Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; October 18, 2001; Federal Appellate Court
In March 1999, federal agents discovered two kilograms of cocaine in Juan Pedroza's car, along with $61,000 in cash and drug paraphernalia in his residence. Hilario Pedroza's home contained $10,000 in cash and ledgers of drug transactions. After the brothers' motions to suppress the evidence were denied, they entered conditional guilty pleas to conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 846. They subsequently appealed the denial of their suppression motions and the refusal to dismiss their indictment for violating the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. The Seventh Circuit upheld the convictions.
On March 18, 1999, DEA agents were surveilling Juan Pedroza, suspected of drug involvement. After Juan visited Hilario's house, he returned to his car where Hilario passed him a cardboard box, raising suspicions of a hidden compartment. Juan later left in a Jeep Cherokee, prompting agents to follow him. When approached by Agent Dan Foley at a stoplight, Juan agreed to talk and moved to a nearby laundromat parking lot. Although Juan claimed his car was blocked by agents, the district court found it was not. A bilingual agent, Lou Dominguez, conducted the conversation in Spanish, during which Juan denied involvement in drug activities and consented to a search of the Jeep.
Dominguez conducted a pat-down of Juan for safety, finding cell phones and pagers but no weapons. Although he could not recall when the items were confiscated, Dominguez continued questioning Juan, who cooperated while three other agents searched Juan's Jeep, finding no contraband. Juan shared his address and mentioned owning a Ford Thunderbird, denying the presence of contraband in either location. He voluntarily consented to searches of his home and the Thunderbird, informing the agents that his wife could provide the keys.
Upon arrival at Juan's home, agents informed his wife of the consent, leading her to hand over the keys. The search of the Thunderbird uncovered a hidden compartment containing two kilograms of cocaine. Following this discovery, Juan was arrested, read his Miranda rights in Spanish, and acknowledged understanding them. The agents then searched his home, finding drug paraphernalia, a firearm, and approximately $61,000 in cash.
After his arrest, Juan revealed to the agents that he had obtained the cocaine from Hilario, prompting the agents to pursue Hilario's arrest. Agents approached Hilario's home, where they were invited inside by Hilario after announcing their presence. Dominguez conducted a security sweep, explained the arrest, and read Hilario his Miranda rights, which he waived. Hilario denied having drugs or contraband but consented to a search of his home and garage. The search revealed $10,000, which Hilario admitted was drug money, along with ledgers documenting drug transactions.
Juan and Hilario sought to suppress evidence obtained from the Thunderbird and their homes, arguing that Juan's initial stop by agents constituted an illegal arrest without probable cause, rendering his consent to search involuntary, while Hilario contended he did not voluntarily consent to the search of his home. The district court, following a magistrate judge's recommendation, determined that Juan's interaction with the agents was consensual and that Hilario voluntarily consented to the search.
On appeal, many of the Pedrozas' arguments challenge the magistrate judge's factual findings and credibility assessments, which are typically hard to overturn. The magistrate judge conducted two days of hearings and found the agents' testimonies to be consistent and credible, while deeming the Pedrozas' testimonies inconsistent and unreliable. This credibility determination is given significant deference, and the court will assess the legality of the stops based on the magistrate judge's findings.
Ultimately, the court concluded that Juan's consent to search was not a result of an illegal seizure, emphasizing that whether an encounter is consensual depends on the circumstances and whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave. Juan's argument, citing his initial reluctance to speak to the agents, was interpreted as not negating the consensual nature of the encounter since he ultimately agreed to speak with them.
Juan's response to Agent Foley's inquiry about speaking with him was ambiguous but became clear through his actions, as he voluntarily pulled over without hesitation. Although he claimed to have felt compelled by a traffic officer to stop, this assertion contradicts the magistrate judge's findings and the objective circumstances, which indicated the officer aimed only to keep the intersection clear. A reasonable person would have interpreted the agents' approach as consensual, as there was no indication of compulsion.
The subsequent pat-down search conducted by Agent Dominguez raised concerns regarding its legality, as it requires at least articulable suspicion of danger or consent, neither of which was established in this case. Dominguez did not seek Juan's consent before conducting the search, and the agents' rationale for suspicion appeared insufficient.
Despite the pat-down being potentially problematic, it yielded no incriminating evidence and did not influence the later discovery of drugs and paraphernalia. Juan continued to engage with the agents freely after the pat-down, and he consented to searches of both his home and vehicle, doing so voluntarily and prior to any requests from the agents. The critical issue is whether the pat-down's legality affected Juan's consent for later searches. The determination is that it did not.
If a suspect's seizure, such as a pat-down search, is deemed illegal, any subsequent consent to search may be invalid unless the state demonstrates that the consent was an independent act of free will. This assessment relies on whether the evidence was obtained through exploitation of the initial illegality or through means sufficiently distinguishable from it. Three factors are considered in this determination: (1) the time elapsed between the illegality and evidence acquisition, (2) the presence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the purpose and severity of the official misconduct, though none of these factors alone is decisive.
In this case, even if the pat-down was illegal, evidence suggested that Juan's consent to search his home and car was an independent act of free will, not a product of the illegal search. Juan voluntarily engaged with the agents before the pat-down and continued to do so afterward, indicating no coercion. Agent Dominguez's inquiry about Juan’s residence and vehicles did not constitute a request for consent; rather, Juan voluntarily offered permission for the search and facilitated access to the car keys. The remote location of the house and vehicle further supports the conclusion that Juan's consent was freely given, as no reasonable person would interpret the agents' inquiries as requiring compliance with a search.
Consent to search following a potentially unlawful pat-down was deemed voluntary due to two key factors. First, Juan independently volunteered permission for the search without any prompting from the agents, indicating an intervening circumstance that mitigated any taint from the pat-down. The agents did not coerce Juan into consenting, nor was the pat-down executed as a tactic to intimidate him; its sole purpose appeared to be for weapon detection. There was no indication that the agents attempted to leverage the pat-down to obtain Juan’s consent, and his decision to allow the search was considered an independent act of free will. Consequently, the district court's ruling to not suppress evidence found in Juan's home and vehicle was upheld.
In contrast, Hilario contested the legality of his consent for a search, arguing that he was subjected to excessive force by DEA agents during his arrest. The government acknowledged that agents needed Hilario's consent to enter his home, as they lacked a warrant. Despite Hilario's claims of coercion, the magistrate judge found the agents' account more credible. The agents testified that they identified themselves and were invited into Hilario's home without any display of force or intimidation. Hilario's immediate consent was therefore accepted as voluntary, leading to the conclusion that he freely permitted both the entry and the search of his home.
Hilario's consent to search his house was deemed free and voluntary, as he provided consent shortly after his arrest, having been read and waived his rights without any coercion, threats, or aggressive behavior from the agents. The district court found the agents acted cordially and professionally, leading to the affirmation of the denial of Hilario's suppression motion.
Regarding the Pedrozas' claim for dismissal of their indictment due to delays violating the Speedy Trial Act, the statute requires trial within 70 days of indictment. The period between their indictment on April 13, 1999, and the filing of suppression motions on May 20 was excludable. The time from the filing of the suppression motions until the last brief was filed on September 15 was also properly excluded. However, the district court took 121 days to rule on the suppression motions, exceeding the 30 days allowed for advisement, resulting in a missed 70-day deadline by 21 days. The Pedrozas did not argue that the time between the district court's ruling on January 14 and their guilty pleas on July 12 affected the Speedy Trial Act timeline.
The government contended that the delay was irrelevant due to the pending motion to revoke detention, which the court had linked to the resolution of the suppression motions. The Pedrozas countered that allowing this linkage could undermine the Speedy Trial Act's intent. While their argument was acknowledged, the court ultimately found the resolution of the suppression motions was timely and did not need to address this broader issue.
The Speedy Trial Act permits only 30 days of excludable time after the last brief on a single pretrial motion is filed. However, if multiple motions are pending, the 30-day period can be extended if the district court resolves the motions with "reasonable promptness." This standard does not have a strict definition, but previous cases have upheld delays of 42 days for seven motions, 68 days for eight motions, and 50 days for 24 motions as reasonable. In this case, the district court considered four suppression motions from two defendants, which involved various constitutional issues and took two days for hearings. Although the court took 121 days to resolve these motions, only 51 days need be considered excludable for compliance with the Speedy Trial Act. This determination allows the court to meet the 70-day limit for non-excludable time. Thus, the Speedy Trial Act was not violated, and the district court's denial of the Pedrozas' suppression motions was affirmed.
