UNITED STATES v. MARCOS MARTÍNEZ-MEDINA, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MANUEL PÉREZ-COLÓN, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ANGELA AYALA-MARTÍNEZ
Docket: 99-1790
Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; February 7, 2002; Federal Appellate Court
The case involves three appellants—Marcos Martínez-Medina, Manuel Pérez-Colón, and Angela Ayala-Martínez—who are part of a large drug smuggling and distribution network in Puerto Rico from 1994 to 1997, as indicted alongside 76 others. Ayala and Pérez faced charges of conspiracy to possess and distribute significant quantities of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 846, as well as conspiracy related to illegal financial transactions involving drug proceeds under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) and 1957. Pérez's money laundering charge under § 1957 was later dismissed. Martínez was charged solely with participating in the drug conspiracy.
The trial lasted forty days, featuring extensive evidence and testimonies from several co-conspirators who cooperated with the government for leniency. Key evidence revealed that Ayala established contact with Colombian drug dealer Jorge Alicea-Serrano to import cocaine, leading her from a minor dealer to a significant supplier in Ponce's housing projects. Various drug distribution points were identified, including those owned by Pérez and the Garcia family. Violent disputes at these locations, although not charged as crimes, played a critical role in the government's case, influencing both conspiracy claims and sentencing considerations. Testimony from a witness indicated Pérez ordered the murder of a rival drug dealer to protect his sales, illustrating the violent nature of the drug network. Internal conflicts, such as the firing of a drug runner named 'Gerardito', further complicated relationships within the organization, leading to alliances for revenge against the Garcias.
A violent conflict arose between the Garcias and their allies (Ventura, Ayala, and Gongolon) and Gerardito's faction (Nelsito, the Vazquezes, and Jose Negron-Santiago, a/k/a 'Bejumen'). The factions engaged in several violent incidents, resulting in multiple fatalities, including Tommy Garcia and Abraham Borgos Santiago in 1995, and Bejumen and his wife in 1997. Witness Gamaliel Goglas-Valentin testified that Andrés, Manuel, and Marcos Martínez celebrated the killing of Bejumen after ambushing him. Following this, Ayala and others hired kidnappers to 'arrest' Michael Vazquez, who was later killed by the Garcias and their associates, along with Eddie Vazquez. Ayala celebrated the successful execution of this plan. The appellants were convicted on various charges, with Ayala and Pérez receiving life sentences for drug conspiracy and 20 years for money laundering, while Martínez was sentenced to 405 months. Their appeals raised issues regarding evidentiary sufficiency, specifically the argument that the jury's finding of a single conspiracy was in error, asserting that it should have been viewed as multiple conspiracies. However, the court ruled that the government was not required to prove every individual indicted was part of the same conspiracy, and the appellants did not sufficiently argue that evidence regarding non-defendants was unfairly prejudicial. The court affirmed all convictions and sentences.
Appellants claim that not all tried together were part of a single conspiracy, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions. The court evaluates this claim by viewing evidence favorably to the government and determining if a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A conspiracy requires an unlawful agreement, where knowledge of all participants is not necessary. The jury may infer an agreement from factors like common purpose and participant overlap.
Evidence indicated that the Garcias, Ventura, and Batiz were involved in a joint drug venture at the La Cantera drug point, with Ayala supplying drugs and reaping profits. This collaboration suggested a single drug conspiracy. Pérez, although not directly involved at La Cantera, distributed drugs for Ayala and assisted in retrieving drugs from a Colombian contact, providing sufficient evidence of his involvement in the conspiracy.
Martínez contends he was not part of the conspiracy, portraying himself as a hired gun unrelated to the drug operations. However, evidence showed Martínez's participation in drug dealing, including frequent drug pickups for resale from the Garcias, which could lead a jury to find that he was part of their drug enterprise.
Clear evidence of an agreement exists between Teta and Garcia prior to February 1997, where Teta agreed to assist Garcia in his conflict with Gerardito in exchange for aid with issues at the Guanica drug point. Martínez's regular involvement in drug dealing with Teta provides a reasonable basis for the jury to infer his awareness of Teta and Garcia’s arrangement, which explains his assistance in the murder of Bejumen and connects him to the larger conspiracy. This inference is further supported by a previous failed attempt by Teta and Martínez to kill Nelsito and Gerardito, using guns supplied by Manuel Garcia.
The jury could conclude that Martínez joined the Garcias' drug operation as an enforcer based on Teta's pact with Manuel Garcia, Martínez's relationship with Teta, and his actions on behalf of Manuel Garcia. Martínez contends that the conviction should not rely solely on uncorroborated testimony from a government informant. However, the law permits juries to assess witness credibility unless the testimony is inherently incredible or insubstantial.
Regarding Pérez's appeal of his money laundering conviction, the government argues that he conspired with Ayala to conceal unlawful proceeds, citing an instance where Ayala paid cash for air conditioning units installed in Pérez's house, retrieved from a friend who hid drug money. To convict under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), the government must demonstrate Pérez's knowledge that the transaction involved illegal proceeds and was intended to conceal the nature or source of those proceeds. Pérez claims a lack of evidence regarding Ayala's intent, but the evidence of other transactions between Ayala and Dominicci supports an inference of a pattern indicative of intent to conceal. These prior transactions, where Ayala purchased vehicles with drug money through third parties, could lead a jury to reasonably conclude that the air conditioning purchase was similarly intended to conceal drug proceeds.
Pérez's involvement in Ayala's drug operations was significant, as he assisted in retrieving and distributing drugs, and managed two drug points himself. His knowledge of Ayala's use of air conditioners to conceal drug money allows a jury to reasonably conclude he was aware of the criminal activity. Regarding evidence admission, Martínez contested the relevance and prejudicial impact of the Bejumen and Vazquez murders, asserting they were unrelated to the drug conspiracy. However, the evidence suggested a connection, demonstrating a pattern of violence tied to the drug trade, with the Garcias targeting Bejumen due to his association with a rival and the Vazquezes due to threats to their drug profitability. The court found the murder evidence relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. Additionally, the government’s case relied heavily on hearsay statements admitted under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, which allows for statements made by a co-conspirator during the conspiracy's course. The district court determined these statements likely met the requirements of the rule, despite challenges from Ayala and Pérez regarding eight specific statements. Most of the contested statements conveyed operational details of the drug conspiracy and were deemed to advance its goals, fulfilling the "in furtherance" requirement of the hearsay exception.
Eleizer's admissions to Gongolon regarding the killing of Joito El Orejon are contentious. Eleizer, serving as Gongolon's bodyguard at a drug point in Tibes, expressed a desire to kill Orejon after Gongolon indicated he was upset with Orejon for attempting to sell a stolen car, which could jeopardize their drug operations. Gongolon advised Eleizer to wait until Orejon left the area. After the murder, Eleizer recounted the incident to Gongolon, linking his statements to their drug conspiracy discussions. In contrast, witness Goglas claimed Ayala had Eleizer kill Orejon due to a theft involving jewelry and money, suggesting a motive less connected to the drug conspiracy. Despite uncertainty regarding the accuracy of either version, the district court found Eleizer's admissions likely related to the conspiracy. Even if admitting these statements was erroneous, it was deemed harmless given the strong evidence against the appellants.
Regarding witness payments, Gamaliel Goglas, a key witness, received $9,000 for cooperating with the government, citing fear for his safety after a robbery. Angela Castro was paid $10,000 for her relocation. Martínez argued these payments violated the federal witness bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2). However, it is questionable whether this statute applies to the government, especially since the Attorney General is authorized to provide for the protection and relocation of witnesses under 18 U.S.C. § 3521. While inducements could affect a defendant's right to a fair trial, security-related expenses are generally acceptable if procedural safeguards like disclosure and jury instructions are followed.
Payments made to Goglas were minimal and intended for protection and relocation expenses, which the defense used to suggest bias to the jury. The district judge advised the jury to approach witness testimony with caution, which was constitutionally appropriate. The appellants argued that the trial was compromised by the prosecutor's improper remarks during summation, some of which were objected to while others were not. Although several comments were deemed highly improper, they did not warrant a new trial. The prosecutor's graphic references to murders were legitimate as part of the conspiracy case but were criticized for inflaming the jury's emotions. Some remarks appealed to the jury's emotions and conscience, which were improper, yet the trial judge's immediate instructions to the jury mitigated any potential prejudice. The prosecutor's description of the defendants as "hunting each other like animals" was inflammatory, though it was unlikely to have significantly impacted the jury's decision given the overall evidence presented. Allegations of misstatements of fact were generally supported by the record or fell within the prosecution's rights to characterize evidence. Claims that the prosecutor improperly vouched for witness credibility were largely unfounded, as the statements made did not constitute personal assurances regarding the witnesses.
Cooperating witnesses had a motive to tell the truth due to the severe consequences of breaking their plea agreements, which was not considered improper vouching as it offered a rationale for the jury's belief rather than a personal assurance. This argument directly countered the defense's claim that these witnesses were dishonest for leniency. However, the prosecution's rebuttal included improper statements suggesting that the witnesses would have fabricated more damaging accounts if they were lying, which has been deemed unacceptable in prior cases. The court criticized federal prosecutors in Puerto Rico for this persistent misconduct, emphasizing the need for adherence to established precedents. Although the prosecutor's comments concerned only four minor witnesses and did not affect the credibility of key witnesses whose testimony was corroborated by evidence, the remarks were deemed problematic, especially since they occurred in rebuttal without a cautionary instruction. Despite the misconduct, the court ruled that it did not justify a new trial due to sufficient evidence establishing the drug conspiracy. Additionally, the prosecution was accused of improperly shifting the burden of proof by highlighting the defense’s failure to fulfill its opening statement promises; however, the district judge mitigated any potential prejudice by promptly striking the remark and reaffirming the prosecution's burden. Lastly, Ayala and Pérez asserted that the district court's denial of a 'buyer-seller' jury instruction was a reversible error, as such an instruction clarifies that not all buyer-seller relationships in a single transaction indicate a drug conspiracy.
Appellants Ayala and Pérez were denied a 'buyer-seller' jury instruction due to overwhelming evidence indicating they conspired to import and distribute large quantities of narcotics. The court found that over 150 kilograms of cocaine were attributable to both, warranting maximum life sentences under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) and U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. The court applied upward adjustments for firearm possession and for being leaders of the conspiracy, increasing their offense levels to 43, thereby confirming life sentences. Additionally, Ayala's prior drug felony convictions led to a mandatory life sentence. The court also sentenced both on a money laundering count, imposing a maximum of 20 years each. Ayala and Pérez challenged the life sentences under Apprendi v. New Jersey, arguing that drug quantity determinations affecting sentencing must be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, as the default statutory maximum for their conspiracy would be 20 years without a quantity finding.
Ayala and Pérez were sentenced in 1999, prior to the Apprendi decision in 2000, but the decision can still apply to their direct appeals. An Apprendi error can be deemed harmless if overwhelming evidence supports the minimum drug quantity for a higher statutory maximum. The government presented substantial evidence during the trial, including testimony from Hector Dominicci about transporting large quantities of cocaine and Victor Rodriguez regarding significant air drops of drugs, establishing that the conspiracy involved at least five kilograms of cocaine. The sentencing court concluded that the conspiracy involved over 150 kilograms, far exceeding the threshold for a life sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Both appellants acknowledge the conspiracy's involvement with at least five kilograms; Ayala does not challenge the accuracy of the sentencing findings, while Pérez concedes responsibility for more than 50 kilograms, making his Apprendi argument irrelevant.
Ayala and Pérez also contest the application of U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 related to first-degree murder, arguing that the sentencing court violated Apprendi by finding their involvement in murders based on a preponderance of evidence. However, Apprendi does not apply to sentencing guideline findings. They further claim the murders should not influence drug crime sentencing since U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 does not reference drug statutes, but the guidelines allow for consideration of murders in drug crime sentencing. Lastly, they express concern that the higher base offense level for first-degree murder might be applied improperly, but this concern is unfounded as the conspiracy's murders meet the criteria for first-degree murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111.
Ayala challenges the district court's classification of her two prior drug felony convictions as separate, which subjects her to a mandatory life sentence under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). Although she admits to having the convictions, she argues they should be treated as a single episode of ongoing criminal conduct. The legal standard allows for separate counting only if the convictions stem from distinct criminal episodes, as established in United States v. Gillies. Ayala's convictions arose from multiple transactions over several months, involving different drugs, justifying their classification as distinct. The Ninth Circuit's reasoning supports this interpretation, emphasizing that ongoing criminal conduct can consist of multiple discrete episodes.
Separately, Perez contests the district court’s imposition of a four-level enhancement for his role in the drug conspiracy, asserting the enhancement is unwarranted as he did not lead the overarching conspiracy. He admits to managing certain operations within the conspiracy and suggests a two-level enhancement is more appropriate. The legal framework allows for a four-level increase if the defendant is deemed an organizer or leader of extensive criminal activity. The evidence indicates Perez oversaw multiple drug points and supervised at least five individuals, which supports the enhancement. Despite the close nature of the case regarding leadership roles, the court's decision remains intact unless clear error is demonstrated. Even a three-level enhancement combined with a two-level firearms enhancement would result in a life sentence for Perez.
Both Ayala and Perez also argue that the court erred in sentencing them to 20 years for money laundering.
The guideline range for the money laundering offense was claimed to be 121 to 151 months, yet the sentences imposed were 240 months. This misinterpretation stemmed from a misunderstanding of how the guidelines apply to multiple-count convictions. If solely considering the money laundering count, it would have an adjusted offense level of 30. However, due to the combined offense level for multiple counts, which was determined to be 43 for drug conspiracy, the district court used this higher level for sentencing. The court ruled that drug and money laundering convictions should not be grouped, a decision not contested by Ayala and Perez. Consequently, despite the combined offense level of 43, the money laundering sentence was capped at the statutory maximum of 20 years, running concurrently with a life sentence, thus not disadvantaging the appellants.
In the case of Martinez, who was sentenced first, the court established his involvement in murders, applying the murder provision guidelines to reach a base offense level of 43. After a two-level downward departure for being a minor participant, his level was adjusted to 41, leading to a guideline range of 324 to 405 months, with the court imposing the maximum sentence. Notably, the sentencing court did not determine drug quantity, which should have limited Martinez's maximum statutory sentence to 20 years. However, he did not raise an objection to this error at sentencing.
Martinez acknowledges responsibility for over 500 grams of cocaine, leading to a sentencing range of five to 40 years. He objects to being sentenced for murder without being charged or convicted, claiming a due process violation under Apprendi, but his concession on drug quantity undermines this argument since his sentence was below the statutory maximum. Additionally, he contests the sufficiency of evidence regarding his involvement in the murders, but the court's reliance on admissible hearsay consistent with eyewitness accounts does not constitute clear error.
Martinez also requests supplemental briefing regarding the leniency of co-defendants' sentences post-Apprendi, but the court declines to address this, noting that similar defendants may receive different sentences based on the timing of their cases relative to major legal decisions.
Both Martinez and Perez seek a new trial based on new evidence, claiming it was withheld by the prosecution, violating Brady v. Maryland. The prosecution's failure to disclose evidence necessitates applying the Brady standard, which requires a showing of "reasonable probability" of prejudice due to the withheld evidence. However, the court finds no potential for prejudice in either case. Martinez's Brady argument is based on a statement from a former police officer, which implicates a different individual in the murder, but does not demonstrate a connection to the case that would warrant a retrial.
A statement discovered post-verdict during a preliminary hearing in the Commonwealth trial of Manuel Garcia and Ventura could have impeached the credibility of key witnesses Gongolon and Goglas, the latter being crucial in implicating Martinez in Bejumen's murder. Withheld impeachment evidence, if significant enough, can warrant a new trial under precedent such as United States v. Bagley. However, Rivera's statement does not sufficiently challenge Goglas's testimony linking Martinez to the drug conspiracy, as it pertains to a different case (the Vazquez murders). Thus, this weak impeachment evidence does not justify a new trial.
In contrast, the withheld evidence concerning Perez is more relevant, stemming from a DEA report about Samuel Arce-Leon, who relayed conversations implicating Ayala and Perez in the murder of Sol Garcia. Despite the potential impact of Arce's testimony, it does not significantly undermine the strong evidence supporting Perez's drug conspiracy conviction, which included multiple witness testimonies and physical evidence. While the murder's relevance arose during sentencing, the district court found sufficient evidence to implicate Perez in Garcia's murder, even after the statement was disclosed. Perez did not contest the sufficiency of this evidence on appeal, and the district court's sentencing decision was deemed not clearly erroneous, despite ambiguities in Arce's statement.
Any potential error regarding drug quantity and enhancements in the district court's decisions was deemed harmless due to other findings. The judgments of conviction, sentences, and denials of post-trial motions are affirmed. Evidence presented at trial was significantly more extensive than that in the separate case against Jaime Garcia-Torres. The defendants did not contest the jury instructions on conspiracy; thus, the issue is reviewed solely for evidentiary sufficiency. Multiple previous cases are cited to support this review standard. Testimony indicated that Danny Gongolon sold Ayala cocaine and had prior interactions with her, but specifics about her relationship with Martinez were lacking. Despite no impact on appeal outcomes, the government acknowledged efforts to prevent past prosecutorial behavior. Ayala faced several drug distribution charges, which were consolidated, leading to guilty pleas and concurrent sentences. With a criminal history category of IV, Ayala's sentencing range was miscalculated by her, as the correct range corresponds to a category III defendant. The district court found sufficient evidence to hold Martinez accountable for large cocaine quantities, given his involvement in the drug conspiracy. Testimony from an eyewitness regarding the murder of Sol Garcia suggested discrepancies in descriptions of the assailants, supporting a particular narrative. Circuit Judge Torruella expressed ongoing concerns about prosecutorial conduct in a separate case.
Judge Torruella, in dissent, expresses frustration with the persistent prosecutorial misconduct exhibited by the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Puerto Rico, particularly in closing arguments. Despite previous warnings from the court regarding ethical violations, the prosecutors continue to disregard established rules and engage in unethical behavior, which is not unique to Puerto Rico but is notably prevalent among its federal prosecutors. The judge cites the lack of effective institutional sanctions and emphasizes that the problematic statements made by prosecutors are not merely technical errors but serious ethical violations condemned by multiple authorities. He argues that district courts possess the inherent power to sanction such misconduct and urges them to take decisive action against it. Rather than relying solely on appellate reversals, he advocates for immediate reprimands or sanctions as more appropriate remedies to restore confidence in the justice system, highlighting the danger that such misconduct poses to public trust.
Prosecutorial misconduct in convictions has led to increased skepticism towards the judicial system, undermining the dignity of both the executive and judiciary. The repeated presentation of tainted convictions on harmless-error grounds exacerbates this issue. In light of numerous criticisms from the Court regarding this misconduct, federal prosecutors in Puerto Rico have been warned that their claims of harmless error will be subjected to enhanced scrutiny. A review of case law over the past fifteen years reveals a troubling pattern of improper closing remarks by prosecutors in the District of Puerto Rico, highlighting the need for a more rigorous examination of prosecutorial conduct.
