Joyce Lewis v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security
Docket: 99-35922
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; March 1, 2002; Federal Appellate Court
Joyce Lewis appealed a district court judgment denying her motion for attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act in her Social Security disability case against Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security. The Ninth Circuit, with jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. Lewis had applied for disability benefits, claiming a back injury from August 1994 impaired her ability to work as a gas station cashier and attendant, a job that required standing for six hours, bending, lifting, and cleaning. During the administrative hearing, Lewis described her job duties but clarified that she did not perform heavy lifting, as male coworkers assisted her with deliveries, and she was allowed to sit while working. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Lewis had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her injury, identified a severe impairment, determined she could only perform sedentary work, and concluded that her past job did not require more than sedentary demands.
The ALJ determined that Lewis could perform her past relevant work, concluding she was not disabled under the Social Security Act. This decision became final when the Appeals Council declined to review it, prompting Lewis to seek judicial review. A magistrate judge affirmed the ALJ's decision, but the district court rejected this recommendation, stating that the ALJ mischaracterized Lewis's testimony regarding the physical demands of her previous job and overlooked evidence indicating that her role exceeded sedentary work. The district court highlighted inconsistencies in Lewis's statements and dismissed her claim for attorney fees, asserting that the evidence was ambivalent and that the Commissioner's position was "substantially justified" given the magistrate judge's agreement with the ALJ. Under the Act, attorney fees may be awarded unless the Commissioner demonstrates substantial justification for their position, which may be considered reasonable even if ultimately incorrect. The district court criticized the ALJ for failing to accurately assess Lewis's testimony at step four of the evaluation process, where Lewis needed to prove her inability to perform past relevant work. The ALJ had the responsibility to evaluate Lewis's residual functional capacity alongside the demands of her past work, drawing from both her testimony and a vocational report. The ALJ was also tasked with determining credibility and resolving any ambiguities in the claimant's testimony.
The ALJ evaluated Lewis's testimony regarding her work at a gas station, interpreting ambiguities to her disadvantage. Although the district court later deemed the ALJ's characterization of her testimony erroneous, it acknowledged that the Commissioner's defense of the ALJ’s findings at step four was legally justified. The ALJ is permitted to assess and define past relevant work based on the claimant's testimony, as supported by precedent cases. The district court also found a factual basis for the Commissioner's position, noting evidence that questioned Lewis's claims, such as her ability to sit for long periods and her assertion that male employees handled most lifting. This evidence was tied to the specific error concerning the definition of past relevant work, leading the court to conclude that the ALJ's decision was not entirely unreasonable.
Lewis contended that the district court erred in considering the magistrate judge's recommendation that upheld the ALJ's decision, arguing that the agreement of another court does not determine the justification of the Government's position. However, the Supreme Court has indicated that while one court's agreement isn't definitive, a pattern of judicial outcomes can be relevant. Thus, the district court was within its rights to reference the magistrate judge's decision. In dissent, Judge Browning criticized the focus on substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner's view on Lewis's ability to perform past work, suggesting a procedural error should have been emphasized instead. He referenced prior cases, arguing the approach taken was misaligned with established precedent. Nonetheless, the majority found no significant distinction in the approaches and contended that Judge Browning misinterpreted the cited cases, particularly in the context of the procedural assessments made in those instances.
Flores sought to recover attorney's fees after her request was denied by the district court, which found the Commissioner substantially justified in asserting that Flores was not disabled. Following her appeal, the Supreme Court's decision in Shalala v. Schaefer clarified the definition of a "prevailing party" for social security disability claimants who receive a sentence-four remand, establishing that such claimants are considered prevailing parties at the time of remand rather than needing to prove entitlement to benefits first. The court then addressed whether the Commissioner's position was substantially justified, deciding that the focus should be on the justification of the Commissioner's position taken during the remand proceedings, as opposed to the overall disability determination. This approach was validated in subsequent case Corbin v. Apfel, where the court ruled that the Commissioner's defense of procedural errors made by the ALJ was not substantially justified, emphasizing that the reasonableness of the Commissioner's position must be assessed at each stage of the proceedings.
Judge Browning contends that the inquiry should not focus on whether the Commissioner’s stance that Lewis could perform other work was substantially justified, as this parallels the ultimate disability determination. Instead, he advocates for an examination of whether the Commissioner was justified regarding the 'procedural errors' made by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). However, the majority disagrees, emphasizing that their reference to the 'ultimate issue of disability' in prior cases like Flores was to differentiate between the specific issues in remand proceedings and the broader disability question. They argue that both Flores and Corbin, which involved procedural errors, do not necessitate distinguishing between substantive and procedural matters. In the case at hand, the district court remanded due to clear evidence that Lewis could not perform her prior work, thus necessitating a focus on whether the Commissioner was justified in asserting that she could. The majority concludes that this analysis, which aligns with the district court's findings, confirms that although incorrect, the Commissioner’s position was substantially justified, leading to the affirmation of the denial of attorneys’ fees. Judge Browning dissents, referencing prior decisions which he believes necessitate a reversal, highlighting that similar procedural issues in Flores led to a different outcome regarding attorneys' fees, indicating the need for a focused inquiry on procedural errors rather than the ultimate disability determination.
Flores and Corbin argue that the district court should focus on the procedural error leading to the appeal when assessing whether the Commissioner's position was substantially justified. While the majority claims the district court's remand centered on the Commissioner's conclusion that Lewis could perform her past work, the record reveals that the remand was due to the Commissioner's failure to adequately consider and weigh evidence. The Commissioner concluded that Lewis could perform her previous job as a gas station attendant based solely on its classification as sedentary work. However, the district court identified evidence from Lewis and her vocational expert that contradicted this finding, noting the Commissioner's significant mischaracterization of Lewis's testimony regarding the job's demands. The district court emphasized that the inquiry should focus not on the reasonableness of the Commissioner's conclusion about Lewis's job capabilities, but rather on the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s defense of the ALJ's procedural errors. This aligns with the intent of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), which aims to remove financial barriers for individuals contesting unjust government actions. If the Commissioner had properly evaluated Lewis's evidence initially, she would not have incurred attorneys' fees to challenge the error. The precedent set in Flores indicates that awarding attorney's fees is justified when the Secretary commits procedural errors that lack substantial justification, reinforcing the obligation of the Secretary to properly assess evidence before denying a claim.
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) made a determination regarding a claimant's ability to perform past relevant work, which became the Secretary's decision after the Appeals Council declined to review it. The district court referenced Social Security Ruling 82-62, which mandates that the ALJ must carefully evaluate specific evidence in determining the claimant's capabilities. This includes: (1) the claimant's statements about unmet past work requirements and the reasons for those limitations; (2) medical evidence that shows how the impairment restricts physical and mental work requirements; and (3) supplementary information from external sources, such as employers or the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, regarding job requirements as generally performed. The ruling emphasizes that the ALJ must make every effort to gather evidence that clearly addresses the issue. The district court suggested that if it had concentrated on the procedural error leading to its reversal, it would have concluded that the Commissioner's defense of the ALJ's oversight in considering "clear direct" evidence was not substantially justified, referencing relevant case law where the Commissioner's position was deemed unjustified due to the ALJ's failure to adequately weigh evidence or account for claimant testimony.
