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Kashuba v. Jim Limbaugh Toyota, Inc.
Citations: 669 So. 2d 987; 1995 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 668; 1995 WL 681771Docket: 2940790
Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama; November 16, 1995; Alabama; State Appellate Court
Jeanette Kashuba appeals a summary judgment favoring Jim Limbaugh Toyota, Inc. and its agents regarding her purchase of a used 1988 Honda Prelude. After responding to a newspaper ad, Kashuba learned the vehicle was at another dealership and returned multiple times to inquire about it. During her visits, she asked about the car's condition and completed paperwork for the sale. Six days later, she purchased the vehicle but later discovered it needed a new transmission and had previously sustained extensive damage. Limbaugh Toyota agreed to repair the transmission and other issues at no cost but required her to sign a release, which she claims she misunderstood, believing it only pertained to the repairs. In March 1993, Kashuba filed suit against Limbaugh Toyota for negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement. The trial court granted summary judgment to the dealership on March 21, 1995. In reviewing the motion for summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard as the trial court, assessing whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The burden shifts to the nonmovant to provide substantial evidence of a genuine issue when the movant establishes a prima facie case. The court must interpret the record in favor of the nonmovant and resolve doubts against the movant, allowing fraud claims to typically be decided by the factfinder if evidence supports such inferences. Limbaugh Toyota contends that Kashuba’s claim is invalid due to a release she signed, which discharges the company from all claims related to a transaction on March 14, 1992, in exchange for repairs. A release obtained through fraud is void, as established in Taylor v. Dorough. In the absence of fraud, a clear release will be honored based on its explicit terms, with no external evidence allowed to challenge it, per Miles v. Barrett. Kashuba claims that Limbaugh Toyota fraudulently secured the release, supported by her deposition which indicates that the agents did not fully disclose the release's meaning, she did not understand it, relied on the agents' representations, and felt compelled to sign to retrieve her vehicle. Given this evidence, a reasonable inference exists that Limbaugh Toyota fraudulently obtained the release, potentially rendering it void and not a barrier to her claims. Additionally, Kashuba provided an affidavit from mechanic Thomas Hurly, who reported prior damage to the vehicle, substandard repairs, and advised against driving it. Her testimony also suggests that Limbaugh Toyota misrepresented the vehicle's condition, specifically regarding the transmission and body damage, which influenced her purchasing decision. Based on this assessment, the court cannot conclude that reasonable individuals would dismiss Kashuba's claims and thus reverses the summary judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings.