Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; August 30, 2001; Federal Appellate Court
Deon Gunn, the petitioner-appellant, appealed from a state conviction related to two separate robberies involving a firearm. Gunn had entered a guilty plea after an agreement with the prosecutor, which included a waiver of indictment and a commitment to plead guilty to two counts of robbery with a deadly weapon. The plea agreement stipulated that the robbery sentences would run concurrently but that the sentences for the use of a deadly weapon would run consecutively.
During the arraignment, the prosecutor indicated that while they would not oppose concurrent sentences for the robbery counts, any sentence related to the use of a weapon would be consecutive. The potential maximum sentence for the four charges was noted to be sixty years. Gunn sought clarification on the meaning of "concurrent," and the judge confirmed that the weapon sentences would be consecutive to the robbery sentences, effectively capping his total exposure at twenty years if sentenced at the upper end.
A written plea agreement later reiterated that the state would not oppose concurrent sentences for the robbery counts. However, the agreement did not guarantee a specific sentence, leaving the judge with discretion to impose a harsher penalty. The presentence report revealed Gunn's extensive criminal history and suggested consecutive sentences totaling thirty-six years, despite the plea negotiation aiming for a maximum of thirty years. The case raises issues about whether the prosecutor breached the plea agreement terms.
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor, unfamiliar with the case, initially stated that the state would not oppose running Counts V and III concurrently. However, after the judge cautioned him against making any recommendations that could contradict the plea agreement, the prosecutor mistakenly concurred with a recommendation for four consecutive nine-year sentences totaling thirty-six years, deviating from the previously agreed position of two concurrent nine-year sentences totaling eighteen years. The judge, confused by the plea bargain details, sought clarification from the prosecutor, who affirmed the recommendation of the Department of Parole and Probation.
Gunn's attorney proposed a different sentence structure, suggesting pairs of three-year concurrent sentences totaling six years, but failed to address the prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement. She argued for leniency based on Gunn's character and lack of harm caused. Ultimately, the judge imposed the four consecutive nine-year sentences, and the defense did not object regarding the plea agreement.
The Nevada Supreme Court ruled that Gunn could not withdraw his guilty plea based on the alleged breach because the plea agreement allowed the sentencing judge discretion. The court noted that while the prosecutor did concur with the presentence report's recommendation for nine-year sentences, it did not breach the agreement's term not to oppose concurrent sentences. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Gunn's motion. Additionally, Gunn's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was dismissed as it was filed late without explanation.
Gunn later sought a writ of habeas corpus, and a certificate of appealability was granted on two issues: the prosecutor's alleged breach of the plea agreement and ineffective assistance by his attorney. The conclusion reached was that Gunn was entitled to relief based on the prosecutor's breach, rendering the ineffective assistance claim unnecessary for consideration.
The district court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus is reviewed de novo, while decisions from the highest state court are afforded deference. A writ must be denied for any claims previously adjudicated in state court unless the state court's decision was either contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as defined by the Supreme Court, or was based on an unreasonable factual determination. The term "unreasonable" implies a need for a "clear error" standard, requiring a firm conviction that an error occurred. This is akin to standards used in mandamus petitions and clear error cases.
In assessing whether a state court's decision constitutes an "unreasonable application" of federal law, the review must reveal a firm conviction that the court's decision was incorrect rather than merely better than an alternative reasonable argument. Similarly, an "unreasonable determination of the facts" requires more than mere incorrectness; it necessitates a clear error that leads to a firm conviction of mistake based on the evidence presented.
The analysis begins by identifying the applicable federal law, specifically referencing the Supreme Court case Santobello, which holds that any promise inducing a plea must be fulfilled, regardless of whether a breach is inadvertent or influences the sentencing judge. The understanding of the plea agreement by Gunn, the defendant, is critical, particularly in light of his inquiries regarding concurrent sentencing. The plea agreement explicitly stated that the State would not oppose concurrent sentences for the relevant counts, a fact affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court and essential to Gunn's decision to plead guilty.
The central issue is whether the prosecutor violated the plea agreement by opposing concurrent sentences. The Nevada Supreme Court found no breach, asserting the state would not oppose concurrent sentences. However, a thorough review of the state court's sentencing hearing revealed no explicit support for this assertion. The prosecutor's statement during the plea change did not carry over to the sentencing phase, where he merely concurred with a presentence report recommending consecutive sentences. This concurrence effectively opposed concurrent sentences, contradicting the plea agreement. The difference between concurrent and consecutive sentences was significant, potentially resulting in a prison term of 18 years versus 36 years. The evidence indicates a clear error in the state court's determination, suggesting an unreasonable factual conclusion. The excerpt also references the Third Circuit's analysis in a similar case, where a prosecutor's actions were deemed inconsistent with a plea agreement, reinforcing the notion that the state court's conclusion fell outside the deference typically afforded under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
Habeas corpus proceedings have established that when the government violates a plea agreement, the typical remedy on direct review is to remand for resentencing. In habeas petitions, courts require states to provide for resentencing when a plea agreement is breached, but do not dictate how the state should implement relief. The district court's determination is reversed, and the petition is granted, directing that the judgment be vacated, allowing Gunn to be resentenced or receive other appropriate relief from the state court due to the breach of the plea agreement.
Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) addresses several legal principles under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), particularly in relation to the standards for evaluating state court decisions in habeas corpus petitions. Key points include references to the necessity for federal courts to defer to state court findings unless they are contrary to or involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The case cites Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2000), which further emphasizes the limitations imposed on federal review by § 2254(d)(2). Various precedents are referenced, including United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979), and United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333 (9th Cir. 1993), illustrating how federal courts have corrected sentences or vacated them under § 2255 motions. Additionally, the excerpt mentions the discretionary powers of state courts in determining remedies for violations, as established in Pierre v. Thompson, 666 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1982). The citations reflect a consistent judicial approach to maintaining a balance between state and federal judicial authority in criminal matters.
