You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.

G.D.M. v. State

Citations: 655 So. 2d 1020; 1995 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 7Docket: AV93000456

Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama; January 5, 1995; Alabama; State Appellate Court

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil
On May 17, 1993, W.C.C. and W.E.C. filed a petition to adopt a minor child in probate court, including consents to adoption signed by the child's parents, G.D.M. and L.M.M. An interlocutory order was granted on August 11, 1993, allowing custody to W.C.C. and W.E.C. and ordering a full post-placement investigation by the Department of Human Resources (DHR). On October 29, 1993, the parents objected to the adoption, claiming they did not understand they were consenting to adoption and argued that G.D.M. was a 'legal incompetent,' invalidating his consent. They sought custody in juvenile court, which was granted, and a guardian ad litem was appointed for the child.

On January 15, 1994, the juvenile court denied the parents' custody petition, ruling the child dependent, affirming L.M.M.'s consent as valid, and declaring G.D.M.'s consent invalid due to his incompetence, which required a formal judicial process for termination of parental rights. The court decided it was in the child's best interest to remain in W.C.C. and W.E.C.'s custody. Following a hearing on March 11, 1994, the juvenile court terminated G.D.M.'s parental rights, granting permanent custody to W.C.C. and W.E.C. G.D.M. appealed, arguing there was insufficient evidence for the termination and dependency findings, and that alternatives to termination were not considered. The parents, who divorced in December 1992, were living together at the time of the hearing and had three other children, not involved in this case. The mother had health issues that required hospitalization, while G.D.M. suffered from paranoid schizophrenia linked to alcohol abuse, complicating their ability to care for their children. W.C.C. and W.E.C. had initially taken in the minor child to assist L.M.M. during her recovery.

The court terminated the parental rights of G.D.M. based on several findings: the child is under eighteen and resides in Baldwin County; G.D.M. cannot care for the child, constituting dependency; his lack of support and contact with the child amounted to abandonment; and he suffers from a mental defect affecting his parenting capabilities. The court determined that terminating G.D.M.'s rights serves the child's best interests, which include ensuring her moral, health, and welfare by granting custody to W.C.C. and W.E.C. The court emphasized that no less drastic alternatives were appropriate in this case.

In determining the child's best interests, the court considers the parents' physical, financial, and mental capacities. According to Ala.Code 1975, 26-18-7(a), parental rights can be terminated if clear and convincing evidence shows parents are unable or unwilling to fulfill their responsibilities. The trial court found that G.D.M. abandoned the child, supported by his testimony of no contact or financial support. 

The court acknowledged the necessity of a two-pronged test for terminating parental rights when evaluating a nonparent's petition: confirming the child’s dependency and assessing available alternatives to termination. The ore tenus rule applies, presuming the trial court's judgment is correct unless clearly erroneous. 

However, the appellate court found that the trial court did not adequately apply the second prong regarding viable alternatives. The record lacked evidence of any reports from DHR or consideration of family members for placement. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to explore all viable alternatives. The ruling was supported by concurring opinions from judges Robertson and Thigpen.