Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; September 7, 2001; Federal Appellate Court
Sanford J. Berger appealed a decision from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, which had granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Mayfield Heights and other defendants regarding a dispute over the maintenance of his property. The appellate court reversed the district court's ruling, finding that the municipal ordinance under which Berger was cited violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Upon remand, Berger sought attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, but the district court denied this request, stating he had only succeeded in a simple constitutional challenge rather than a claim under § 1983. The appellate court disagreed, determining that Berger was a "prevailing party" and remanding the case for a determination of reasonable attorneys' fees.
The case arose from a conflict with a neighbor, who prompted the City Council to amend an ordinance requiring owners of vacant lots with 100 feet or less of street frontage to maintain their lots to a height of no more than eight inches. Berger's lot, maintained in a natural state, did not comply, leading to his citation. In his 12-count complaint, Berger alleged the ordinance was unreasonable, arbitrary, and violated both substantive due process and equal protection. His claims included jurisdiction under several statutes and sought compensatory and punitive damages, an injunction against prosecution under the ordinance, and a declaratory judgment regarding its constitutionality. The district court had issued a temporary restraining order against criminal prosecution while the case was litigated.
After the dismissal of other defendants or their immunity from liability, the district court granted summary judgment to the City on all counts of Berger's complaint. On appeal, the court reversed this decision regarding Counts 1 and 2, determining that the ordinance violated both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following the remand, Berger sought attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, while the City countered with a cross-motion for its own attorneys' fees and sanctions against Berger. The district court denied both requests.
Berger contends that the district court incorrectly denied him attorneys' fees, asserting that under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, prevailing parties in civil rights actions may recover reasonable attorney's fees. The appellate review of this denial is based on whether the district court abused its discretion, which occurs if it applies the wrong legal standard or relies on erroneous factual findings.
The district court acknowledged Berger's success in challenging the ordinance's constitutionality but denied fees, arguing that this challenge was not confined to a 1983 action and that Berger did not prevail under § 1983. The court claimed that the constitutional challenge was merely a constitutional inquiry, not a civil rights action. The appellate court rejected this reasoning, emphasizing that the Supreme Court has previously ruled against such a distinction, indicating that Berger's constitutional challenge should qualify him as a prevailing party eligible for attorneys' fees under § 1988.
The Supreme Court addressed whether Section 1983's prohibition against violations of federal laws is limited to specific laws. In Thiboutot, respondents claimed that Maine violated the Social Security Act under Section 1983. Although they won their claim, the state court initially denied attorney's fees under Section 1988. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine later determined that attorney's fees were applicable. Upon review, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that the Social Security Act is encompassed within Section 1983's provisions, emphasizing that Section 1983 broadly covers violations of both federal statutory and constitutional rights. The Court asserted that Section 1983 provides remedies for various official violations beyond civil rights, including enforceable rights under federal regulations, such as those from the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984. The Court held that attorney's fees under Section 1988 are available for any action under Section 1983, including those based solely on Social Security Act violations, rejecting the notion that such fees are limited to civil rights cases. This position was supported by precedents, including Maher v. Gagne, which reinforced the applicability of Section 1988 to all Section 1983 actions. The Court also dismissed the district court's view that relief could only be granted for constitutional violations, clarifying that plaintiffs do not need to rely solely on Section 1983 to secure attorney's fees under Section 1988.
Plaintiffs in Americans United successfully claimed a violation of the Establishment Clause against the State of Michigan. However, their request for attorney's fees was denied by the district court, which noted that the action was brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act rather than to enforce 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the plaintiffs did not specifically plead reliance on that statute. The court clarified that § 1988 concerns the substance of a prevailing party's action rather than its formal presentation. A failure to specifically plead § 1983 does not bar a claim for attorney's fees if the case involves a significant Fourteenth Amendment claim related to the plaintiffs' success. Additionally, it was determined that prevailing on a basis other than § 1983 does not prevent a fee award under § 1988 if § 1983 would have been an appropriate basis for relief. This interpretation aligns with legislative history indicating that fees should be awarded when a constitutional claim is involved, even if the statutory claim does not qualify for fees under § 1988. The plaintiffs had established jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), which is viewed as the jurisdictional counterpart to § 1983. The court emphasized that jurisdiction under § 1343 requires alleging a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes, and although § 1983 does not confer jurisdiction by itself, § 1343 does for claims arising under § 1983. The complaint contained sufficient allegations to state a cause of action under § 1983, leading to the conclusion that the plaintiffs met the requirements for fee recovery under § 1988. In the current case, it is noted that Berger's complaint also cited jurisdiction under § 1983 and § 1343, reinforcing the relationship between these provisions.
Berger successfully alleged constitutional violations under Counts 1 and 2 of his complaint, which allows his 1983 claim to properly invoke jurisdiction under 1343, contrary to the district court's assertion of 1331 jurisdiction. The court's prior ruling in Americans United reinforces that a claim for attorney's fees is valid even if reliance on 1983 isn't explicitly stated, provided the pleadings and evidence present a substantial Fourteenth Amendment claim related to the plaintiffs' success. The essential elements of a 1983 claim require establishing: (1) a person, (2) acting under state law, and (3) deprivation of a federal right. Berger's claim meets these elements, as the City qualifies as a person under federal law, and the criminal citation against him constitutes an action under color of state law. The City deprived Berger of his constitutional rights through the citation, which the court previously addressed. Berger is entitled to full relief through the declaration of the ordinance's nullity, as the parties agreed to suspend criminal prosecution during the appeal. Consequently, Berger's reliance on 1343(3) for jurisdiction and his substantial claims under the Fourteenth Amendment support his entitlement to attorney's fees under 1988.
The district court did not rule on whether Berger was a 'prevailing party' under 1988, but he clearly qualifies. The prevailing party standard dictates that a party must succeed on significant issues in litigation, achieving some benefits sought in the suit. Actual relief that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties benefits the plaintiff. The Supreme Court has clarified that a party need not prevail on the central issue to be considered 'prevailing'; partial success still warrants an award of attorney's fees proportional to that success.
Berger's legal action resulted in a significant shift in his relationship with the City, which had initiated a criminal citation against him for failing to trim his vacant lot as per an amended ordinance. In municipal court, Berger's motions to dismiss, suppress, and quash the charges were denied, exposing him to potential criminal prosecution and disciplinary action from the Ohio State legal bar due to the misdemeanor. However, his successful outcome in federal court mitigated these risks, illustrating a substantial change in his legal standing with the City.
The City contested Berger's status as a prevailing party, noting that 12 of his 14 counts were dismissed, which they argued indicated he did not achieve substantial relief. This assertion contradicts the conclusion that Berger prevailed. The City also claimed that the awarding of attorney's fees is at the district court's discretion; however, prior rulings establish that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to fees unless special circumstances dictate otherwise. The district court is tasked with determining the appropriate amount of attorney's fees upon remand, considering the extent of Berger's success in the litigation, acknowledging that partial success may lead to a reduction in awarded fees even if the claims were non-frivolous and pursued in good faith. The judgment of the district court was reversed, and the case was remanded for a determination of attorney's fees in favor of the plaintiff.
