Christy Brzonkala,plaintiff, and United States of America, Intervenor-Plaintiffappellee v. Antonio J. Morrison James Landale Crawford, and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Cornell D. Brown William E. Lansidle, in His Apacity as Comptroller of the Commonwealth
Docket: 00-2437
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; December 2, 2001; Federal Appellate Court
Antonio J. Morrison and James L. Crawford successfully challenged the constitutionality of Subtitle C of the Violence Against Women Act, which led to a Supreme Court ruling that it exceeded Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. Following this, they sought attorneys' fees from the United States under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), after their request was denied by the district court. The EAJA allows for the award of reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in civil actions involving the United States, unless prohibited by statute. The general principle under the American Rule is that parties bear their own legal fees, but the common-benefit doctrine permits fee awards to individuals who benefit from litigation they did not participate in, spreading the costs among beneficiaries. The case highlights the interplay between the EAJA, the common-benefit doctrine, and the circumstances under which attorneys' fees may be awarded against the government.
The common-benefit doctrine has traditionally been applied in shareholder derivative suits and union member lawsuits against unions. The Supreme Court’s decision in Alyeska delineates four requirements for a class to recover attorneys' fees under this doctrine: the class must be small and easily ascertainable, benefits must be traceable with accuracy, and there must be confidence that costs can be shifted precisely to those benefiting. This ruling restricts fee recovery for individuals acting as private attorneys general. In a case considered, the district court found that defendants failed to establish the necessary connection between litigation costs and a specific class of beneficiaries, rejecting their reliance on the Brewer case as a precedent for fee recovery. Two proposed classes of beneficiaries were identified: all U.S. taxpayers and individuals spared from prosecution due to the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison. However, the broad class of taxpayers does not meet Alyeska's criteria for being small and identifiable, resembling claims that were previously dismissed by other circuits. Similarly, even if individuals spared from liability could be identified, costs would not be accurately shifted to them since all federal taxpayers would incur the burden, not just those directly benefitting. Defendants attempted to sidestep Alyeska's requirements, but their arguments did not prevail.
Plaintiffs in Brewer appealed a district court's approval of a school desegregation plan, arguing it did not provide free bus transportation for students beyond walking distance, and sought attorneys' fees from the school board. The court agreed with the plaintiffs, awarding fees based on a 'quasi-application of the common fund doctrine,' noting that the litigation secured a direct financial benefit for students. The court highlighted two essential factors from Brewer: the creation of a common fund for student transportation and the necessity of assessing fees against the school board to fulfill the relief purpose. In the current case, these factors were absent, and thus the court found no justification for applying the common-fund or common-benefit doctrines. The defendants failed to demonstrate that assessing fees against the United States would spread litigation costs among a qualifying class of beneficiaries. Consequently, the district court's denial of the defendants' motion for fees was upheld, affirming the judgment.
