United States v. Michelle Lyn Michaud

Citations: 268 F.3d 728; 2001 Daily Journal DAR 10346; 2001 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8381; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 20884Docket: 99-10440

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; September 25, 2001; Federal Appellate Court

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Michelle Lyn Michaud appealed her conviction for kidnapping and transporting a victim across state lines, arguing that her incriminating statements should have been suppressed and that her sentence was improperly enhanced. The case arose from an investigation by the FBI and local authorities into a kidnapping and sexual assault, leading to Michaud's arrest at a motel in Nevada based on existing state warrants. 

Upon her arrest, FBI Agent Lynn Ferrin obtained her consent to search her belongings and advised her of her Miranda rights, which she waived. Following an interview, Michaud requested a lawyer, prompting the termination of the questioning. Subsequently, evidence from a search of her vehicle led to a federal arrest warrant for charges of kidnapping and aiding and abetting.

While incarcerated, Michaud expressed distress to her cellmate about being in trouble, which prompted her cellmate to seek help from law enforcement. After being placed in a holding cell, Michaud was later interviewed by FBI Agent Christopher Campion, who recorded the session. The appeal ultimately affirmed the conviction, as the court found no error in the handling of Michaud's statements or her sentence enhancement.

Michaud provided information about a recent homicide and was informed of her Miranda rights, which she acknowledged and waived before a lengthy interview lasting about nine hours. Following another interview on December 6, Michaud collapsed in her cell and was subsequently interviewed at the hospital. On December 8, Placer County transferred prosecutorial priority to federal authorities, and Michaud was taken into federal custody the next day, where she was appointed counsel and later indicted on charges of kidnapping and conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1201. Michaud moved to suppress her statements made during the interviews, arguing that her arrest was unlawful, that there was collusion between state and federal officials to delay her appearance before a magistrate, and that she was interrogated after invoking her right to counsel. The district court denied her motion, leading to a conditional guilty plea on the kidnapping charge. Michaud was sentenced to 152 months in prison. 

In her appeal, she contested the legality of her arrest, claiming that deception used by officers to gain entry to her hotel room violated her Fourth Amendment rights, despite a valid warrant existing at the time. The court found that there is no constitutional prohibition against using deception to execute a valid arrest warrant, affirming the denial of her motion to suppress based on the arrest's legality. Michaud also claimed collusion between the Placer County officers and FBI agents violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel and her rights under Rule 5(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c), but the court would evaluate these claims in light of the relevant statutes.

In criminal prosecutions by the United States, a confession made by a defendant while under arrest is admissible if it is voluntary and made within six hours of the arrest, despite any delay in bringing the defendant before a magistrate. This six-hour "safe harbor" allows for the confession's admissibility, with the jury determining the weight of the confession. Delays beyond this period may still allow for admissibility if deemed reasonable by the court or supported by public policy. 

Michaud, arrested on state charges, claims the delay in her federal presentation—six days—was due to collusion between state and federal authorities. The law allows for considering delays from state arrests if there is evidence of actual cooperation intended to violate the right to prompt federal presentment. The burden lies with Michaud to prove such collusion, rather than mere suspicion.

Michaud was arrested under a California warrant, with the FBI involved in her arrest and subsequent questioning. The FBI had already secured a federal warrant prior to her arrest, and the collaboration between state and federal authorities in her case appears lawful. Evidence gathered led to the federal arrest warrant, and the procedures followed complied with legal standards for admissibility of statements made during custody.

A finding of collusion necessitates evidence of a deliberate intention to violate a defendant's federal procedural rights, as established in Doe, 155 F.3d at 1078. Michaud's claims of collusion lack substantiation, consisting solely of unsupported suspicion without evidence of actual collusion between state authorities and the FBI. The district court determined Michaud's allegations did not demonstrate infringement of her rights and found the information exchange between federal and state authorities to be minimal. On appeal, Michaud failed to prove the district court's factual findings were clearly erroneous, leading to the affirmation that her rights were not violated by collusion.

Regarding custodial interrogation, once a defendant asserts their right to counsel, further police questioning is prohibited unless the defendant initiates communication. Michaud invoked her right to counsel during a police interview on December 3, which was promptly terminated. She was not questioned again until December 5 when Agoroastos informed Deputy Conrad that Michaud wanted to discuss a murder. Michaud, visibly upset, remained silent during this interaction. After being placed in an isolation cell for about an hour without questioning, Michaud had the opportunity to reconsider her willingness to engage with law enforcement.

When Sergeant Minister and Agent Campion arrived, they were justified in asking Michaud if she was re-initiating communication, based on Agoroastos' statements to Conrad. Campion indicated that he had not initially planned to interview Michaud until learning of her expressed interest in speaking. These interactions raise the question of whether Michaud's actions constituted a re-initiation of communication after invoking her right to counsel.

Campion introduced himself to Michaud in the interview room, acknowledging her desire to share information regarding a recent murder. He presented her with a written form of her Miranda rights, which included her right to consult with a lawyer, to have a lawyer present during questioning, and to cease answering questions at any time. Michaud confirmed her understanding of these rights and signed a waiver before the interview commenced. 

Testimony from both Conrad and Michaud indicated she was upset and frightened when Agoroastos suggested she speak to someone about the murder. Although Michaud did not initiate the conversation with Conrad, she accompanied Agoroastos to the gate without resisting and did not contradict Agoroastos’s statements. During questioning, Michaud clarified that she did not explicitly inform the deputy that she did not want to speak with him nor did she object to going with him. The questioning focused on whether Michaud's actions constituted an initiation of communication with the police, thereby determining whether the subsequent interrogation was police-initiated or valid under the circumstances. The Supreme Court precedent indicated that an accused who has invoked their right to counsel cannot be interrogated unless they themselves initiate further communication.

Michaud's actions, including accompanying Agoroastos to communicate with Deputy Conrad and her apparent agreement with Agoroastos' claim that she had "information about a murder," demonstrate her desire to speak with law enforcement. The court holds that Michaud initiated the questioning, in line with the principles established in Edwards, which prevents police from coercively starting conversations with defendants. Despite recognizing that an accused can change their mind about communication, the facts indicate that Michaud willingly approached the police with information. There is no evidence that Agoroastos acted as a police agent or coerced Michaud; instead, she acted in Michaud’s presence, who did not object to Agoroastos’ statements. Deputy Conrad appropriately ceased questioning and consulted with his supervisor after receiving Agoroastos’ information. Officers confirmed Michaud's voluntary request to speak before questioning her, following proper Miranda procedures. The court differentiates this case from United States v. Rodriguez, where the defendant did not initiate contact, affirming that Michaud's actions and lack of coercion led to the conclusion that her constitutional rights were not violated. Thus, the court upholds the district court's denial of Michaud's motion to suppress her statements.

Michaud argues that the district court incorrectly applied the Sentencing Guidelines in her case. U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1 sets a base offense level of 24 for kidnapping, but § 2A4.1(b)(7)(A) mandates using the offense level from another applicable guideline if it results in a higher level. The court cross-referenced U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1, which pertains to criminal sexual abuse and includes a specific enhancement for abduction, leading to a calculated offense level of 35 after adjustments. Michaud contends that § 2A4.1(b)(5), which accounts for kidnapping involving sexual exploitation, would yield a lower offense level of 27 if applied. However, the court's finding that the cross-referenced guideline yielded a higher offense level is critical to the appeal's outcome. The court concluded that it did not err in applying the Guidelines.

Additionally, the court upheld the law enforcement's use of a ruse for Michaud's arrest, finding no evidence of collusion between state and federal officials that would violate her rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c). Michaud's motion to suppress was denied, as the police did not question her after she requested counsel. The district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines and the denial of the suppression motion were both affirmed. Michaud did not contest the voluntariness of her confession beyond her § 3501(c) argument, and the court declined to address issues not specifically raised in her brief.

Under Nevada law, individuals arrested on out-of-state warrants must be presented before a magistrate for a probable cause determination without undue delay, specifically within 48 hours. The state police failed to fulfill this obligation in Michaud's case. While a jurisdiction may conduct combined probable cause and arraignment hearings, this must occur as soon as reasonably feasible, and any delays not related to federal agents cannot be considered under § 3501(c) without evidence of collusion. 

The dissenting opinion argues that Michaud's actions do not demonstrate that she initiated communication with law enforcement, as required by the precedent set in Edwards v. Arizona, which prohibits police interrogation of a suspect who has invoked their right to counsel unless the suspect initiates contact. The dissent highlights that Michaud did not express a desire to speak with the authorities; rather, her cellmate initiated contact with the police based on her own interpretation of Michaud's distress. The dissent emphasizes that Michaud's prior wish to speak with a lawyer indicates she likely did not want to communicate with the police, especially after her situation deteriorated. Therefore, the majority's conclusion that Michaud initiated the conversation with police is deemed unsupported by the evidence.

Michaud's silence and emotional state during interactions with law enforcement are central to the argument against the majority's conclusion that her conduct indicated a willingness to engage in conversation. Deputy Conrad initiated contact by asking Agoroastos to bring Michaud forward, not Michaud voluntarily seeking to communicate. Michaud exhibited extreme distress, followed directions without speaking, and remained silent throughout her detention, even during discussions about her situation. The majority's assertion that her silence implied consent to questioning contradicts her rights under Edwards, which protects a suspect's ability to remain silent after invoking the right to counsel. The majority's reliance on Oregon v. Bradshaw is flawed, as it applies only when a suspect verbally inquires about their situation, which Michaud did not do. The distinction between verbal communication that may initiate questioning and mere silence is crucial to uphold the protections established by Edwards. The ruling suggests that silence could trigger police questioning, undermining the principle that a suspect's prior assertion of rights must be respected. This interpretation lacks support in judicial precedent and threatens to erode individual rights.

Michaud's voluntary decision to speak after being asked if she wanted to talk is irrelevant to the Edwards analysis, as is the fact that her Miranda rights were re-read after she began talking. The critical factor is that Michaud did not express a desire to speak to authorities until after several police-initiated actions, including being told to meet a deputy and being placed in an interrogation room. The majority's argument regarding the "absence of official coercion" does not hold, as police may not initiate discussions with a suspect who has invoked their right to counsel, regardless of the manner of questioning. The Supreme Court emphasizes the need for clarity and certainty in the Edwards ruling; if silence or ambiguous gestures are allowed to signify initiation, it undermines this clarity. The dissent argues that the majority's interpretation distorts the concept of "bright-line" rules and essentially requires judges and police to interpret a defendant's unexpressed intentions. Consequently, the dissent concludes that Michaud's Fifth Amendment rights were violated during her interrogations on December 5, 6, 7, and 8, warranting the suppression of her statements from those interviews.

Defendant Agoroastos initiated communication by passing a note to a prison guard expressing his desire to talk. Deputy Conrad mistakenly assumed that Michaud, being present, had consented to further questioning based on Agoroastos's report of her wishes. Under Edwards, the appropriate protocol would have been for Conrad to inform Agoroastos that he could not question Michaud unless she explicitly expressed a desire to speak. The majority's argument that Michaud's silence constituted an initiation of communication is problematic, as it contradicts established jurisprudence against using a suspect's silence to their detriment, as seen in Doyle v. Ohio and United States v. Whitehead. Furthermore, a defendant's response to a police inquiry does not equate to initiation of conversation, violating Edwards principles. The majority's characterization of police actions as "reactions" fails to acknowledge that these actions were not initiated by statements made by Michaud, thereby qualifying them as "police-initiated" actions rather than responses to her conduct.