Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
McBride v. Acceptance Insurance Co.
Citations: 653 So. 2d 978; 1995 Ala. LEXIS 43; 1995 WL 29840Docket: 1930952
Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; January 26, 1995; Alabama; State Supreme Court
The jury awarded McBride $47,500 in damages against Hicks, the uninsured motorist. In November 1993, the court ruled that McBride could stack coverages under his insurance policy with Acceptance. Acceptance sought a new trial or modification of the judgment. On March 1, 1994, the trial judge granted a new trial, citing "improper and highly prejudicial arguments" made by McBride’s counsel, despite Acceptance not having objected during the trial. The judge referenced specific arguments made by both parties. McBride’s counsel emphasized Acceptance's right to pursue Hicks for reimbursement if they compensated McBride, while Acceptance’s counsel questioned the feasibility of recovering damages from Hicks, suggesting punitive damages would not be beneficial since McBride was dealing with his own insurer. The judge noted the broad discretion in granting new trials and established that appellate complaints regarding opposing counsel's comments must be accompanied by specific objections made during the trial. An exception exists to the requirement for a timely objection or motion regarding improper remarks in court when such remarks are deemed grossly improper and highly prejudicial, to the extent that no corrective action by the trial court could mitigate their impact. In this case, McBride argues that the trial court erred in granting a new trial based on claims that the arguments made by plaintiff's counsel were improper and prejudicial. McBride asserts that his counsel’s arguments were legally justified and that the trial judge misapplied legal standards in favor of Acceptance. The court reviewed the record and found that the trial judge abused his discretion in granting a new trial based on the alleged impropriety of McBride's counsel's arguments. Acceptance’s trial strategy invited these arguments by shifting the jury’s focus away from the uninsured motorist and emphasizing McBride's entitlement to benefits. The trial judge had instructed the jury that Acceptance could seek reimbursement from the uninsured motorist, which was a correct interpretation of the law. Furthermore, the trial judge incorrectly applied legal principles related to subrogation rights compared to indemnification, leading to his decision to grant a new trial. The Supreme Court of Alabama has previously ruled that jurors should not be informed of indemnity rights in tort cases, but this principle does not apply in uninsured motorist cases, where the presence of an insurance company is known to the jury. Consequently, the court reversed the new trial order and reinstated the judgment in favor of McBride, while not addressing the tort claims. The decision was concurred by Justices Maddox, Houston, Kennedy, Ingram, and Cook.