Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; November 15, 2001; Federal Appellate Court
On May 10, 2000, the County of Morris, New Jersey, initiated a declaratory judgment action in state court to affirm the constitutionality of its policies regulating private use of county facilities, prompted by a threatened lawsuit from the Nationalist Movement. The organization planned a parade and rally in Morristown on July 4, 2000. After the case was transferred to federal court, the District Court ruled that the courthouse steps and lawn were not public forums, allowing the County to reasonably prohibit the Nationalist Movement from using these areas for their rally. The court also found that some of the County's policies were constitutional while others were not. On appeal, the Nationalist Movement argued that the District Court incorrectly ruled their First Amendment rights did not extend to the courthouse steps. The appeal's relevance regarding the right to use the courthouse facilities became moot due to subsequent events, although the question of attorney's fees remained open. The conflict arose from the Nationalist Movement's request for permission to hold an "Independence from Affirmative-Action Day" event, including a parade and rally at the courthouse, with specific logistical needs outlined in their correspondence with the County.
On April 26, 2000, County Administrator James J. Rosenberg informed Mr. Barrett of the Nationalist Movement about Policy and Procedure Guidelines No. 4:1.01 concerning public facility use. He mandated that the Nationalist Movement provide liability insurance of $3,000,000 for bodily injury and $5,000,000 for property damage due to potential risks associated with their planned rally in Morristown. Rosenberg noted that the courthouse would be closed on July 4 and suggested the rear of the courthouse as an alternative assembly location, as Washington Street would remain open due to holiday traffic concerns. He also indicated that any event would incur costs for additional police, fire, and public works support above normal staffing levels.
In response, Barrett’s May 4, 2000 letter appealed to the Board of Freeholders, challenged the constitutionality of the policy on First Amendment grounds, and indicated that the Nationalist Movement would not waive objections to fees and insisted on using the front of the courthouse while threatening to hold the County liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment violations. Subsequently, the County filed for a declaratory judgment in state court to confirm the constitutionality of its actions under the policy. The Nationalist Movement removed the case to federal court, counterclaiming under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for First Amendment violations, and sought injunctions, damages, and declaratory relief.
The District Court denied the County's motion to remand the case, conducted a four-day evidentiary hearing, and issued an oral opinion on June 22, 2000, followed by a written order on June 27, 2000. The court noted an agreement on the parade route and restricted access to rally supporters. It determined that the courthouse steps and lawn were not public forums, considering them merely functional areas for courthouse access rather than designated public spaces. The court concluded that there were sufficient alternative venues for the rally.
The District Court ruled that the County could impose reasonable restrictions on the use of certain areas as long as these did not aim to suppress expression due to opposition to the speaker's views. The Court determined that prior use of the courthouse steps and lawn for a Memorial Day observance did not establish those areas as public forums for other groups. While the Court refused to dictate the location of a rally, it suggested the County consider closing part of Court Street near the courthouse for the holiday.
The Court evaluated the County's policy 4:1.01, which was the sole written authority for the County's response to the Nationalist Movement's request. Although the County's decision was not found to be influenced by opposition to the Nationalist Movement's message, several aspects of the policy were deemed invalid:
(a) the hold-harmless provision was overly broad;
(b) the requirement for County Administrator approval for all applications lacked clear standards and posed potential for abuse;
(c) the provision allowing fees for facility use without a clear schedule or limits was unconstitutional based on Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement; and
(d) the insurance provision was unenforceable.
The Court also found it unreasonable for the County to charge the Nationalist Movement for anticipated emergency service costs. The Nationalist Movement's § 1983 counterclaim was denied as premature, as the County had not violated any constitutional rights. Consequently, the Nationalist Movement was not considered a prevailing party but could still seek attorney's fees related to the County's declaratory judgment action.
On July 4, 2000, the Nationalist Movement held its event in Morristown, marching near the courthouse but not using the courthouse lawn or steps. Subsequently, they filed a motion for attorney's fees totaling $48,750.15, supported by detailed affidavits. However, on August 8, 2000, the District Court denied their application for attorney's fees in connection with the County's declaratory judgment action.
The District Court concluded that the Nationalist Movement failed to demonstrate a violation of its rights under § 1983, which meant that § 1988's provision for attorney's fees was not applicable. Even if § 1988 were considered, the District Court found it appropriate to deny the attorney's fees request due to several reasons: the Nationalist Movement did not succeed on the main issue of access to the courthouse steps and lawn, many issues were resolved by consent, and the application for fees was deemed flawed and inflated, questioning its good faith. Consequently, the Court could not accurately quantify the requested amounts.
On October 2, 2000, the District Court denied the Nationalist Movement's motions for reconsideration of its earlier opinions and orders. The discussion on mootness established that the declaratory judgment action regarding the July 4, 2000 event was moot, as the Constitution’s Article III restricts federal courts to actual controversies. Both parties argued against mootness, with the Nationalist Movement claiming the situation was "capable of repetition, yet evading review," and the County suggesting ongoing intent to pursue future rallies. However, the Court found that the exception for mootness applied only in exceptional circumstances, which did not apply here. The District Court had already provided guidance for the July 4 event, and future disputes could be addressed in new lawsuits.
Finally, regarding attorney's fees, the Court affirmed that a request for fees could still be considered even if a case became moot during appeal, but the Nationalist Movement argued that the District Court erred in entirely denying its application for fees.
The Nationalist Movement claims it is a prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 after successfully defending against the County's declaratory judgment action. In contrast, the County contends that no fees should be awarded, arguing that it initiated the action and that the Nationalist Movement's legal success did not cover central issues in dispute. The County also cites the District Court's reasoning that the Nationalist Movement's fee application was irregular and exaggerated.
The review of the District Court's ruling encompasses three issues: 1) whether § 1988 supports an award of fees following the dismissal of the Nationalist Movement's § 1983 counterclaim, 2) whether the Nationalist Movement qualifies as a 'prevailing party,' and 3) whether the inadequacy of the fee application justifies a complete denial. The first two issues are subject to plenary review, while the adequacy of the application involves both legal standards and factual findings regarding excessive expenses.
Generally, each party bears its own costs unless a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees under § 1988(b) in cases enforcing § 1983. The District Court noted that the Nationalist Movement did not experience a deprivation of rights, as they had adhered to court rulings to prevent any violation. Consequently, it ruled that without a violation of § 1983, fees could not be awarded. However, the review indicates that the Nationalist Movement did prevail on issues relevant to their § 1983 claim, as the County's declaratory judgment action mirrored a § 1983 suit. Thus, the substantive outcomes matter more than the nominal roles of the parties involved.
The Nationalist Movement is recognized as a prevailing party under § 1988 due to its success in challenging portions of policy 4:1.01 deemed unconstitutional. The case is remanded to the District Court to determine the appropriate attorney's fees. The appeal regarding the right to use the courthouse steps and lawn for a rally is dismissed as moot. The County revised policy 4:1.01 after the District Court's ruling, which included changes to application procedures, discretion, fees, and insurance requirements. Despite the Nationalist Movement's intent to hold future events at the courthouse, the mootness of the case is supported by the revisions made by the County. The District Court found deficiencies in the Nationalist Movement's fee application, particularly regarding the lack of distinction between successful and unsuccessful claims, and criticized the inclusion of questionable transportation expenses and unsubstantiated time claims. These criticisms suggest significant issues with the fee application that the District Court is entitled to address.
