McLean Contracting Company v. Waterman Steamship Corporation
Docket: 01-1542
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; January 14, 2002; Federal Appellate Court
McLean Contracting Company filed a maritime claim against Waterman Steamship Corporation in the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking damages from an allision caused by a barge operated by Waterman colliding with the Newport River Railroad Bridge, which McLean was repairing. Following a bench trial, the magistrate judge ruled in favor of McLean, awarding approximately $17,562.33 for damages incurred due to the incident on August 27, 1998, when the barge CG-5151 broke free during Hurricane Bonnie.
On appeal, Waterman contended that the magistrate judge wrongfully excluded evidence and improperly presumed fault. Notably, Waterman claimed it should not be liable for the actions of its third-party contractors, James River Towing Company and Captain Robert M. Glander, but raised this defense only shortly before trial, which McLean objected to based on its absence in the pretrial order. The magistrate judge upheld McLean's objection and excluded the defense based on procedural grounds.
The appellate court reviewed the magistrate judge's discretion in enforcing the pretrial order and affirmed the ruling, underscoring the trial court's broad authority to manage evidence and maintain the integrity of pretrial proceedings.
Waterman argues that the district court improperly relied on the pretrial order to exclude its third-party contractor defense, claiming this shifted the burden of proof to Waterman to disprove agency relationships asserted by McLean. According to settled agency law, McLean bears the burden of proving agency once the issue is contested. However, Waterman was required to identify disputed issues, and failing to do so does not shift the burden of proof. The pretrial order clearly indicated McLean’s intent to hold Waterman liable for the actions of James River Towing and Glander, which Waterman acknowledged as an integral part of McLean's liability theory. Waterman did not list agency as a trial issue in the pretrial order, thus waiving its right to have this issue heard in court. The magistrate judge was within discretion to exclude evidence related to the third-party contractor defense due to this waiver.
Furthermore, the magistrate judge applied a presumption of fault under admiralty law, which assumes that a moving vessel that collides with a stationary object is at fault, requiring Waterman to disprove the fault of its barge and the third parties involved. Waterman failed to introduce evidence explaining why its barge drifted away, leading to the conclusion that it did not meet its burden to rebut the presumption of fault. Although Waterman asserted that the presumption does not apply when the fault lies with independent contractors, the magistrate judge reasonably viewed James River Towing and Glander as Waterman's agents, allowing for imputed liability. Consequently, the judgment in favor of McLean was affirmed, as the magistrate properly excluded Waterman's defense under the pretrial order and correctly applied the presumption of negligence.
