Second Amendment Foundation v. United States Conference of Mayors

Citations: 274 F.3d 521; 348 U.S. App. D.C. 238; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 27009; 2001 WL 1635883Docket: 00-7188

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; December 20, 2001; Federal Appellate Court

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Firearm consumers and organizations, including the Second Amendment Foundation (SAF), filed a civil conspiracy lawsuit against the mayors of twenty-two cities for allegedly violating their First, Second, and Ninth Amendment rights. The mayors had initiated lawsuits against gun manufacturers and dealers, claiming these entities contributed to public nuisance by irresponsibly marketing firearms. SAF contended that the mayors conspired to harm these manufacturers financially through litigation, resulting in increased prices and reduced sales of firearms, thus infringing upon SAF's rights and interstate commerce.

The mayors, none of whom reside in the District of Columbia, moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that their participation in a meeting in D.C. did not constitute sufficient grounds for jurisdiction under the District of Columbia long-arm statute. SAF claimed jurisdiction existed as the mayors “transacted business” through their discussions at the United States Conference of Mayors' meeting in D.C., where they shared litigation strategies against gun manufacturers. The district court ruled in favor of the mayors, concluding that attending the meeting did not meet the jurisdictional criteria. The Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal, agreeing that the mayors’ actions did not subject them to suit in the District of Columbia.

Mayors from various cities, including New Orleans and Chicago, engaged in discussions about lawsuits against the gun industry, with Miami-Dade County and Bridgeport filing new suits. The court dismissed the complaint against the gun industry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), finding that the allegations did not establish personal jurisdiction. SAF is appealing this dismissal, which focuses solely on legal issues since the facts are undisputed. The mayors also contend that SAF lacks Article III standing. The court emphasizes that personal jurisdiction is paramount and can be exercised under the District's long-arm statute when a person transacts business in the District. SAF's argument relies on the "conspiracy theory" of personal jurisdiction, asserting that conspiratorial activities can create jurisdictional contacts. To succeed, SAF must demonstrate a prima facie case of civil conspiracy, which requires proving an agreement among parties to engage in an unlawful act, resulting in injury through an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Simply alleging conspiracy is insufficient; specific acts must connect the defendant to the forum for jurisdiction to be established.

SAF contends that the four mayors present at the 67th Winter Meeting, along with the eighteen absent mayors from cities that also filed suit, engaged in business transactions within the District under the long-arm statute by conspiring to harm gun manufacturers. However, SAF has failed to provide specific acts demonstrating that the mayors agreed to file lawsuits with an unlawful intent. The claim of conspiracy is merely a legal conclusion and does not meet the required standard for establishing personal jurisdiction, as established in Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt. Discussions led by Mayor Rendell on legislative and litigation strategies do not imply an unlawful agreement to file lawsuits. Additionally, SAF's argument that the collective action of multiple cities filing suit indicates a conspiratorial agreement is deemed unpersuasive, particularly since some cities had filed lawsuits prior to the meeting. This failure to show a prima facie case regarding the necessary elements of civil conspiracy leads to the conclusion that the district court correctly determined there was insufficient evidence for jurisdiction. Furthermore, while SAF argues the district court erred by dismissing the suit without allowing jurisdictional discovery, plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable discovery when faced with such a motion.

To obtain discovery, a party must formally request it. SAF referenced jurisdictional discovery only during a hearing related to the mayors' motion to dismiss, stating an expectation that evidence of a conspiratorial agreement would emerge post-discovery. However, SAF did not file a motion for jurisdictional discovery nor did it argue against the dismissal on the basis of lacking discovery. Consequently, the district court did not issue a discovery order. The court of appeals will not entertain SAF's claim of an erroneous denial of jurisdictional discovery, as it failed to timely raise this issue in prior proceedings. The district court's decision is affirmed.