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C.E.B. v. State
Citations: 668 So. 2d 922; 1995 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 311; 1995 WL 527818Docket: CR-94-0949
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; September 8, 1995; Alabama; State Appellate Court
C.E.B. Jr. appeals the juvenile court's order to transfer him to circuit court for trial as an adult for capital murder, violating Alabama Code § 13A-5-40. The incident occurred on May 24, 1994, when C.E.B. and three others were pursued by a white Chevrolet Cavalier. At an intersection, C.E.B. allegedly fired three shots from a gray Honda Accord, resulting in the death of 16-year-old Davin Jefferson, a passenger in the Cavalier. The appellant argues that the evidence for probable cause is inadequate, citing potential witness bias and conflicting testimonies, including claims of hearsay. Witness William Gaiter testified that C.E.B. was in the front passenger seat and fired the shots, while Travis Crutcher corroborated Gaiter's account, noting C.E.B. placed a gun under the seat after the shooting. Investigator Bud Parker confirmed that eyewitness reports about the shooter were conflicting but consistent regarding the vehicle involved. The court noted that the transfer hearing's purpose is to establish probable cause, defined as sufficient evidence that would lead a reasonable person to believe the accused committed the offense. The juvenile court's probable cause finding will be upheld unless clearly erroneous, and based on the hearing testimony, it was reasonable to conclude that C.E.B. fired the fatal shot. The appellant's argument that Gaiter and Crutcher were potential accomplices raises issues related to the weight and credibility of evidence, which are not subject to appellate review, as established in Glover v. State. Hearsay testimony from Investigator Parker, introduced during the appellant’s cross-examination, did not influence the establishment of probable cause. The juvenile court correctly found probable cause for the appellant's offense. The appellant also argued that the juvenile court's decision to transfer him lacked clear and convincing evidence. This standard is defined as evidence that makes a proposition "highly probable," falling between a preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, as clarified in D.D.P. v. State. The transfer order addressed the six required factors from 12-15-34, specifically noting the serious nature of the offense, the absence of effective treatment options in the juvenile system, and assessments of the appellant's demeanor and maturity. Testimony from the appellant's probation officer supported the transfer recommendation, indicating that the juvenile system could not adequately address the appellant's needs. Consequently, the juvenile court's order to transfer the appellant is justified by clear and convincing evidence, and the court's decision is affirmed, with all judges concurring.