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T.R.D. v. State
Citation: 673 So. 2d 838Docket: CR-93-1801
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; October 20, 1995; Alabama; State Appellate Court
Judge Cobb reassigned this case on January 17, 1995, involving juvenile appellant T.R.D., charged with the capital murder of Vicki Lynn Deblieux during a first-degree kidnapping, as per Alabama law. The State sought to transfer the case to adult court, which was granted after a hearing. T.R.D. appeals the transfer order, arguing insufficient evidence of probable cause for capital murder, contending that while a homicide occurred, there was no proof of a kidnapping. The facts reveal that T.R.D. and others picked up Deblieux while she was hitchhiking. They agreed to drive her in exchange for lodging but instead took her to a secluded area where they murdered her after she expressed a desire to leave. Evidence indicates that once at the location, threats were made, and the group physically assaulted Deblieux, ultimately suffocating her. After the murder, they transported her body, mutilated it, and disposed of it over a cliff. T.R.D. claims the victim was free to leave and did not demonstrate coercion; however, the court disagrees, stating that first-degree kidnapping occurs if a person is abducted with intent to inflict harm or abuse, supporting the charge against T.R.D. and the transfer to adult court. The term "abduct" is legally defined as restraining a person to prevent their liberation by either hiding them or using/threatening deadly force. "Restrain" involves unlawfully restricting a person's movements without consent, which can occur through physical force, intimidation, or deception. The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to demonstrate intent to kidnap, arguing that the victim entered the vehicle voluntarily. However, the statute does not necessitate that a victim be forcibly taken to a confined location. Legal precedents affirm that a victim may voluntarily enter a location but can still be considered kidnapped if they are later restrained against their will. The definition of restraint emphasizes intentional, unlawful, and nonconsensual confinement. In this case, the victim's request to exit the vehicle after realizing she was not being taken to her intended destination indicates that she was being held against her will. Evidence suggests that the appellant and accomplices intended to harm the victim, and their intent can be inferred from their actions after initially picking her up. Additionally, for juvenile transfer to criminal prosecution, only a probable cause finding is required, which is determined by whether a reasonable person would believe an offense has been committed by the individual in question. A reasonable inference can be drawn that the men involved intended to kidnap and murder the woman, as the facts presented align closely with the appellant's statement, excluding details of post-mortem mutilation. The State successfully met the lower burden of establishing probable cause. The appellant argues that the juvenile judge erred by considering only one of the six statutory factors required before transferring a case for criminal prosecution under § 12-15-34. This statute mandates a hearing to determine if transferring the case serves the child's or public's best interest, considering factors such as the nature of the offense, the child's delinquency record, responses to treatment, demeanor, maturity, and community interests. Although the juvenile court is not required to provide specific findings on these factors, it must indicate that they were considered in its order. The court's transfer order reflected that it had considered all factors before deciding to transfer the case to circuit court. The appellate court will not overturn the transfer unless it finds the lower court's decision clearly erroneous. The appellant claims the court disproportionately weighted the gruesomeness of the crime compared to other factors, but case law supports that the trial court has discretion in weighing the factors as it sees fit, provided all are considered. No abuse of discretion was found in the judgment. The appellant challenges the admissibility of a photograph of the victim, arguing that it was introduced without proper foundational support. According to established evidentiary standards, photographs must be verified and relevant to proving or disproving a fact. The photograph in question, taken in 1992, was identified by the victim's mother, who testified that it accurately depicted her daughter prior to her murder. The court found the photograph relevant and properly authenticated, as the mother had been present during its capture and provided it to the prosecution. The trial court's decision to admit the photograph is subject to review only for abuse of discretion, which was not evident in this case. Additionally, the appellant claims the juvenile court improperly admitted a statement from L.C.M. against him. However, the court determined that the appellant did not preserve this issue for review because his counsel failed to join the objection raised by L.C.M.'s counsel. The judge had instructed that objections must be made individually for each defendant, and the record shows no indication that objections made by one counsel were considered applicable to all defendants. Consequently, the court concluded that the appellant's failure to independently object means the issue is not preserved for review. The court affirmed the transfer of the appellant to stand trial as an adult for his role in the kidnapping and murder of Vicki Lynn Deblieux, with all judges concurring.