Potter v. Patterson

Citations: 690 So. 2d 1118; 96 La.App. 4 Cir. 1172; 1997 La. App. LEXIS 576; 1997 WL 126319Docket: Nos. 96-CA-1172, 96-CA-1739

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; March 18, 1997; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

A mistaken voluntary dismissal with prejudice occurred in a personal injury case where only one defendant, Mine Safety Appliances Company (MSA), had settled with the plaintiffs, John Potter's widow and children. The trial court deemed the erroneous judgment a nullity. However, the appellate court determined that the judgment could have been reversed through a motion for a new trial, thereby affirming the trial court's decision to reinstate the case against all defendants except MSA, but on different procedural grounds.

The plaintiffs alleged that Potter died from mesothelioma due to asbestos exposure while employed by NOPSI. After settling with MSA for $2,500, a motion and judgment of dismissal were inadvertently filed, stating the entire case was settled and dismissed with prejudice. Both counsels intended only to dismiss the claim against MSA. The trial court signed the dismissal on May 14, 1992, but the clerk did not issue a notice of this judgment as required by law.

Subsequent to the signing, new counsel for the plaintiffs discovered the full dismissal on June 9, 1992, prompting an ex parte motion to clarify. This led to a June 15 order specifying that the May 14 judgment only applied to MSA. As additional defendants appeared, some challenged the validity of the clarification order, leading to exceptions of res judicata and other defenses. In response, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial to modify the judgment and a petition for declaratory judgment to annul it.

Defendants filed exceptions and responses to a petition to annul, leading to a trial court hearing on these matters as well as a plaintiffs' new trial motion. Testimony revealed that plaintiffs had only settled with MSA, which paid $2,500, and that the dismissal motion was a mistake. The trial court overruled defendants' exceptions, denied the new trial motion as untimely, and declared the May 14, 1992 judgment null and void. Defendants appealed, and it was concluded that the plaintiffs' new trial motion was timely and should have been granted. The court indicated it would have granted the motion had it not mistakenly believed it was untimely. Denial of the new trial motion was deemed an abuse of discretion. Under La.Code Civ. Proc. Article 1913, the delay for filing a new trial begins after notice of the judgment is served, which is required for final judgments like the May 14, 1992 dismissal. The court rejected defendants' argument that the case was not contested due to the voluntary dismissal motion, clarifying that a "contested case" refers to situations where answers or exceptions are filed. Consequently, notice of the judgment must be mailed by the clerk, and without such notice, the time limits for new trial motions and appeals do not commence.

In Gould v. HANO, 595 So.2d 1238, 1241 (La.App. 4th Cir.1992), it was established that actual notice of a judgment's signing does not initiate the time limits for filing new trial motions or appeals unless the clerk has mailed a notice of signing. This principle is supported by several cases, including State, DOTD v. Unknown Owners and Johnson v. East Carroll Detention Center. The court amended the trial court's judgment by granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial and vacating the dismissal judgment from May 14, 1992, except regarding defendant MSA. The case is remanded for further proceedings. The trial court was not specifically informed that the clerk had not mailed the judgment's notice, meaning the time period for a new trial motion had not commenced. Notably, exceptions under Article 1913(B) regarding homologation proceedings and judgments signed on the trial day with all parties present do not apply in this case.