United States v. Juan Llanos-Agostadero

Citations: 486 F.3d 1194; 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 11347; 2007 WL 1412239Docket: 06-14382

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; May 15, 2007; Federal Appellate Court

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether aggravated battery on a pregnant woman, under Florida law, qualifies as a “crime of violence” for the purpose of sentencing enhancements under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2. The case involved Juan Llanos-Agostadero, a Mexican national indicted for illegal re-entry after being deported following his conviction for aggravated battery on a pregnant woman. At his plea hearing, he acknowledged the indictment’s factual basis and pleaded guilty.

The presentence investigation report (PSI) indicated that Llanos-Agostadero had two convictions for aggravated battery on a pregnant woman, detailing instances of physical violence against his wife. The PSI recommended a base offense level of 8, with a 16-level enhancement for the prior violent crimes, resulting in a total offense level of 21, leading to a sentencing range of 46 to 57 months. Llanos-Agostadero contested the enhancement, arguing that the jury did not classify his prior offenses as crimes of violence and claimed that the definition of “crime of violence” did not fit his actions. He also argued that the lack of a fast-track program in his district resulted in an unconstitutional sentencing disparity.

The district court rejected Llanos-Agostadero’s objections and denied his motion for a downward departure. It concluded that aggravated battery on a pregnant woman constituted a crime of violence under the relevant Florida statute and affirmed that the absence of a fast-track program did not violate equal protection principles. Consequently, the court sentenced him to 50 months imprisonment, leading to his appeal of the sentence.

U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) defines a “crime of violence” as offenses under state law that involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person. Llanos-Agostadero contests the district court's classification of his Florida aggravated battery convictions as crimes of violence warranting a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1). The determination of whether a prior offense qualifies as a “crime of violence” is a legal question reviewed de novo. The categorical approach is generally employed, focusing solely on the conviction and statutory definitions, unless ambiguities necessitate examining the underlying facts of the conviction. In such cases, the district court can only consider specific documents like charging documents, plea agreements, and trial judge findings. Under Florida law, aggravated battery on a pregnant woman involves knowing or should have known that the victim was pregnant. This offense necessitates a predicate act of simple battery, defined as intentionally touching or striking another person against their will or causing bodily harm. The court has not yet ruled on whether aggravated battery on a pregnant woman constitutes a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1), though it has dealt with similar issues in previous cases. In Glover, simple battery against a law enforcement officer was classified as a crime of violence, and in Griffith, simple battery under Georgia law was recognized as a crime of domestic violence, as both involve the use of physical force.

Griffith and Glover cases establish that the offenses in question are not significantly different when determining if they qualify as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1). The definitions of a “crime of violence” under various statutes show no meaningful distinction. Specifically, aggravated battery on a pregnant woman in Florida law requires simple battery, which has been previously classified as a “crime of violence.” Consequently, the court affirmed that Llanos-Agostadero's prior conviction for aggravated battery on a pregnant woman constitutes a crime of violence, justifying a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).

Llanos-Agostadero also argued that his sentence was unreasonable per 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and violated the Equal Protection Clause due to disparities in sentencing between districts with and without fast-track programs. The review of constitutional and statutory interpretations is conducted de novo, while the overall sentence is assessed for reasonableness. A district court, after calculating the advisory Guidelines range, can impose a sentence that may differ from what the appellate court would choose, provided it is still reasonable. The burden of proof for unreasonableness lies with the challenging party.

The sentence's reasonableness is evaluated based on factors such as the nature of the offense, the defendant's history, deterrence, the Guidelines range, and the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among similarly situated defendants. While sentencing courts consider these factors, they are not mandated to explicitly articulate each one. The fast-track departure provision under U.S.S.G. 5K3.1 is limited to districts that have approved early disposition programs. The disparity created by the existence of fast-track programs in some districts does not compel district courts to depart from sentencing guidelines, as Congress has implicitly acknowledged that such disparities are warranted.

A district court cannot consider sentencing disparities linked to early disposition programs when imposing a sentence. Specifically, in the case of Llanos-Agostadero, the court found no jurisdiction to review claims of error regarding the denial of a downward departure due to the lack of a fast-track program in the Middle District of Florida, as there was no indication that the district court misunderstood its authority. The court correctly calculated Llanos-Agostadero's Guidelines range at 46 to 57 months and deemed a 50-month sentence appropriate after considering the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court does not need to explicitly state that it considered each § 3553(a) factor. Additionally, the absence of a fast-track program does not inherently render sentences in other districts unreasonable or violative of equal protection rights, as established in United States v. Campos-Diaz. Consequently, Llanos-Agostadero’s sentence was deemed reasonable, and the appeal was affirmed.