Rebecca Lewis v. Holsum of Fort Wayne, Inc.

Citations: 278 F.3d 706; 7 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 961; 12 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1228; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1122; 82 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 40,932; 2002 WL 101101Docket: 01-1723

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; January 28, 2002; Federal Appellate Court

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Rebecca Lewis, the plaintiff-appellant, filed a pro se complaint against Holsum of Fort Wayne, Inc., alleging discrimination based on race, disability, and sex, as well as retaliation for filing an EEOC claim, violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. After being granted leave to amend her complaint, she included a claim of being denied medical leave and terminated in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Holsum, which Lewis appealed.

The case's background reveals that Lewis, who suffers from asthma, worked under medical restrictions to avoid flour dust and applied for a job transfer, which was denied by Holsum due to her medical condition. Although she filed a grievance and obtained a physician's note clearing her for unrestricted work, she was still denied the transfer. Subsequently, Lewis suffered an asthma attack in December 1997, resulting in hospitalization and an off-work slip provided to Holsum. While the day of her attack was designated as FMLA leave, Lewis failed to report for work on three consecutive scheduled days afterward and did not inform Holsum of her absences. Consequently, Holsum terminated her employment based on its attendance policy.

The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment, agreeing with its findings regarding Lewis's failure to comply with attendance requirements and the lack of evidence supporting her discrimination claims.

On January 2, 1998, Lewis had a follow-up appointment with Dr. Amin, who provided an off-work slip, valid from December 17, 1997, to January 8, 1998, allowing her to return to work on January 8. Mack delivered this slip to Holsum on the same day. While Prater acknowledged receipt of the slip delivery, he claimed he did not receive it until January 3. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Holsum regarding Lewis' claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and retaliatory discharge. The court found Lewis' termination was in compliance with company policy and not a violation of the FMLA. Additionally, it determined that Lewis did not demonstrate a necessary causal connection between her EEOC charge and her termination. Lewis contended that the district court erred by concluding that she was on continuing FMLA leave and that her timely submission of the off-work slip constituted a violation of the FMLA. She also argued that the court neglected to consider other factors establishing the alleged causal connection. The review of the summary judgment was conducted de novo, affirming that summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court upheld the district court's decision, stating Lewis did not notify Holsum of her need for leave for three consecutive days after her vacation, in violation of company policy. Furthermore, the court confirmed that Lewis failed to prove the causal link necessary for her retaliatory discharge claim.

Lewis was deemed qualified for FMLA leave, but the dispute centers on her obligation to notify Holsum in advance of her absences. Company rule D-1 mandates that employees inform authorized personnel at least one hour prior to their scheduled shift if they cannot report to work, with discharge following a third infraction. Holsum's Attendance Policy further stipulates that without a specified return date from a doctor, employees must call in daily for any scheduled absence. Lewis' off-work slip did not provide a return date, leading to her requirement to call in on December 29 and 31, 1997, and January 2, 1998. She acknowledged understanding the rule regarding termination after three consecutive absences without notification.

FMLA regulations allow employers to enforce customary notice procedures for leave requests. The case of Gilliam v. United Parcel Service illustrates this principle, highlighting that employees on leave must keep their employers informed about their return. Lewis similarly failed to adhere to company policies. Additionally, the Labor Agreement with the Union states that the employer-employee relationship is terminated if an employee is absent for three days without notification, unless it is impossible to do so. Lewis, who had access to a phone and could have had someone notify the company on her behalf, did not comply with these requirements. Therefore, her discharge was consistent with FMLA regulations.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, Lewis must demonstrate three elements: (1) engagement in a statutorily protected activity; (2) suffering an adverse action following this activity; and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. Lewis acknowledges her engagement in a protected activity (filing an EEOC charge) and her termination as an adverse action but disputes the causal link. She asserts that the timing of her EEOC filing in October 1997 and her termination in January 1998 suggests retaliation. However, this timing alone is deemed insufficient to establish causation, as the interval is considered too long to support an inference of retaliation without additional evidence. Speculative claims based on timing are inadequate; specific facts must connect the adverse action to the protected activity. Lewis also attempts to strengthen her claim through allegations regarding Prater's behavior, but these claims lack sufficient support or fail to establish a causal link. Even if a prima facie case were made, Holsum provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination, which Lewis did not prove to be a pretext. Consequently, the district court's summary judgment in favor of Holsum on the retaliatory discharge claim is affirmed.