Jeffrey M. Janes v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Dba Sam's Club, and Gary Dawes
Docket: 00-55611
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; February 4, 2002; Federal Appellate Court
Wal-Mart appeals a jury verdict in favor of ex-employee Jeffrey Janes in a wrongful termination case, claiming breach of an implied contract not to terminate him except for good cause after he was fired for cooking and eating expired meat from the store's waste. Wal-Mart contests the district court's decisions, including the exclusion of evidence regarding Janes's prior termination for theft, the assertion that his employment application established at-will employment that could not be altered by an implied agreement to terminate only for cause, and the claim that his actions constituted good cause for termination. The court affirmed the district court's rulings. Janes's employment history included a transition from PACE Membership Warehouse, where he was hired at-will, to Wal-Mart's Sam's Club, where he maintained an at-will employment status, as indicated by his signed application stating that only the President or Vice President could modify this status through a written agreement.
Janes was terminated by Wal-Mart after he and other employees cooked and consumed expired meat from the store’s disposal area on multiple occasions during the summer of 1995. Although Wal-Mart has no explicit policy against taking expired meat, it enforces a strict anti-dishonesty policy, which was cited as the basis for Janes's firing. Following his termination, Janes filed a lawsuit against Wal-Mart alleging unlawful discrimination, wrongful discharge, emotional distress, and breach of contract, among other claims. Most claims were dismissed prior to trial.
During a four-day jury trial in February 2000, Janes contended that he had an implied contract with Wal-Mart that protected him from termination without good cause, bolstered by his promotions and the company's disciplinary policies. He claimed he was unaware of any wrongdoing regarding the expired meat. The jury ruled in favor of Janes, awarding him $167,000 in damages. Wal-Mart's motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial were denied, leading to an appeal.
The appellate court reviews evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and found that the trial court acted appropriately in excluding evidence of Janes's previous firing for theft at age 17, deeming it unduly prejudicial, which Wal-Mart challenged but was ultimately upheld by the appellate court.
The evidence presented by Wal-Mart to demonstrate that Janes was aware he could be terminated for theft was of limited value, as Janes admitted during trial to understanding that theft constituted gross misconduct warranting termination. Additionally, the evidence risked undue prejudice against Janes, potentially leading the jury to view him with unwarranted suspicion due to his past misconduct. Consequently, the court's decision to exclude this evidence was justified and not an abuse of discretion.
Wal-Mart failed to meet the procedural requirements for a judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) by not moving for JMOL before the jury was presented with the case, thereby forfeiting its right to renew the motion post-trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. The Ninth Circuit mandates strict adherence to this requirement to prevent misleading the opposing party about the status of the evidence challenges. Wal-Mart’s argument that its prior motions sufficed was rejected, as substantial compliance does not meet the necessary standard.
Furthermore, the district court did not err in denying Wal-Mart's motion for a new trial. Wal-Mart claimed that Janes's signed at-will employment application negated any implied agreement for termination only for cause and argued that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to rule against Wal-Mart's claim of good cause for termination. However, the court found both arguments unpersuasive. Notably, Wal-Mart waived its challenge regarding the implied contract by not raising it during the trial, thus allowing the district court to consider relevant factors for establishing such a contract based on Wal-Mart's actions.
Issues raised for the first time on appeal are typically not considered, as established in Whittaker Corp. v. Execuair Corp. Here, Wal-Mart did not argue against the district court's assessment of an implied contract during the trial, nor did it object to the consideration of the Foley factors, which Wal-Mart itself advocated. The company referenced two documents—a motion for judgment as a matter of law and a trial brief—that actually supported the court's inquiry into whether an implied contract existed based on the parties' conduct. Wal-Mart's JMOL motion acknowledged the Foley factors and argued that written agreements indicating at-will employment were strong evidence against the existence of an implied contract, thereby not contesting the implied contract framework. Consequently, Wal-Mart waived the argument regarding the existence of Janes's written contract.
Further, Wal-Mart contended that it had good cause to terminate Janes, citing his taking of expired meat. However, the jury instructions stipulated that good cause required a “fair and honest cause or reason,” and the jury, having heard extensive testimony, concluded that Wal-Mart's reasons were not genuine. Wal-Mart's failure to file a timely Rule 50(b) motion precluded it from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, limiting the review to plain error. The district court upheld the jury's verdict, affirming that it was adequately supported by the evidence, and found no plain error or manifest injustice in allowing Janes to retain his jury award despite the circumstances of his termination.
The court affirms the previous ruling for several reasons. It notes that Janes submitted an employment application eleven months into his tenure at Wal-Mart, purportedly due to the company's need to "update the files." There is a dispute regarding the value of expired meat to Wal-Mart. Janes initially included his former supervisor, Gary Dawes, as a defendant in the first four causes of action, but Dawes was later dismissed from the case. The court references United States v. Patrin, stating that it may consider legal issues not raised in earlier stages if they do not depend on the factual record and do not prejudice the opposing party. However, if Janes could have approached his case differently by presenting new facts or legal arguments, such issues should not be introduced on appeal. Throughout the litigation, Wal-Mart consistently argued against the existence of an implied contract based on common law factors without objection. The court suggests that had Janes been aware earlier of this argument, he might have developed alternative facts or arguments regarding the validity of Wal-Mart's employment application. Consequently, the court declines to entertain Wal-Mart's argument at this stage.
