Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; December 7, 1995; Florida; State Appellate Court
Rosenberg Bail Bonds (Rosenberg) appeals the denial of its motions to discharge a surety bond and remit the forfeiture associated with a $10,000 bond it issued for a defendant charged with battery on a pregnant person. The defendant, arrested on May 4, 1993, entered a pretrial intervention program, which stipulated that his case would be re-evaluated if he failed to meet program objectives. After missing appointments, the defendant did not appear for trial set for May 16, 1994, leading to a capias issuance and bond estreated. Subsequently, Rosenberg sought to discharge the bond and obtain a refund but was denied by the trial court, prompting this appeal.
Rosenberg argues its obligation was discharged upon the defendant's acceptance into the pretrial intervention program, citing section 903.31 of the Florida Statutes, which states that an appearance bond does not guarantee conduct or appearance after admission to such a program. The county counters that Rosenberg misinterprets this statute, referencing case law that diverges from Rosenberg’s literal interpretation. Historical context is provided, noting that the 1970 version of section 903.31 allowed for conviction or acquittal to satisfy bond conditions, without limiting this to bondsmen. The appeal centers on the interpretation of these statutory provisions and their implications for the surety's responsibilities post-admission to a pretrial intervention program.
In *Accredited Surety and Casualty Company v. State*, 318 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), the court upheld a decision to deny a motion to set aside a bond forfeiture after a defendant pleaded guilty, with sentencing deferred pending a presentence investigation and no judgment entered. The court determined that a plea alone does not constitute a conviction under the statute. In response, the Florida legislature amended section 903.31 in 1980, stipulating that a bond is canceled when conditions are met, but the language was unclear regarding the treatment of deferred sentences. The 1982 case, *American Druggists’ Insurance Co. v. State*, involved a defendant who pleaded nolo contendere, and the court interpreted the updated statute to mean that bond discharge requires an adjudication of guilt or innocence. Further amendments in 1986 clarified that bonds do not guarantee appearances related to deferred sentences, presentence investigations, or other specified conditions unless stated in the judgment. In *State v. Fisher*, 578 So.2d 746 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), the court ruled that the absence of a formal adjudication or sentence meant the bond could be forfeited. This ruling was echoed in *Battles v. State*, 595 So.2d 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), which also addressed the implications of a nolo contendere plea and the validity of the bond in relation to presentence investigations.
The Battles court affirmed that a judgment is a prerequisite for discharging a bail bond, despite amendments to the statute. It rejected alignment with a senate staff analysis that would permit original bonds to serve as guarantees for appearances related to presentence investigations, pretrial interventions, or appeals, emphasizing that a judgment must be entered before a bond can be discharged. The dissent contended that the statute’s plain language indicated that original appearance bonds do not cover appearances during or after a presentence investigation.
Subsequent cases, including AAA Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State and Polakoff Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Orange County, reiterated that bonds remain unsatisfied without a final judgment or sentencing. The Florida Supreme Court confirmed that bonds are satisfied only upon an adjudication of guilt or innocence. It noted that the statute explicitly states that the original bond does not guarantee appearances during or after a presentence investigation unless adjudicated guilty.
The complexity arises from the 1986 amendment, which complicates the interpretation of the statute regarding pretrial intervention programs. The court suggested that the legislature likely intended to create an exception for pretrial interventions, where no adjudication occurs. Thus, the court concluded that a surety's obligation is relieved upon a defendant’s entry into such a program. Consequently, Rosenberg's obligation was deemed discharged when the defendant was accepted into the pretrial intervention program, leading to the reversal of the order denying Rosenberg’s motions and mandating a refund of the forfeited amount. Other issues raised by Rosenberg were deemed unnecessary to resolve.
