United States v. Jose Guadalupe Jimenez-Villasenor, Also Known as "Grenas," United States of America v. Alejandro Flores-Romero

Citations: 270 F.3d 554; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 23713; 2001 WL 1346140Docket: 01-1021, 01-1350

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; November 2, 2001; Federal Appellate Court

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Guadalupe Jimenez-Villasenor and Alejandro Flores-Romero were convicted of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. § 846 following a ten-day trial. Jimenez-Villasenor appeals his conviction on the grounds of insufficient evidence, arguing that the evidence against him comprised only a false ID and an address book linked to the conspiracy, with no direct references to narcotics in the monitored phone calls. Flores-Romero appeals both his conviction and sentence, questioning the district court's ruling on his competency to stand trial and the determination that he was responsible for 1.33 kilograms of methamphetamine.

The court affirms both convictions and Flores-Romero's sentence. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) had identified Jimenez-Villasenor and Jesus Ibarra-Torres as key distributors for a drug organization operating between California and Minnesota. The DEA's electronic monitoring revealed Juan Gabriel Rosas as the main drug source and his brother Jaime Rosas Mancilla overseeing transportation.

For Jimenez-Villasenor’s appeal, the court applies a standard where evidence is viewed favorably towards the verdict, affirming that a conviction can be upheld if reasonable jurors could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The government needed to prove the existence of a conspiracy, Jimenez-Villasenor's knowledge of it, and his intentional involvement. While circumstantial evidence can establish a conspiracy, mere presence without further evidence does not suffice for membership. However, once a conspiracy is established, minimal evidence can connect a defendant to it.

Evidence indicated a conspiracy between Rosas and Jimenez-Villasenor to distribute methamphetamine, with Jimenez-Villasenor's knowledge and voluntary participation. At trial, it was shown that he supervised co-conspirators, including Flores-Romero, in drug distribution after the arrival of methamphetamine and cocaine in Minnesota. The government presented over one hundred exhibits, including 57 phone call transcripts, 45 of which involved drug-related discussions between Jimenez-Villasenor and co-conspirators. Key evidence included intercepted calls about a 30-pound methamphetamine shipment from California, which law enforcement seized on October 24, 1999. Although the calls contained no explicit references to drugs, a DEA agent testified that code words were used, based on extensive experience in narcotics investigations. A search warrant of Jimenez-Villasenor’s residence revealed a loaded firearm, cash, ammunition, a digital scale, and drug-related notes. This collective evidence allowed a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Jimenez-Villasenor conspired to distribute methamphetamine.

In Flores-Romero's appeal regarding his conviction, he argued that the district court erred in deeming him competent for trial, claiming that anti-psychotic medication caused drowsiness that hindered his ability to engage in the trial process and communicate with his attorney. The standard of review for such findings is clear error. Due process bars the trial of a mentally incompetent defendant, and judges generally presume competency unless evidence suggests otherwise, placing the burden on Flores-Romero to prove his incompetence. The competency assessment focuses on a defendant's ability to consult with their lawyer and understand the proceedings. The presence of mental illness or treatment with anti-psychotics does not automatically imply incompetence. Prior to the trial, Flores-Romero underwent a competency evaluation, and a hearing determined that he had major depressive disorder in partial remission due to treatment.

Flores-Romero was found competent to stand trial by the magistrate judge, a determination affirmed by the district court. Prior to trial, his medication dosage increased, including two anti-psychotics and an anti-depressant, which raised concerns about potential sedative effects impairing his ability to participate in his defense. On the trial's first day, Flores-Romero moved for a competency re-examination and suspension of his medication, but the district court noted he was voluntarily taking it and expressed concerns about suspending it without evidence of benefit. The court reserved ruling on the motions while confirming his competency remained an issue.

Throughout the trial, Flores-Romero displayed varying levels of alertness; he was drowsy during jury selection but responsive during competency inquiries. A marshal was assigned to monitor his alertness, noting instances of him dozing off. Despite some drowsiness, he was attentive during key parts of the trial. By the sixth day, he chose to waive his right to testify, after confirming with the court that he understood this right and had discussed it with his attorney, who advised against testifying. The court ultimately denied the motion to suspend his medication, affirming it was taken voluntarily.

The court determined that Flores-Romero was competent to stand trial based on observations, a magistrate judge's finding, and medical testimony. Flores-Romero failed to present evidence of incompetency. Following his guilty verdict, a competency evaluation and hearing revealed that a government psychologist believed Flores-Romero was malingering and exaggerating symptoms. Although sedative side effects from his medication could have contributed to decreased alertness, there was no evidence that these effects impaired his ability to understand or participate in court proceedings. Flores-Romero's physician concurred with the malingering assessment but could not definitively link his drowsiness to his medication. The district court found Flores-Romero competent, having closely monitored his alertness during the trial and observed his demeanor, which did not indicate incompetency. The court's conclusion was deemed not clearly erroneous.

Regarding sentencing, Flores-Romero claimed insufficient evidence for the determination of his responsibility for 1.33 kilograms of methamphetamine and argued that the district court neglected his objections to the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). Sentencing courts’ quantity calculations are factual findings reviewed for clear error. A defendant in a drug conspiracy is accountable for all reasonably foreseeable drug amounts involved in the criminal activity. The PSR attributed 1.33 kilograms of methamphetamine to him based on specific transactions discussed in 1999. The district court's finding was supported by sufficient evidence and was not clearly erroneous.

Drug notes from Jimenez-Villasenor's residence indicate substantial balances next to the alias 'Alex,' correlating with large methamphetamine purchases, contradicting Flores-Romero's claim that these figures pertain to ounces. The court dismissed Flores-Romero's argument regarding personal use deductions from his drug quantity as unfounded, referencing United States v. Brown, which affirms that personal use can factor into drug quantity assessments in conspiracy cases. The jury found Flores-Romero guilty of conspiring to distribute over 500 grams of methamphetamine, establishing a base offense level of 32, which the district court applied correctly in sentencing.

Flores-Romero also contended that the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1) by not ruling on his PSR objections prior to sentencing. This rule mandates that the sentencing judge address unresolved objections and base findings on reliable evidence rather than disputed PSR information. The district court, having presided over the trial, was permitted to rely on trial evidence and uncontested PSR statements. During the sentencing hearing, the court acknowledged the defense's motions and arguments, ultimately holding Flores-Romero accountable for 1.3 kilograms of methamphetamine based on trial testimony and evidence. 

The district court's compliance with Rule 32(c)(1) is affirmed, leading to the upholding of Flores-Romero's sentence and the convictions related to both defendants. The discrepancy in the drug quantity attributed to Flores-Romero (1.3 kg vs. 1.33 kg) is deemed inconsequential for the sentencing guidelines.