Charles Laverne Singleton v. Larry Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction
Docket: 00-1492
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; October 12, 2001; Federal Appellate Court
Charles Laverne Singleton appealed the denial of his petition for a stay of execution by the district court. The Eighth Circuit Court reversed this decision and remanded the case, directing the district court to grant Singleton's petition, impose a permanent stay of execution, and reduce his sentence to life imprisonment without parole. Singleton, convicted of the capital murder of Mary Lou York in 1979 and sentenced to death, had his aggravated robbery conviction vacated due to double jeopardy. His post-conviction relief efforts were unsuccessful, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
After an execution date was set, Singleton filed for a stay in federal court, citing issues regarding his competence for execution, the fairness of jury selection, and ineffective counsel. Initially, the district court granted a stay and later ruled that Singleton's death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment due to reliance on an invalid aggravating factor (pecuniary gain). The court upheld the conviction but barred the State from retrying the penalty phase and mandated a sentence reduction.
Both sides appealed; Singleton included the claim of incompetence, while the State contested the retroactive application of prior rulings. The Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction but reinstated the death sentence, citing later precedents. On remand, Singleton raised further challenges, but the district court ultimately dismissed his petition in 1990, a decision that was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit in 1992.
In December 1992, Singleton initiated a state court action asserting his incompetence for execution, referencing the Arkansas Constitution and the Ford case. He sought a cessation of antipsychotic drug administration and a psychiatric evaluation, claiming the state violated his rights by medicating him to appear competent. The state court acknowledged Singleton met exhaustion requirements under Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-506(d)(1) but ultimately denied his motion. The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute and ruled that Singleton was not improperly denied an evaluation, noting similar claims were in a pending federal habeas petition.
In 1993, Singleton filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition addressing double counting, actual innocence, and Ford incompetency, which the district court held in abeyance during state court proceedings. Following the Arkansas Supreme Court's 1994 ruling, the district court conducted hearings in 1995, ultimately dismissing Singleton's petition, determining he was competent to be executed while taking antipsychotic medication, and rejecting his double-counting and actual-innocence claims. Singleton appealed the dismissal of the double-counting claim but conceded he lacked evidence for any future incompetency claim, as he was competent while medicated. He did not appeal the denial of his actual-innocence claim. The district court's ruling was affirmed, allowing for the possibility of future incompetency claims under different conditions, subject to procedural objections from the state.
Singleton's medical history from 1979 to 2000 reveals extensive use of psychotropic medication while in prison. Initially placed on medication for anxiety and depression, Singleton began experiencing hallucinations in 1987 and was diagnosed with schizophrenia. After periods of involuntary medication, his condition fluctuated, leading to recurring delusions and the reinstatement of involuntary medication until June 1991, when his psychiatrist chose to discontinue medication to assess his mental stability.
Singleton exhibited delusional behavior within five months, including stripping off his clothes and accusing prison staff of using "subliminal suggestions." The State placed him on an involuntary medication regimen from November 1991 to March 1995. Despite this, in mid-1993, he reported hallucinations, claiming his food turned into worms and cigarettes into bones, prompting an increase in his antipsychotic medication, which ultimately alleviated his hallucinations by the end of July. In response to his federal habeas petition, the district court ordered an evaluation at the Federal Medical Center (FMC) in February and March 1995 to assess his competence for execution and the effects of discontinuing his medication. Dr. David Mrad concluded that Singleton was competent but suggested he might remain competent for a time without medication before becoming psychotic.
After returning to prison in March 1995, Singleton was on a voluntary medication regime until September 1996, when he requested to stop. By April 1997, he exhibited signs of psychosis, prompting a psychiatrist, Oglesby, to prescribe medication again, which Singleton only partially adhered to. By July 1997, Singleton expressed delusional beliefs, claiming he was on a mission from God, leading Oglesby to recommend a Medication Review Panel evaluation. Singleton continued to display erratic behavior, including refusing food and flooding his cell. At the August 18 hearing, he insisted he did not want medication and claimed his sentence had been overturned. The panel, after considering his behavior and health, unanimously agreed to involuntarily medicate him, citing concerns for his safety and that of others.
Oglesby initiated an involuntary medication regimen for Singleton, who remained delusional for two months but showed improved mood and behavior. Evaluations in November and December 1997 indicated his psychosis was mostly in remission, with a brief period of visual hallucinations in early December. Over the next thirteen months, Singleton's mental condition gradually improved, although he experienced sleep issues and anxiety. A psychotic episode occurred in February 1999, prompting an increase in medication, but by August 1999, his psychosis was again considered in remission.
In January 2000, Singleton's psychosis appeared to remain in remission, but the State scheduled his execution for March 1, 2000. On February 10, 2000, Singleton filed a pro se motion for counsel and a petition for a successive writ of habeas corpus, both of which were denied. He then petitioned under 28 U.S.C. 2241, arguing that involuntary medication violated the precedent set in Ford, which prevents execution of an incompetent inmate. The district court denied this petition, asserting that Singleton was receiving necessary medication and that there was no evidence of intent to medicate him solely for the purpose of execution.
Singleton subsequently appealed, prompting a stay of his execution. The appeal raised two factual questions: whether Singleton was Ford competent when medicated and whether stopping the medication would result in his regression into psychosis and incompetence. The case was remanded for these questions to be resolved. In March 2000, Singleton's counsel informed the court that Singleton had discovered he was no longer being involuntarily medicated, as a psychiatrist had recommended voluntary medication without notifying him. While Singleton took his medication through March 2000, he refused it in April upon learning of the change, though he received an injection in May. The court directed the district court to comply with the remand order.
Singleton was evaluated by Mrad during his stay at the FMC from June 29 to August 14, 2000. He reported experiencing hallucinations starting at ages twelve and fourteen, and despite his mother's suggestion to see a psychiatrist, he resorted to drugs and alcohol. Singleton described hearing voices, including one in 1978 that suggested he could resurrect his deceased siblings through incest, and another shortly before a murder that warned him of impending imprisonment.
Regarding Singleton's competency prior to August 1997, Mrad noted that Singleton had not received medication for eleven months, exhibited psychotic symptoms, and believed he was God, asserting that his conviction had been overturned by the Supreme Court. Mrad concluded that Singleton likely did not understand the nature of his execution due to his psychotic beliefs and delusions about being free, which would render him incapable of grasping the reasons for his punishment.
Mrad also addressed whether Singleton would become incompetent if his medication were discontinued, stating that it assumes he is currently competent. However, Mrad expressed uncertainty about Singleton's present competency, observing more disorganized thinking and a preoccupation with religious themes. His beliefs included notions of a parallel universe, peculiar ideas about death, and self-identification as the Holy Spirit. Although the court did not request a formal opinion on his current competency to be executed, Mrad indicated that this matter must be considered in the broader context of his medication status.
Mrad's report on Singleton reveals significant mental health concerns, including Singleton's belief that he is a marionette controlled by God and his delusions regarding celebrities like Sylvester Stallone and Arnold Schwarzenegger. Singleton expressed a lack of concern for death and recounted a past suicide attempt in 1997, where he cut his jugular three times without fatal consequences. Medical history indicates that Singleton is prone to psychosis if he does not take his medication, with documented instances of psychosis occurring four to five months after discontinuation. Records show he had not received medication for eleven months prior to involuntary treatment starting in 1997, during which he exhibited psychotic symptoms after seven months without medication. Mrad highlighted the uncertainty surrounding Singleton's potential regression into psychosis and his competency for execution, stating the district court found Singleton was not Ford competent at the time of involuntary medication initiation. The court refrained from determining Singleton's current competency due to the limited nature of the remand order.
The State of Arkansas contends that the controversy is moot since Singleton is currently taking medication voluntarily but believes the petition should still be addressed based on a mootness exception, citing the likelihood that he may stop taking his medication. The State argues that the appeal lacks a justiciable controversy and requests dismissal, asserting that any future competency issues should be raised by Singleton if needed. However, the court agrees that the issue is justiciable and resolves to enjoin Singleton's execution both now and in the future.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Ford and Washington v. Harper inform the opinion regarding the execution of mentally ill prisoners and the administration of involuntary medical treatment. In Ford, the Court established that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of an insane prisoner, citing evolving standards of decency and the historical condemnation of executing the insane in common law. The Court emphasized that no state allows the execution of individuals who cannot comprehend their punishment, arguing that executing such individuals lacks retributive value and offends societal norms. Justice Powell's concurring opinion clarified that the Eighth Amendment forbids execution of those unaware of their punishment and its rationale.
In Harper, the Court addressed due process challenges concerning a regulation that allowed involuntary medical treatment of inmates with antipsychotic drugs. The Court recognized that forced medication constitutes a significant infringement on liberty but upheld the regulation under substantive due process, permitting involuntary treatment if deemed necessary for the inmate's safety and the safety of others. The Court specified that such treatment must be justified and medically appropriate, aligning with the state's interests in prison safety.
Involuntary medication of an incompetent prisoner for self-protection raises constitutional questions regarding the state’s ability to execute the prisoner after rendering him competent through such medication. The state and district court assert that the intent behind medicating Singleton should determine its constitutionality, acknowledging that medicating him explicitly to enable execution would be unconstitutional. However, they believe it is permissible to execute him if he becomes competent through medication administered for his protection.
There is skepticism about whether the framework established in Harper applies here, particularly since distinguishing the state's true intent—whether to protect Singleton or to prepare him for execution—can be challenging. This ambiguity raises concerns about due process rights and the necessity of hearings to contest the state's reasons for involuntary medication, potentially complicating the execution process if Singleton's competency fluctuates.
Singleton's case is compounded by his long history of involuntary medication since 1987, during which the state has inconsistently administered treatment. Singleton’s mental stability has varied, with periods of psychosis occurring when medication was discontinued. Expert testimony indicates that Singleton would likely revert to psychosis if removed from medication, but predicting the exact timeline for this deterioration is complex. Past records show varying durations before psychotic symptoms re-emerged after medication cessation, complicating assessments of his competency status.
The relationship between Singleton's competency and his medication presents significant challenges in predicting his mental state, particularly under the Ford criteria, once he is off medication. Although there is some uncertainty regarding his competency while medicated, historical data indicates that prolonged cessation of medication will likely lead to a return of psychosis. The duration of his competency post-medication or the timeframe needed to regain competency upon re-medication is unknown, raising concerns about his competency on the execution date.
Singleton's history reveals episodes of hallucinations and psychotic symptoms despite being medicated, with incidents occurring even after extended periods of treatment. This casts doubt on his ability to maintain Ford competency, suggesting he may not possess the necessary understanding for execution. Previous classifications of Singleton as Ford incompetent further support this conclusion.
The overall assessment indicates that Singleton has not achieved a stable state of competency that would allow for execution, and executing him could be seen as inhumane. Therefore, a permanent stay of execution is warranted, and the court directs a reduction of Singleton's sentence to life imprisonment without parole, while the State retains the option to administer medication as needed for his and others' safety.
Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1989), indicates that Collins was implicitly overruled by Lowenfeld v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988). According to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-506(d)(1), if the Director of the Department of Correction believes an individual on death row is incompetent due to mental illness, they must notify the Deputy Director of the Division of Mental Health Services and the Governor. The Division is then required to conduct a mental health inquiry within 30 days, with the individual’s attorney being informed and allowed to arrange an independent evaluation. If found incompetent, the Governor will ensure appropriate mental health treatment, and the Director may mandate a reevaluation as necessary.
Singleton was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and anxiety in August 1983 and was placed on antipsychotic medication, though the duration is unclear. Prior to trial, his counsel sought a psychiatric evaluation, leading to assessments at the Arkansas State Hospital. Results indicated Singleton had a full-scale IQ of 83, suggesting he functioned at a dull normal level, with reading skills at nearly a seventh-grade level. The evaluating psychiatrist concluded that Singleton was not legally irresponsible at the time of evaluation or likely at the time of the alleged offense, indicating he could understand the proceedings and assist in his defense. His diagnoses included no psychosis, habitual excessive drinking, and severe antisocial personality disorder.
The district court noted Singleton's medical history and personal testimony indicated potential mental health issues from as early as age twelve. The case's procedural history reveals Singleton's long-term presence on death row, now nearing twenty-two years, marked by episodes of delusional thinking and bizarre behavior, necessitating involuntary medication for his safety. The current matter before the court is to determine Singleton's present competency under the Ford standard, a question not previously addressed by the district court upon remand in March 2000.
The author expresses a reluctance to conclude the case despite recognizing the appeal of the Court's decision to expedite matters. They highlight the challenges posed by delays in competency hearings related to execution dates. The author suggests that had the district court been asked to address the current question, the outcome may not differ. They also point out that the Court's opinion does not resolve the complex constitutional issue of whether a state can execute an individual deemed Ford-competent through forced administration of psychotropic drugs. The author expresses disagreement with the Court's analysis, emphasizing the need for a clearer resolution to ensure that the State meets its obligations under Ford v. Wainwright. They argue that while further delays are undesirable, they are necessary to ensure that the punishment imposed is constitutionally valid, concluding with a respectful dissent.
