who does not meet standard qualifications set forth in specified sections, provided the attorney's experience and record are considerably superior, and they associate with a qualified attorney. Under ARS 13-4013(B), in capital cases where a defendant demonstrates financial inability, the court must appoint necessary investigators and expert witnesses at the county's expense. Additionally, ARS 13-4234(D) mandates the appointment of post-conviction counsel following a mandate affirming a conviction, requiring the filing of a notice of post-conviction relief and allowing the defendant sixty days to file a petition. Timing for issuing mandates is governed by Rule 31.23(b)(1), which states that the mandate is issued when the period for seeking certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court has expired or if a petition has been denied. Rule 32.4(c) reiterates the obligation to appoint counsel within 15 days upon a timely notice if the defendant is indigent. The burden of proof lies with the respondent to demonstrate compliance with Arizona's appointment mechanism, as required by federal statute 28 U.S.C. 2261. The Arizona mechanism allows for the issuance of appropriate court orders for counsel appointment as mandated.
The parties agree that the system complies with the statutory requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2261 regarding its embodiment in statutes or supreme court rules. The focus is on whether additional requirements of § 2261 are satisfied, specifically: (1) mandatory and binding competency standards for appointed counsel, (2) reasonable compensation for appointed counsel, (3) payment of reasonable litigation expenses, and (4) an offer of post-conviction counsel to all capital defendants.
To qualify for benefits under Chapter 154, Arizona must provide binding competency standards, which Congress intended to be defined with substantial state discretion. Arizona's Rule 6.8 sets clear qualifications for post-conviction counsel, requiring attorneys to have five years of good standing in the Arizona bar, recent criminal litigation experience, and demonstrated proficiency in handling capital cases. Additional qualifications include a mix of appellate and post-conviction experience in felony and murder cases, along with recent educational training in capital defense.
Although Rule 6.8(d) allows for the appointment of attorneys who do not meet all specified qualifications, it mandates that at least one qualified attorney be involved in every case, ensuring that all indigent capital defendants receive competent representation. The text of § 2261 does not prohibit states from implementing alternative competency standards. Despite arguments from amici that the standards are insufficient due to potential appointments of inexperienced lawyers, the requirement for capital experience is not mandated by § 2261(b) or logical reasoning.
Arizona's standards mandate that appointed counsel for capital post-conviction cases must demonstrate proficiency and commitment as outlined in Rule 6.8. Specifically, Rule 6.8(a)(3) requires lawyers to show necessary qualifications, while Rule 6.8(c)(2) mandates completion of at least twelve hours of relevant training within one year of appointment. Petitioner contends that ARS 13-4041(D) undermines these competency standards by allowing courts discretion to appoint counsel who do not meet the established qualifications. However, the court interprets ARS 13-4041(D) as discretionary only when no qualified candidates are available, and the Arizona Supreme Court has chosen to adhere to Rule 6.8's standards over the statute. Thus, Rule 6.8 governs the appointment of counsel, ensuring compliance with 28 U.S.C. 2261 regarding competency standards.
In terms of compensation, Arizona law caps payment for court-appointed lawyers at $100 per hour for up to 200 hours of work, regardless of whether a petition is filed (ARS 13-4041(G)). If an attorney exceeds 200 hours on a case, the court may grant compensation at the same hourly rate upon a showing of good cause (ARS 13-4041(H)). The petitioner argues that this 200-hour limit does not constitute reasonable compensation for legal representation.
Post-conviction counsel typically spend over 200 hours on a case, but it is deemed unreasonable to require them to show good cause for fees exceeding this amount. Section 2261 mandates that states must establish a compensation mechanism for competent counsel, which Arizona's ARS 13-4041 satisfies by allowing compensation up to $100 per hour, a rate not contested by the parties involved. If a lower rate is set and deemed unreasonable, counsel can seek redress through the Arizona Supreme Court.
The statute does not limit compensation based on the 200-hour threshold; rather, it stipulates that counsel can be compensated for hours worked beyond this threshold as long as they can demonstrate the time spent was reasonable. Such requirements to justify hours worked are standard in both criminal and civil contexts, and there is no indication that the statute demands unlimited compensation.
Regarding litigation expenses, the amici argued that the district court erred in asserting that Arizona's system allowed for the payment of reasonable litigation expenses as of July 17, 1998. However, ARS 13-4041(H) mandates the payment of reasonable fees and costs, which includes investigator and expert witness fees as specified in ARS 13-4013(B) for indigent defendants in capital cases. The court, in Chaney v. Stewart, held that while trial courts have discretion to assess whether the need for such services is reasonable, once deemed necessary, the statute requires payment of reasonable fees for them. Thus, Arizona's compensation system adheres to Chapter 154 as of the specified date.
Title 28 U.S.C. 2261(b) mandates that states provide for reasonable litigation expenses, allowing states to assess what constitutes "reasonable" as part of their process. Arizona's system complied with this requirement as of July 17, 1998, by mandating payments for reasonable costs and fees to investigators and experts deemed necessary by the court.
While the district court found that Arizona's offer of post-conviction counsel did not satisfy 28 U.S.C. 2261 due to significant delays in counsel appointment for the petitioner and similar capital defendants, it was concluded that, in theory, Arizona's offer complied with the statute's requirements. The federal statute stipulates that states must offer post-conviction counsel to indigent capital defendants whose convictions have been upheld on direct appeal, with exceptions for non-indigence or voluntary waiver of counsel.
Although the statute does not specify a timeframe for extending the offer of counsel post-affirmance of a conviction, the context and legislative history suggest Congress intended for states to act expeditiously. The limitations period for filing a federal habeas petition begins after the final state court affirmation, with no tolling allowed for delays in counsel appointment. This implies a need for quick action by states to ensure that defendants can initiate state post-conviction proceedings within the federal 180-day period. Legislative intent behind Chapter 154 emphasized the reduction of delays in capital collateral relief proceedings.
Unnecessary delay in capital collateral review is identified as a significant issue, prompting Chapter 154 to require capital defendants to file federal habeas petitions six months earlier than in non-opt-in states. This chapter also imposes expedited review timelines on federal courts for opt-in petitions. The case of Ashmus v. Calderon highlights that states cannot leverage expedited procedures under Chapter 154 if they fail to timely appoint counsel, emphasizing that California cannot benefit from the six-month limitation if it takes years to appoint representation. To comply with Chapter 154, states must provide counsel to indigent capital defendants promptly after the conclusion of their direct appeals or the Supreme Court’s decision on their certiorari petitions.
Arizona's statutory framework for appointing post-conviction counsel, effective July 17, 1998, is deemed compliant as it mandates timely counsel appointments for indigent capital defendants following the Arizona Supreme Court's affirmation of their convictions. Arizona Revised Statutes require that counsel be appointed unless a judicial determination finds the defendant is not indigent or has waived counsel. The mechanism ensures expeditious appointments, with a notice of post-conviction relief filed automatically upon the issuance of a mandate affirming the conviction, triggering the obligation to appoint counsel within fifteen days. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4(c) specifies that the presiding judge must appoint counsel within this timeframe if the defendant requests it and is found to be indigent.
The Arizona system required post-conviction counsel to be appointed within fifteen days following the issuance of a notice of post-conviction relief, triggered by either the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari or the expiration of the 90-day period for filing certiorari. This timeline was deemed sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Chapter 154 of AEDPA. However, for Arizona to invoke opt-in status under Chapter 154, it must have a functioning system that meets federal criteria for appointing post-conviction counsel for indigent capital defendants and must adhere to that system in practice. The court aligned with the Fourth Circuit's view that mere compliance on paper is insufficient.
In this case, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on November 4, 1996, yet post-conviction counsel for the Petitioner was not appointed until July 17, 1998, resulting in a delay of approximately one year and eight months. Given the Arizona system's requirement for timely counsel appointment, the failure to adhere to this requirement led to the conclusion that Arizona cannot enforce Chapter 154 procedures in this specific case.
In conclusion, while Arizona had established a mechanism for timely appointment of post-conviction counsel that complied with Chapter 154 on its face, the failure to meet the timeliness requirement precluded Arizona from benefiting from expedited procedures in this instance. The question posed in the interlocutory appeal was answered, clarifying that as of July 17, 1998, Arizona was not entitled to the advantages of Chapter 154 due to this failure.
The mistake regarding Arizona's opt-in system is deemed immaterial, as the relevant statutes and Arizona Supreme Court rules were in effect on both specified dates. The court determined that July 17, 1998, was crucial for assessing Arizona's compliance with Chapter 154 for the Petitioner's case. Arizona's system was found to provide for reasonable litigation expenses and adequate competency standards for appointed counsel; however, it was concluded that the offer of counsel did not fully comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2261. Arizona lacks a "unitary review" system, which is necessary for a state to opt in under 28 U.S.C. § 2265, meaning defendants' petitions are instead subject to the one-year limitations period outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 2244. This situation contrasts with previous cases where states attempted to opt in using pre-AEDPA procedures.
The current statutes and rules remain unchanged since their amendments, with a specific mention that the Arizona Supreme Court amended certain rules in 2000. Amici contended that Arizona should consolidate its appointment system into a single statute or supreme court rule; however, federal law does not mandate this as long as the system is coherent. The court clarifies that the rules were accessible and not scattered across various locations, ensuring they were discernible. Furthermore, a provision exists allowing qualified capital-defense lawyers from other jurisdictions to associate in cases. Amici's argument for conditional appointment of counsel lacking relevant training does not align with the text of the rule, which requires that a lawyer must have completed necessary continuing legal education (CLE) requirements prior to appointment, as indicated in the specific language of the rule. Under Rule 32.4, appointed counsel has a maximum of 120 days to initiate post-conviction proceedings.
The interpretation of Rule 6.8 regarding the continuing legal education (CLE) requirements for newly appointed lawyers is under scrutiny. The timeline for compliance is critical, as the necessity for knowledge arises shortly after appointment, making a one-year completion period impractical. Although an ad hoc committee suggested a broader interpretation, the Arizona Supreme Court did not adopt this view, and it is inconsistent with the rule's text. Rule 6.8 was amended in 2000, and it is emphasized that state supreme courts, including Arizona's, have exclusive authority to regulate legal practice, a principle recognized in many jurisdictions. While vacated opinions, such as Roe v. Anderson, hold persuasive authority, they are not binding. The mandate in ARS. 13-4041 requiring post-conviction counsel for capital defendants is interpreted as a legislative request that initiates a fifteen-day appointment period under Rule 32.4(c) upon filing for post-conviction relief.
