United States v. Jamaal Adeem Atif Singletary, A/K/A Jamal Singletary A/K/A Curtis Singletary Jamaal Singletary

Citations: 268 F.3d 196; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 21276; 2001 WL 1159002Docket: 00-3850

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; October 2, 2001; Federal Appellate Court

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Jamaal Singletary was convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, he argued that the statute is unconstitutional, claiming that intrastate firearm possession does not significantly impact interstate commerce, thus exceeding Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. Singletary urged the court to reconsider its previous ruling in United States v. Gateward, asserting that recent Supreme Court decisions, specifically United States v. Morrison and Jones v. United States, necessitate a reevaluation of the statute's constitutionality. The court, however, determined that these Supreme Court rulings did not invalidate its prior interpretation of the law and reaffirmed the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute as established in Gateward, subsequently affirming the District Court's decision. The case arose from an incident where Singletary was observed firing a handgun in a park, leading to his indictment for unlawful possession of the firearm, which was linked to interstate commerce. The District Court had previously denied Singletary's motion to dismiss the indictment based on his constitutional claims.

At trial, the Government presented expert testimony from Special Agent James J. Uvena, establishing that the firearm in question was manufactured in Brazil, imported through Atlanta in 1973, and sent to a Texas dealer, although no evidence indicated when it arrived in Pennsylvania or its impact on interstate commerce. Singletary admitted to a prior felony conviction, and while possession was contested, it was not central to the appeal issues. The defense requested jury instructions requiring the Government to demonstrate that the firearm's possession substantially affected interstate commerce, defining this requirement explicitly. The court denied these requests and instructed the jury instead that it needed to prove the firearm had crossed state lines prior to Singletary's possession. The jury found Singletary guilty, and his subsequent motion for acquittal was denied. He was sentenced to 27 months in prison, three years of supervised release, a $100 special assessment, and a $200 fine.

On appeal, Singletary argues that recent Supreme Court rulings on the Commerce Clause render 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional, challenging the validity of his conviction. Alternatively, he seeks a reversal due to insufficient evidence on the interstate commerce element or a new trial based on erroneous jury instructions. The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and appellate jurisdiction is asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Singletary's constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) will undergo plenary review, respecting Congress's authority over the Commerce Clause, with all related challenges reviewed under the same standard.

The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among states, and with Indian tribes. Under this authority, Congress enacted the felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits individuals convicted of crimes punishable by over one year of imprisonment from shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving firearms or ammunition in or affecting commerce. The statute outlines three distinct offenses: 1) shipping or transporting firearms or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce; 2) possessing firearms or ammunition in or affecting commerce; and 3) receiving firearms or ammunition shipped in interstate or foreign commerce. Importantly, Congress did not specify "in interstate or foreign commerce" for possession, instead using "in or affecting commerce."

The statute has evolved from its predecessor, 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), which broadly criminalized any possession or receipt of firearms by felons without requiring a direct interstate commerce connection. In United States v. Bass, the Supreme Court clarified that the commerce requirement must apply to the possession and receipt of firearms, rejecting the government's interpretation that could infringe upon state jurisdiction without proof of an interstate connection. Subsequently, in Scarborough v. United States, the Court ruled that proof of a firearm's previous interstate travel suffices to establish the required nexus between possession and commerce, a principle applicable to the current felon-in-possession statute, § 922(g)(1).

The central issue raised by Singletary in this appeal is whether the legal principles established in Scarborough remain valid following key Supreme Court decisions, specifically United States v. Lopez, United States v. Morrison, and Jones v. United States. Singletary argues that the felon-in-possession statute is unconstitutional on its face because it criminalizes intrastate firearm possession, which he claims does not significantly impact interstate commerce and therefore exceeds Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. He further contends that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him, as there was no evidence demonstrating that his firearm possession affected commerce in any substantial way. Singletary asserts that the District Court erred by not allowing specific jury instructions regarding the Government's burden to prove a substantial effect on interstate commerce and by preventing defense counsel from making this argument to the jury.

In the context of Lopez, the Supreme Court ruled that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 was unconstitutional because it did not regulate a commercial activity nor did it connect firearm possession in school zones to interstate commerce. The Court emphasized that Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause are limited, derived from Article I, § 8 of the Constitution, and identified three areas Congress may regulate: channels of interstate commerce, instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and activities substantially related to interstate commerce. In Lopez, the Court classified the statute in question as a criminal law unrelated to commerce or economic activity.

The Court noted that 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) lacks a jurisdictional element to ensure that firearm possession affects interstate commerce, distinguishing it from its previous ruling in Bass, where a jurisdictional clause demonstrated a sufficient nexus to commerce. The ruling in Bass pertained to the former statute 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), which suggested that evidence of a firearm's interstate transport could uphold constitutional validity. The Court referenced Scarborough, which established that proof of a firearm's prior travel in interstate commerce suffices for federal prohibition. However, in Lopez, the Court determined that § 922(q) does not include a specific jurisdictional limit tying firearm possession to interstate commerce, unlike the statute in Bass. 

Furthermore, the legislative history revealed that the Government admitted there was no express congressional finding on how gun possession in school zones affects interstate commerce. The Court rejected the Government's argument linking firearm possession in school zones to violent crime's economic impact, asserting that such reasoning would improperly expand congressional authority under the Commerce Clause and encroach on state police powers. 

Subsequently, in United States v. Gateward, the implications of Lopez were considered concerning the felon-in-possession statute, § 922(g)(1). The Third Circuit clarified that Lopez did not undermine the Bass/Scarborough principle, which maintains that the jurisdictional element 'in or affecting commerce' keeps the felon firearm law within constitutional boundaries. The Gateward Court upheld the conviction based on the gun's movement in interstate commerce, while acknowledging the need to reevaluate this analysis in light of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence since Lopez.

In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court invalidated 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which aimed to federalize crimes of violence based on gender. The Court referenced its earlier decision in United States v. Lopez, emphasizing that the non-economic, criminal nature of conduct was pivotal in that case. The Court pointed out that previous rulings upholding federal regulation of intrastate activities under the Commerce Clause pertained only to economic endeavors. Morrison highlighted that § 13981 lacked a jurisdictional element connecting it to interstate commerce, which would have supported its constitutionality. The Court expressed concern that accepting the petitioners' argument could allow Congress to regulate all crimes based on their aggregated impact on interstate commerce, undermining the distinction between national and local authority. Consequently, the Court established that economic effects alone could not justify a criminal statute under the Commerce Clause without involving actual commercial activity. However, it implicitly upheld a precedent from Scarborough, stating that a connection to interstate commerce could be established if the firearm possessed by a felon had previously traveled in interstate commerce. The Court's decision in Morrison was followed closely by its ruling in Jones v. United States, which involved a statute with a clear interstate commerce jurisdictional element, reinforcing the importance of such elements in federal criminal statutes.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) applies to the arson of a private residence and, if applicable, whether its application in this case is constitutional, considering precedents like United States v. Lopez. The Government argued that the Fort Wayne residence was involved in commerce due to its use as collateral for a mortgage from an Oklahoma lender, insurance from a Wisconsin insurer, and receipt of natural gas sourced from outside Indiana. However, the Court, led by Justice Ginsburg, rejected these claims, warning that an expansive interpretation of § 844(i) would lead to nearly all buildings falling under federal jurisdiction. The Court emphasized the need to avoid constitutional questions that could arise from reading the statute to federalize traditionally local criminal conduct, referencing the concerns raised in Lopez. The Court held that the statute only applies to properties currently involved in commerce or activities affecting commerce, and notably chose not to extend the precedents established in Scarborough to home ownership, as suggested by the Government. Additionally, while Jones involved a jurisdictional element, the analysis differs from that of Lopez and Morrison, which focused on Congress's power over activities affecting interstate commerce. The Court's rationale in Jones regarding the arson statute does not impact the regulation of firearms in interstate commerce, and the analogy drawn by Singletary is flawed since Jones did not overrule Scarborough or negate its principles relevant to gun possession statutes.

The prior ruling in Gateward remains binding in this circuit, with no en banc consideration granted for Singletary's appeal. Even if Singletary's arguments regarding the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause decisions could weaken Scarborough's precedential value, the court must adhere to existing Supreme Court precedent unless explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court itself. The court reaffirmed its decision on the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) post-Lopez, agreeing with eight other circuits that had also addressed this issue following Morrison and Jones. There is no indication that any appellate court has reached a different conclusion. The evidence presented in this case demonstrated that the firearm had previously traveled in interstate commerce, satisfying the necessary legal standard, leading to the affirmation of the District Court's judgment. Singletary's request for an en banc review was denied.