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Department of Transportation v. Landman

Citations: 664 So. 2d 1141; 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 12901; 1995 WL 739321Docket: No. 95-483

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; December 14, 1995; Florida; State Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

An appeal was made regarding a judgment in an inverse condemnation case, focusing on whether modifications to a road adjacent to the appellee’s property represented a compensable taking of real property. The court reversed the lower judgment, determining that the road's widening was not the issue; rather, the construction of curbs significantly limited the appellee’s access. Previously, the appellee had an informal curb-less entry that allowed parking for guests. Post-construction, access was reduced to a single driveway, making it challenging to park and maneuver. However, since the appellees did not lose all access to their property and had no legal rights to the prior curb-less entry, they were not entitled to compensation for the diminished access. The ruling cited several precedents to support that limitation of access, without loss of property rights, does not warrant compensation. The judgment was ultimately reversed, with concurrence from other judges.

Legal Issues Addressed

Inverse Condemnation and Compensable Taking

Application: The court evaluated whether modifications to a road constituted a compensable taking of real property and determined that the construction of curbs, rather than the road's widening, was at issue.

Reasoning: An appeal was made regarding a judgment in an inverse condemnation case, focusing on whether modifications to a road adjacent to the appellee’s property represented a compensable taking of real property.

Limitation of Access and Property Rights

Application: The court ruled that the limitation of access due to the construction of curbs did not amount to a compensable taking because the appellees retained some access and had no legal rights to the prior curb-less entry.

Reasoning: However, since the appellees did not lose all access to their property and had no legal rights to the prior curb-less entry, they were not entitled to compensation for the diminished access.

Precedents on Access Limitation

Application: The decision cited precedents affirming that limitation of access, without the loss of property rights, does not warrant compensation.

Reasoning: The ruling cited several precedents to support that limitation of access, without loss of property rights, does not warrant compensation.