Booker T. Johnson v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Incorporated, C/o Target Distribution
Docket: 00-1268
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; February 13, 2002; Federal Appellate Court
Booker T. Johnson, an African-American employee of J.B. Hunt Transport, was terminated on June 12, 1995, after a tenure marked by commendations and status as a "gold driver," which afforded him various privileges, including preference for new trucks and route selection. In late 1994, seeking a transfer to the Oconomowoc, Wisconsin terminal for better work-life balance, Johnson applied for a position that was not filled promptly, despite initial positive feedback from Project Manager Sharon Lincks. Upon transferring in February 1995, he experienced discriminatory treatment, including being consistently assigned the least favorable tasks and routes, impacting his income. Lincks displayed unprofessional behavior towards him, and he was denied access to new trucks despite his gold driver status, while observing other drivers using those trucks. Additionally, after agreeing to work on a Saturday in exchange for Memorial Day off, he faced threats of drug testing from Lincks if he did not show up on Memorial Day, despite his prior arrangement. The case raises issues of employment discrimination and retaliation.
Johnson reported to the main office in Arkansas that Lincks was discriminating against him regarding truck assignments and routes, and that he was barred from working at the Oconomowoc facility. Following a meeting to address his concerns, he returned to work on June 12, where Lincks informed him he was selected for a random drug test. After experiencing delays at the clinic, Johnson provided a urine sample, which was noted to be dilute. Lincks subsequently ordered him to undergo another test with direct observation, which Johnson perceived as discriminatory harassment and refused, leading to his termination.
In defense of Johnson's discrimination claim, Hunt argued compliance with Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations required a retest due to the diluted sample. Testimonies from clinic staff indicated that Johnson showed no signs of tampering, and the temperature of the sample was normal. The clinic did not recommend additional testing, nor did it conduct preliminary assessments on samples. The supervisor clarified that observed collections are mandated only under specific circumstances, which were not present in Johnson's case.
The jury ruled in favor of Johnson under Title VII and section 1981, awarding him $202,633.62 plus costs and attorney’s fees. Hunt appealed, challenging the timeliness of the Title VII claim and the exclusion of testimony from Lincks and her supervisor due to discovery violations. The district court's decisions on these matters were upheld, rendering further consideration of Hunt's arguments regarding the sufficiency of Johnson's contractual relationship unnecessary.
Hunt contests the timeliness of Johnson's Title VII charge filed with the EEOC, asserting it was not submitted within the required 300 days following the alleged employment practice. Under Title VII, Johnson was obligated to file within 300 days, but in states like Wisconsin with local antidiscrimination agencies, a charge cannot be filed with the EEOC until 60 days after initiating state proceedings unless those proceedings are terminated earlier. The Supreme Court in EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co. established that state proceedings are considered "terminated" if a state agency indicates it will not proceed for a specified period, rather than needing to be completely concluded.
Johnson filed his charge with the Wisconsin Equal Rights Division (ERD) on April 4, 1996, with the 300-day deadline expiring on April 7, 1996. Hunt claims the state proceedings weren't terminated by that date, raising the issue of whether they had indeed been terminated. The determination requires examining the worksharing agreement between the EEOC and the ERD, which allows the EEOC to handle charges originally received by the ERD and stipulates that the ERD can waive its 60-day exclusivity period. Hunt concedes that the ERD, acting as the EEOC's agent, accepted Johnson's charge as jointly filed on April 3, 1996, thus validating the EEOC's processing of the charge on that date. Consequently, the worksharing agreement facilitated the waiver of the exclusivity period, allowing the charge to be considered timely filed.
The agreement explicitly waives the ERD's exclusive jurisdiction over charges initially processed by the EEOC and stipulates that the EEOC will handle charges filed more than 240 days after the violation. Hunt does not contest the intent behind the worksharing agreement, acknowledging that such language typically indicates a waiver. The ruling confirms that the worksharing agreement is self-executing, meaning the waiver of exclusive jurisdiction took effect upon the filing of the complaint with the ERD.
The ruling cites relevant case law, including Marlowe v. Bottarelli and Ford v. Bernard Fineson Development Center, which established that waivers in worksharing agreements are effective immediately upon filing, thereby terminating state jurisdiction over the charge. Federal regulations support this interpretation, stating that a charge filed with the state agency is considered filed with the EEOC once certain conditions are met, including the waiver of exclusive processing rights.
Hunt's argument that ERD's actions post-filing negated the waiver is rejected. Although ERD sent a form indicating it would investigate the charge, this action does not contradict the waiver's validity. The form acknowledges the worksharing agreement, and any misunderstanding by the individual who submitted it does not affect the waiver's effectiveness. The ruling emphasizes that the worksharing agreement's self-executing provisions result in immediate termination of state proceedings upon filing, regardless of subsequent agency actions.
The court addressed whether it erred in excluding the testimony of Hunt's witnesses, Lincks and Perry, due to Hunt's discovery conduct. The standard of review for discovery sanctions is an abuse of discretion, meaning the court’s decision must be fundamentally wrong. Hunt's repeated failures to produce the witnesses for depositions led to this exclusion. Initially, depositions were scheduled for January 28, 1999, and subsequently for March 25 and 26, 1999, but Hunt indicated reluctance to proceed without resolution on unrelated legal issues and failed to produce the witnesses on those dates. Written discovery responses were not provided until May 24, 1999, after the discovery period closed on May 3. Despite ongoing discussions, Hunt refused to produce the witnesses without a court order, asserting that discovery was closed. Johnson filed a motion to compel and later a motion in limine to exclude the witnesses' testimony. The court granted the motion in limine, citing Hunt's failure to comply with discovery requests and highlighting the lack of civility in the communication between the parties, emphasizing that timely requests for discovery should have been honored.
Requests for witness depositions were not met with timely responses, culminating in the assertion that the discovery period had ended. The court barred the defense from presenting two witnesses who were not made available for depositions, citing unprofessional conduct and a pattern of delay by Hunt. Hunt's failure to respond to written discovery requests in a timely manner led to a misuse of the expired discovery deadline as a rationale for not producing the witnesses. This behavior was deemed contrary to good faith obligations in discovery proceedings. Furthermore, Hunt failed to engage in discussions with opposing counsel to resolve these issues, opting instead to let the court intervene. The court found ample justification for imposing sanctions, which were specifically aligned with the nature of the violations. Hunt's claims that the sanctions severely impacted its case were inconsistent with earlier assertions that the excluded witness had no relevant information. The district court's decision to impose discovery sanctions was upheld as appropriate and proportionate, referencing precedent cases that support such measures for non-compliance. The court affirmed its decision without needing to address the Title VII issue further, as it fully justified the relief granted.
