Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; December 19, 2001; Federal Appellate Court
Petitioner Arnold Winters was convicted in 1987 of murder, attempted murder, and robbery in Marion County, Indiana. He challenged his conviction through a direct appeal and a post-conviction petition, both of which were unsuccessful. A federal district court subsequently denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Winters' conviction did not stem from any constitutional violations.
The case's factual background details a violent incident on July 23, 1986, where Winters shot and killed security officer Eugene Kee during an altercation involving his brothers, Jay and Donnie Winters. After Kee was shot, officer Melvin McCullough was also shot multiple times by Winters and Jay, although he survived.
During the jury's deliberation, there were two significant issues: the jury foreman's attempt to communicate a request to listen to a tape recording, which was denied without the judge's or attorneys' awareness, and a request for a definition of aiding and abetting, which also went unaddressed. Despite these issues, the jury convicted Winters, sentencing him to concurrent prison terms of 40 years for murder and 30 years each for attempted murder and robbery.
Winters appealed his convictions on two grounds: (1) the trial court's error in not severing his trial from those of his co-defendants, and (2) the insufficiency of evidence to support his convictions. His appellate counsel did not address the bailiff's ex parte interference with the jury. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. Winters then sought state post-conviction relief, which was initially granted but later vacated and remanded. On remand, the conviction was reinstated, and the Indiana Supreme Court declined further review. Subsequently, Winters filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, which was denied. He now appeals, asserting two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) trial counsel failed to present evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder to support his defense, and (2) appellate counsel neglected to raise the bailiff’s improper interactions with the jury. He contends that the district and Indiana courts incorrectly applied the Lockhart v. Fretwell standard instead of the Strickland v. Washington standard for evaluating counsel effectiveness.
Federal courts can grant habeas corpus if a state court judgment violates the U.S. Constitution (28 U.S.C. sec. 2254). Relief is granted if the state court decision contradicts or unreasonably applies clearly established federal law. The review of district court decisions on habeas relief involves clear error for fact findings and de novo for legal conclusions. State court findings are presumed correct unless contradicted by clear and convincing evidence.
Under the Sixth Amendment, defendants are entitled to effective counsel, which must be competent and not so deficient as to undermine the trial's reliability. To establish ineffective assistance under Strickland, Winters must show that his counsel’s representation was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced his right to a fair trial. A strong presumption exists that counsel's performance falls within reasonable professional standards, and a petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed absent the counsel's errors.
Winters, during his post-conviction proceedings, presented evidence from two psychologists indicating he suffered from PTSD due to his Vietnam service, which he claimed influenced his actions when he shot Officer Kee. He argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for not introducing this evidence to support his 'defense of others' claim, asserting he shot Kee believing Kee would seriously harm his brother, Jay. The court found Winters' claim without merit, emphasizing the need to assess counsel's decisions based on the knowledge and norms at the time of the trial in 1987. It noted that PTSD was not widely recognized then, and presenting such evidence would not have aligned with prevailing professional standards. Even if counsel's performance was deemed deficient, Winters failed to demonstrate that this deficiency prejudiced the outcome of the trial, as he could not show a reasonable probability that the result would have been different but for the alleged errors. The overwhelming evidence against him, including his initiation of the attack and subsequent flight from the state, further undermined his defense claim. Ultimately, the court concluded Winters did not meet the Strickland standard for proving ineffective assistance of counsel, affirming the Indiana courts' rejection of his claim as reasonable and consistent with established federal law.
Winters claims ineffective assistance of appellate counsel due to failure to appeal the bailiff's ex parte interference with the jury, which the Indiana courts rejected. He argues that the courts incorrectly applied the Lockhart standard instead of the Strickland standard for evaluating ineffective counsel claims. Under Strickland, a petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and prejudice. Appellate counsel's performance is deemed deficient if they fail to raise an issue that is obvious and significantly stronger than those presented. However, counsel is not required to raise every non-frivolous issue.
In this case, the bailiff's actions included denying the jury's first request with a simple "no," and it is unclear if the jury received a response to a subsequent inquiry. Winters contends that this interference violated his right to be present during critical stages of the prosecution. However, the court determined that the ex parte communication did not warrant a reversal or new trial, thus the appellate counsel was not ineffective. A defendant has a constitutional right to be present at critical stages, but this does not extend to every interaction between the court and jury. While ex parte communication creates a presumption of error, it does not inherently require reversal unless the defendant shows prejudice from such communication.
In Winters' situation, although the bailiff's lack of communication with the judge was inappropriate, it was deemed a harmless error, as Winters did not prove that the bailiff's communication prejudiced the trial's outcome. The absence of evidence regarding the jury's second note further undermines the claim. The appellate counsel raised other viable issues, and omitting the bailiff's interference was within professional norms and did not result in prejudice. Although the Indiana courts misapplied the Lockhart standard, the Strickland analysis led to the same conclusion, affirming that Winters did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. As a result, the district court's decision was upheld.
