Karla J. Markel v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System
Docket: 01-1513
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; January 3, 2002; Federal Appellate Court
Karla J. Markel was employed under a fixed-term contract by the University of Wisconsin Learning Innovations (UWLI) from October 1998 to June 1999. A month before her contract ended, she was dismissed but received full payment until the contract's expiration. Markel subsequently filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Wisconsin alleging gender discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and unequal pay under the Equal Pay Act of 1963. The University sought summary judgment, which the district court granted, determining no genuine issue of material fact existed. Markel appealed, but the appellate court affirmed the district court's decision.
During her employment, Markel's role involved promoting web-based services to health care organizations and included a non-compete clause in her contract. In April 1999, university supervisors discovered Markel and two colleagues were involved in a competing business, Learning W@rks, and were allegedly attempting to recruit UWLI employees. Following a meeting among these employees at a restaurant to discuss their business strategy, information was relayed to Markel's supervisors, leading to concerns about their potential competition with UWLI.
In May 1999, Offerman and Breitkreutz confronted Markel regarding her involvement with Learning W@rks, presenting her with written dismissal charges and an opportunity to respond. Offerman required Markel to either submit a signed statement detailing her knowledge of the new business or resign. Markel opted to consult an attorney instead of signing, leading to her immediate suspension from work and the return of UWLI property. Nonetheless, the termination process was not completed, and Markel received full pay until her contract ended on June 30, 1999. Afterward, she appealed her dismissal, but since her contract was nonrenewable, Offerman withdrew the charges.
The document then shifts to legal analysis, stating that summary judgment is reviewed de novo to assess if any genuine material fact exists that warrants a trial. In employment discrimination cases, summary judgment is appropriate when evidence does not support a reasonable jury's conclusions of discrimination against the plaintiff.
Markel claims direct discrimination based on statements allegedly made by Offerman and LaForge, which the defendants deny. The University argues these statements relate to performance, not gender, and that they cannot be classified as direct evidence of discrimination. The court notes that for evidence to qualify as direct, it must be contemporaneous with the adverse action, which was not the case here, as the statements were made months prior to Markel's removal. Consequently, the court concluded that Markel did not establish a valid claim of direct discrimination.
To establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination under the McDonnell-Douglas framework, a plaintiff must prove four elements: 1) membership in a protected class, 2) performance meeting the employer's legitimate expectations, 3) suffering an adverse employment action despite meeting those expectations, and 4) less favorable treatment compared to similarly situated male employees. In this case, Markel satisfies the first element as a member of a protected class. However, the district court determined she did not meet the second element due to a violation of her contract's non-compete clause, thereby not addressing the third element. On appeal, Markel argued she experienced an adverse employment action, despite not being formally dismissed; she received full pay until her non-renewable contract ended. Typically, adverse actions include economic harm such as termination, suspension, or failure to promote. While Markel could be viewed as constructively discharged or suspended pending termination, this issue need not be resolved since she failed to satisfy the second prong of the discrimination test.
Markel alleges adverse treatment due to being denied superior equipment, travel opportunities, and bonuses linked to account removals. However, these claims do not constitute actionable adverse employment actions, as established in case law. Adverse actions encompass more than measurable losses, but not every employee dissatisfaction qualifies. Relevant precedents indicate that lateral transfers without benefits loss, denied reimbursements, and denied bonuses are not adverse actions. Minor office differences, while potentially indicative of discriminatory treatment, do not meet the threshold for Title VII claims.
Markel also claims her termination was gender-based and asserts her contract was renewable. For summary judgment to be avoided, there must be a material dispute of fact. Mere speculation is insufficient; factual evidence is required. The formation of a new enterprise, Learning W@rks, and Markel's meetings regarding job opportunities were pivotal, especially since management acted upon information regarding these discussions. The simultaneous termination of another employee, Schafer, undermines Markel's claims of pretext. Furthermore, Markel's own documents clarify that her contract lacked renewal provisions, confirming her appointment was fixed and non-renewable.
Markel's counsel submitted an affidavit purportedly from Jeffery Sledge, which lacked proper certification and was signed by Markel's attorney, Alan Olson, rather than Sledge himself. This affidavit cannot be considered evidence due to its failure to comply with Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires affidavits to be based on personal knowledge and to be sworn or certified. Following a review of the facts, the district court correctly granted summary judgment, finding no material facts in dispute.
To establish a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) payment of different wages to employees of opposite sexes, 2) that these employees perform equal work requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and 3) that they have similar working conditions. Markel met the first requirement by showing a pay disparity with Schafer, who was an account manager like her. However, the University justified Schafer's higher pay citing his longer tenure and prior role as a program director, which the district court found to be legitimate, non-sex-based reasons.
Markel's claims regarding the pay disparity between her and Parks were insufficient as they did not perform substantially equal work. Additionally, Markel contested Schafer's entitlement to notice and severance pay upon termination, but the University demonstrated that Schafer's length of service warranted such benefits under the relevant administrative code, a conclusion supported by the district court. Markel failed to provide evidence to counter this interpretation.
Ultimately, the application of legal principles to the case affirmed that no reasonable jury could determine that discrimination occurred against Markel, leading to the conclusion being upheld.
