John Doe, a Minor, by His Mother and Next Friend, Jane Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District

Citation: 263 F.3d 833Docket: 01-1048

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; August 29, 2001; Federal Appellate Court

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J.M., a seventh-grade student at Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD), was expelled after writing compositions that referenced killing a classmate, K.G., following their breakup. J.M. did not intend to share these writings, and they were discovered by a friend, D., who later shared them with K.G. Upon learning of the compositions, K.G. expressed concern, which led to intervention by school authorities. The school's principal recommended a one-year expulsion for "terroristic threatening." Following a conference with school officials, J.M. was initially suspended for a semester and required to attend an alternative school, Alpha Academy. However, after an appeal to the PCSSD Board, the expulsion was extended to the end of the school year, denying J.M. access to alternative education. The district court later ruled that J.M.’s writings did not constitute a true threat, prompting PCSSD to appeal this decision. The Eighth Circuit Court affirmed the district court's ruling, agreeing with its interpretation of the "true threat" analysis.

J.M., represented by his parents, filed a lawsuit against the Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD), asserting that his expulsion violated his rights. The district court ruled on November 22, 2000, that J.M.'s writing did not constitute a true threat, as it was taken from his home and shared without his consent, and the content did not present an imminent threat. Consequently, the court determined that J.M.'s writings were protected speech and ordered the termination of his expulsion. PCSSD appealed this decision.

The district court acknowledged that while threats of physical violence are not protected under the First Amendment, distinguishing between true threats and protected speech is crucial. J.M.'s off-campus statements, which did not constitute a true threat, were protected, as schools cannot suppress student expression occurring outside school. The court referenced established legal precedents indicating that while schools may regulate speech inconsistent with their educational mission, they cannot censor similar speech that occurs outside their jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court has not provided a definitive test to distinguish true threats from protected speech. However, the Eighth Circuit has outlined factors to consider, including the reaction of the recipient, whether the threat was conditional, how an objectively reasonable person would interpret the statement, the context of communication, prior behaviors of the threat-maker, and the victim's perception of the threat-maker's propensity for violence. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit established an objective test to assess whether a reasonable person would view the statement as a serious intent to harm, emphasizing the importance of the entire factual context and listeners' reactions when evaluating alleged threats.

Other Circuits have distinguished between threats and protected speech. The Second Circuit defines a threat as a communication that is unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific to the person threatened, conveying an imminent prospect of execution. The Sixth Circuit adds that a serious expression of intent to inflict bodily harm does not constitute a threat unless it aims to intimidate. Integrating precedents from the Eighth, Ninth, Second, and Sixth Circuits, the analysis questions whether a reasonable person would view J.M.'s private letter as a serious intent to harm K.G., concluding negatively. J.M. wrote the letter privately and did not share it with K.G.; it was discovered by D. in J.M.'s bedroom, and J.M. refused to allow D. to copy it. 

Additionally, the conversations between K.G. and J.M. prior to K.G. seeing the letter are not recorded, limiting the understanding of their context. There is no indication that K.G. knew of J.M.'s potential for violence or prior threats against her or others. Evidence suggests K.G. and J.M. engaged in peaceful church activities after K.G. learned of the letter, and J.M. later apologized to K.G. and her mother. The state prosecutor decided against formal action, closing the case.

Concerns were raised about the Board's handling of J.M.'s expulsion, highlighting that Board Members relied on personal experiences unrelated to the case and lacked access to relevant facts and witnesses. It appeared that the expulsion was upheld as punishment for J.M. appealing the decision, rather than on substantive grounds related to the incident.

The court case John Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District addressed the expulsion of a student, J.M., for a composition that contained violent and threatening language directed at another student, K.G. The majority opinion deemed J.M.'s writing as protected speech rather than a true threat, asserting that a reasonable person would not interpret the composition as a serious intent to harm K.G. Consequently, the district court's ruling affirming J.M.'s return to school was upheld. 

In contrast, Judge Hansen dissented, arguing that the threats made in J.M.'s writing were serious and that K.G. perceived them as real, even altering her behavior due to fear. Hansen criticized the characterization of J.M.'s work as a "composition," emphasizing its crude and violent content, which included multiple threats of murder and sexual violence. He contended that the school board was justified in its decision to expel J.M. for violating Rule 36 of the school handbook, which prohibits threats intended to terrorize others, and believed the district court erred by reinstating him.