Dossey Douglas v. California Department of Youth Authority

Citations: 271 F.3d 812; 2001 WL 1412937Docket: 99-17140

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; November 26, 2001; Federal Appellate Court

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Dossey Douglas, an African-American applicant, was denied employment by the California Youth Authority (CYA) due to color-blindness, leading him to sue CYA under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CYA, citing statute of limitations as a bar to Douglas's claims. On appeal, Douglas argued that his claims were timely based on the continuing violations doctrine, asserting that CYA's discriminatory policy was ongoing, and sought to excuse any failure to meet the statute of limitations through equitable tolling or estoppel. CYA, in its defense, raised the Eleventh Amendment for the first time.

The Ninth Circuit remanded the ADA claim to the district court to assess whether CYA waived its sovereign immunity. For the Section 504 claim, the court found that California had waived its sovereign immunity by accepting federal funds. The Ninth Circuit agreed with Douglas that his claims were timely under the continuing violations doctrine, thus not needing to address the equitable arguments. Douglas had previously passed various screening tests for a Group Supervisor position, ranked fourth on the eligibility list, and was later informed of a new color vision standard after he had applied.

CYA tested Douglas's vision on February 1, 1996, informing him he failed the color vision test. He was offered the option to pay for a further test, the Farnsworth D-15, which he took with Dr. Shinfuku on February 5, 1996, who found a "moderate" color vision deficiency. The Chief Medical Officer at CYA reviewed this and concluded Douglas failed the test. Douglas was notified on March 1, 1996, of his failure and informed he could appeal to the State Personnel Board within thirty days. Dr. Shinfuku later assessed the job qualifications and stated Douglas was eligible despite his deficiency. 

On March 24, 1996, Douglas met with an Equal Opportunity Technician at CYA for appeal guidance but was not informed about the federal EEOC. In late March 1996, he filed a complaint with CYA’s EEO and appealed to the State Personnel Board, which denied his discrimination charge on May 2, 1996. Douglas re-tested for the Group Supervisor position in fall 1996. On February 27, 1997, the State Personnel Board denied his appeal but informed him of his rights to pursue legal action or file with the EEOC or California Fair Employment and Housing Department (CFEH).

Douglas filed a charge with the federal EEOC on April 9, 1997, which led to a "cause finding" on February 23, 1998, indicating CYA's color vision requirement violated the ADA. He filed a federal lawsuit in July 1998, alleging violations of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, seeking damages and injunctive relief. CYA moved for summary judgment, claiming Douglas failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the ADA claim and that the Rehabilitation Act claim was time-barred. Douglas contended his claims were timely under a continuing violations theory and sought equitable tolling or estoppel for the Rehabilitation Act claim. The district court rejected these arguments and granted summary judgment to CYA, leading Douglas to file a timely appeal.

California asserts that it is shielded from Douglas's claims in federal court by the Eleventh Amendment, citing the Supreme Court's ruling in *Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett*, which determined that ADA Title I claims for monetary damages against states are barred by this amendment. California only raised this defense on May 21, 2001, shortly before oral arguments, prompting the court to request additional briefing on the implications of *Garrett*. 

The Eleventh Amendment generally protects states from lawsuits by citizens in federal court, with three notable exceptions: states may waive this defense, Congress can abrogate state immunity under a valid constitutional authority, and the Ex parte Young doctrine allows suits against state officials seeking prospective injunctive relief. 

In *Garrett*, the Supreme Court examined whether Congress had validly abrogated states' immunity under Title I of the ADA, establishing a two-part inquiry: first, whether Congress clearly expressed its intent to abrogate state immunity, and second, whether this action was based on a valid constitutional authority. The latter requires a demonstration of "congruence and proportionality" between the injury being addressed and the legislative measures taken, which involves documenting historical wrongs under the Fourteenth Amendment.

At the time of the district court proceedings, circuit courts were split on whether Congress had exercised its authority validly under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment regarding the ADA, with some circuits affirming its congruence and proportionality while others disagreed.

The Supreme Court in Garrett determined that Title I of the ADA does not permit claims for monetary damages against states due to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court ruled that while Congress intended to abrogate this immunity, it acted beyond its authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the ADA did not meet the "congruent and proportionality" test, lacking sufficient evidence of irrational state discrimination in employment against individuals with disabilities. California argues that Douglas's claims for damages under the Rehabilitation Act and Title I of the ADA are similarly barred by the Eleventh Amendment. However, Douglas asserts that his Rehabilitation Act claim is valid because California waived its sovereign immunity by accepting federal funds. This position is supported by the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Clark v. State of California, which held that states can be sued in federal court under the Rehabilitation Act if they accept its funds, based on the premise that such acceptance signifies a waiver of immunity. Other circuit courts, including the Eighth and Fourth, have affirmed this interpretation, stating that the Rehabilitation Act's explicit waiver of sovereign immunity is a valid exercise of Congress's spending power, thus allowing states to be held accountable in federal court for violations of the Act's provisions.

The decision in Clark established that states do not have immunity under the Rehabilitation Act, based on Congress's authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. However, this holding's validity is questioned following the Garrett ruling, which found that Congress exceeded its powers in abrogating such immunity under the ADA. CYA contends that Garrett necessitates overruling Clark's abrogation finding, but does not dispute Clark's alternative holding that states waive immunity by accepting federal Rehabilitation Act funds. 

If California is found to have waived its sovereign immunity by accepting these funds, the issue of Congress's power to abrogate immunity under the Rehabilitation Act need not be addressed. Most district courts post-Garrett have ruled that the Eleventh Amendment does not protect states from Rehabilitation Act lawsuits in federal court, with some exceptions noted. 

The conclusion reached is that California has waived its sovereign immunity under the Rehabilitation Act by accepting federal funds, affirming Clark’s decision that receiving these funds entails waiving the Eleventh Amendment defense. Douglas's Rehabilitation Act claim is therefore not barred. 

Post-Garrett, states are recognized as immune from damages under Title I of the ADA, leaving the question of California's waiver of sovereign immunity for Douglas’s ADA claim. Waivers must be clear but can also be implicit through conduct indicating an intent to relinquish immunity, as exemplified in relevant case law.

CYA did not assert the Eleventh Amendment defense in the district court or in its appellate brief, leading to questions of potential waiver of this defense due to its conduct. The court found that resolving this waiver issue may require additional factual investigation, thus remanding the matter to the district court. The district court previously granted summary judgment to CYA, ruling that claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act were time-barred. Douglas argues these claims are timely under the continuing violations doctrine, which allows for claim accrual to extend if a continuing pattern of discrimination occurs within the limitations period. To survive summary judgment, Douglas must show that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the applicability of this doctrine to CYA's discriminatory policies.

There are two accepted methods for establishing a continuing violation: demonstrating a series of related acts, with at least one occurring within the limitations period, or showing a systematic policy of discrimination that spans the limitations period. Douglas contends that CYA’s color vision requirement reflects such a systemic discriminatory policy. If discrimination and injury are ongoing, the statute of limitations does not start until the discriminatory conduct ceases. Although prior cases have predominantly addressed systemic violations in the context of promotion or placement discrimination, this case involves hiring discrimination, necessitating consideration of whether ongoing discriminatory policies, paired with repeated employment applications by the plaintiff, affect the limitations period.

The analysis of the timeliness of Douglas's claims focuses on the applicable statute of limitations for his Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims. The Rehabilitation Act claim, which has a one-year statute of limitations, is barred if it accrued before July 5, 1997, as Douglas filed suit on July 6, 1998. The ADA claim is timely if he filed an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged violation; since he filed the charge on April 18, 1997, it must relate to discrimination occurring on or after June 22, 1996.

Douglas applied for a position as a group supervisor in 1994 and again in 1996, asserting that applications are kept on file for about two years. He argues for the application of the continuing violations doctrine, citing his denial of the position on March 1, 1996, and his subsequent application in October 1996. He appealed the denial of his 1994 application, which was rejected by the State Personnel Board in February 1997, with no further evidence of a response from CYA regarding his second application.

The document references two Ninth Circuit cases relevant to the continuing violations doctrine. In *Domingo v. New England Fish Co.*, the court required plaintiffs to show they were discriminated against or exposed to discrimination during the limitations period due to ongoing discriminatory policies. In *EEOC v. Local 350*, the court found that a discriminatory policy in effect for years could allow claims to proceed despite the statute of limitations, as the plaintiffs were continuously exposed to the discrimination. Both cases support the notion that the existence of ongoing discriminatory policies can affect the timeliness of claims under the continuing violations doctrine.

Douglas presented sufficient facts to question whether he was subjected to CYA's discriminatory policy during the relevant limitations period, specifically between 1996 and 1998. His application process in 1994 was successful until the vision test, and there is no evidence indicating he was less qualified upon reapplying in 1996. It can be reasonably inferred that CYA's failure to respond to his 1996 application was due to discrimination related to the vision test. By reapplying in late 1996, Douglas remained subject to CYA’s discriminatory practices throughout the period, which extends the deadlines for filing his claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act beyond June 22, 1996, and July 5, 1997, respectively. Consequently, his claims are deemed timely, leading to the reversal of the district court's summary judgment. Additionally, California waived its sovereign immunity regarding Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by accepting federal funds. The court remands the issue of whether the state waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity under the ADA. The claims under both acts are recognized as timely under the continuing violations doctrine.

The only district court that found acceptance of federal Rehabilitation Act funds does not waive immunity under the Act based its ruling on the Supreme Court's decision in College Savings Bank, not on Garrett. This reliance is deemed inappropriate. In College Savings Bank, the Supreme Court revisited the constructive waiver doctrine from Parden v. Terminal Railway, which held that a state waived its sovereign immunity by engaging in interstate commerce under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). The Supreme Court clarified that while it overruled the constructive waiver doctrine in the Parden context, it distinguished this from constructive waivers implied from a state’s acceptance of federal funds. The ruling affirms that Congress can condition federal funds on a state's agreement to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, even if it cannot compel such a waiver.

Douglas has not named a state official as a defendant, rendering the Ex parte Young doctrine inapplicable. An allegation from Douglas regarding a Deputy Attorney General instructing trial counsel not to raise the Eleventh Amendment immunity defense lacks evidentiary support. Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment is viewed as an affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional barrier, allowing consideration of the merits of Douglas's timely ADA claim. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to address a circuit conflict regarding the continuing violations doctrine in hostile work environment cases, but its decision will not likely impact this case, which concerns systemic violations. The broader question of whether a systemic policy of discrimination alone can extend the limitations period in failure to hire cases need not be resolved, though the Fifth Circuit has indicated that mere existence of such a policy would not suffice to constitute a continuing violation.

The employer can terminate litigation exposure by renouncing the discriminatory policy. Douglas's Section 504 claim under the Rehabilitation Act is subject to California's one-year statute of limitations for personal injuries, as agreed by both parties. Prior to filing an ADA suit, a plaintiff must submit a discrimination charge to the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged violation or within 300 days if filed with a state agency, as seen in Douglas's case where the EEOC referred the charge to the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing. While some circuits impose a notice requirement for continuing violation claims—where a plaintiff must have been aware of the discrimination during earlier acts—this court does not strictly adhere to such a requirement. Nonetheless, the continuing violations doctrine applies to Douglas's claim, as it would be unreasonable to expect him to sue before the statute expired, given that he pursued all available appeals and reapplied for the position.