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Peo v. Maas Bros.
Citations: 634 So. 2d 1130; 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 3345; 1994 WL 120056Docket: No. 92-3050
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; April 12, 1994; Florida; State Appellate Court
An appeal was filed following the judge of compensation claims' (JCC) denial of a claim based on the statute of limitations. The appellate court reversed this decision, determining that the treatment received by Claimant Winifred Peo constituted "remedial attention" related to a prosthetic device under Florida Statutes section 440.19(1)(b). Peo sustained a compensable hip fracture on March 20, 1985, necessitating a total left hip replacement two days later. Although a stipulation for partial settlement was approved in 1987, allowing for future medical benefits, Peo did not seek further treatment until 1992, when she returned to Dr. Fenning for pain related to trochanteric bursitis, receiving a cortisone injection. The employer/carrier (E/C) contended that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations, which typically prohibits claims filed more than two years after certain benchmarks. However, the statute provides an exception for remedial attention related to prosthetic devices. Dr. Fenning confirmed that the 1992 treatment was to alleviate pain from bursitis, which is often a post-operative condition resulting from adhesions or scar tissue associated with hip replacements. The court determined that the bursitis was directly related to the prior hip surgery and thus fell within the statutory exception, indicating that the treatment was indeed remedial in nature. No further surgery on the prosthetic device was planned, and the doctor acknowledged the relationship between the adhesions and the prosthetic device insertion. Claimant's current condition is linked to a surgical operation, specifically a total hip replacement, which has caused bursitis due to resulting scar tissue. The Employer/Carrier (E/C) acknowledges this causal relationship but argues that not all related treatment falls under the statute of limitations exemption. They differentiate between treatment directly related to the prosthetic device's insertion and other treatment that is merely causally related to the initial injury. The E/C contend that the February 1992 treatment pertains to the surgical procedure itself and thus does not qualify for the statutory exception. In contrast, Claimant argues that the treatment is logically connected to the device's insertion, citing the ordinary meaning of “relating to” and the legislative intent to include surgical procedures necessary for inserting prosthetic devices within the exemption. Claimant references relevant case law, asserting that the treatment was necessary to address complications arising from the hip implant, which is characterized as a device with a long-term functional purpose. The court finds Claimant's interpretation aligns with the legislative goal of protecting individuals with prosthetic devices. Furthermore, the E/C’s reliance on past case commentary is deemed misplaced, and the current matter does not involve the same definitional issues as those previously addressed. The court reverses the order denying the claim as time-barred, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.