Wright v. Tallant

Citations: 688 So. 2d 262; 1996 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 114; 1996 WL 75910Docket: 2941057

Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama; February 15, 1996; Alabama; State Appellate Court

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On January 25, 1994, Joe E. Wright filed a petition in the Montgomery County Probate Court to condemn a private right-of-way across Eldon Tallant's property, arguing that his own property was landlocked. The probate court denied the petition on June 10, 1994. Wright appealed to the Montgomery County Circuit Court, which conducted an ore tenus proceeding on January 3, 1995, and issued a judgment on February 27, 1995. The circuit court determined that Tallant Road was not a public road south of its paved portion, identified Robert C. Ham Road as the nearest public road, noted that the proposed right-of-way would go through Tallant's orchard (which he did not consent to being condemned), and concluded that the most convenient route for Wright would be along Tallant's western property boundary. The court set the compensation for the right-of-way at $1,500 per acre based on the dimensions of the right-of-way.

The court ordered: 1) denial of Wright's initial request for a right-of-way; 2) granting of a right-of-way along Tallant's western boundary, measuring 30 feet wide; and 3) compensation to Tallant calculated at $1,500 per acre. After Wright's motion to alter the judgment was denied by operation of law, he filed a pro se appeal raising several issues, including the trial court's determination of the nearest public road, the classification of Tallant's property, the feasibility of the granted right-of-way, and the valuation of Tallant's property. The appellate court noted it would not overturn a lower court's findings on ore tenus evidence unless they were clearly erroneous or unjust, emphasizing that the trial court's conclusions in condemnation cases carry significant weight, although misapplication of law is grounds for appeal.

Section 18-3-1 of the Alabama Code allows property owners whose land is entirely surrounded by other properties to acquire a right-of-way of up to 30 feet to access the nearest public road, provided they obtain written approval from the local municipal government and planning board. In the case at hand, Wright's property, located south of U.S. Highway 80 and bordered by Tallant's property, does not directly access the highway. Tallant Road, located on Tallant's property, connects to Robert C. Ham Road, which leads to Highway 80 and was declared a public road by the Montgomery County Circuit Court in 1986. Portions of Robert C. Ham Road are private, while Montgomery County maintains Tallant Road as a public road up to Tallant's driveway.

Wright has requested a right-of-way from Tallant to access his property but faces opposition from Tallant, who has planted pine trees in the area Wright seeks to use and plans to sell them in the future. Tallant suggested an alternative route for the right-of-way along the western edge of his property, which involves constructing a road through swampy land and building multiple bridges, a significantly more challenging option for Wright.

Wright's appeal lacks citations to legal authority for his positions on several issues, leading the court to dismiss those arguments. In addressing Wright's second issue regarding property alterations post-condemnation petition, the court noted that general legal propositions are insufficient for support, affirming the trial court’s determination that only part of Tallant Road is classified as a public road.

The trial court's classification of Tallant's pine plantation as an orchard, which exempts it from condemnation under § 18-3-2 of the Ala.Code 1975, was found to be erroneous. Section 18-3-2 prohibits establishing a right-of-way through certain types of land, including orchards, without the owner's consent. Wright contends that Tallant's plantation does not meet the definition of an orchard, arguing that it consists of pine trees grown for timber rather than for fruit or nuts, which aligns with the definition of an orchard as a planting of fruit or nut trees. Citing the precedent set in Romano v. Thrower, the court clarified that the natural definition of "orchard" does not encompass pine trees intended for timber production. As the trial court misapplied the law by considering the pine plantation an orchard, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further consideration of Wright's petition for a right-of-way, instructing that Tallant's pine plantation should not be classified as an orchard. The court did not evaluate the feasibility of the right-of-way or its adequacy for Wright's access. The judgment was reversed and remanded with instructions for a new ruling regarding Wright's right-of-way across Tallant's property.