Ray Antwane Higgins, Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Thomas M. Carpenter, City Attorney, Little Rock, Arkansas, Appellee/cross-Appellant. Reginald R. Early v. Greg Harmon, Warden, Maximum Security Unit, Adc Larry Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction L. J. Brown Sgt. Hearn
Docket: 3316
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; August 6, 2001; Federal Appellate Court
Ray Antwane Higgins, an Arkansas inmate, appealed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action by the District Court for failure to state a claim. The defendant, City Attorney Thomas M. Carpenter, cross-appealed, arguing that the "three-strikes" rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which limits the ability of inmates with a history of frivolous lawsuits to file in forma pauperis (IFP), should apply to Higgins. Carpenter contended that Higgins had previously filed three or more unsuccessful claims and was not in imminent danger of serious injury.
The appeals were consolidated with that of Reginald Early, another inmate who similarly faced the application of the "three-strikes" rule. Both courts had previously declined to apply this rule, citing a precedent (Ayers v. Norris) that held the rule unconstitutional under strict scrutiny. However, in conducting a de novo review, the Eighth Circuit Court found that the proper standard was rational basis review, which the court determined the "three-strikes" rule met, thus concluding it did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
As a result, the Court reversed the lower courts' decisions not to apply the "three-strikes" rule, dismissed Higgins's appeal, and underscored that Higgins's earlier lawsuits (Higgins I, II, and III), which alleged unlawful search and excessive force stemming from a 1994 arrest, had been dismissed on res judicata grounds. In Higgins IV, he claimed that Carpenter conspired to conceal police misconduct, but the District Court dismissed this claim while granting Higgins IFP status for his appeal.
Early filed a lawsuit in 1983 against prison officials, claiming he was denied exercise for 46 days while in administrative segregation and was repeatedly denied medical appointments for health issues. He was granted in forma pauperis (IFP) status due to a negative balance in his prison account. The defendants sought to deny his IFP status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), citing six prior lawsuits dismissed for failure to state a claim. The District Court recognized Early had three prior strikes but ruled that applying § 1915(g) in his case would be unconstitutional, as it would eliminate his access to the courts due to his inability to pay the full filing fee, especially since his complaint involved fundamental rights violations. This decision was certified for interlocutory appeal.
On appeal, the defendants argued for rational basis review of § 1915(g), asserting it serves a legitimate state interest without impeding access to the courts. The United States intervened. The court noted that classifications affecting inmates and indigents are not suspect classes and that while access to the courts is a fundamental right, § 1915(g) does not infringe upon it by allowing indigent inmates a "reasonably adequate opportunity" to pursue valid lawsuits. The law applies only to civil actions and does not deny IFP status for nonfrivolous claims unless the inmate has filed three meritless suits. Thus, inmates have control over the application of the three-strikes rule by choosing to avoid frivolous filings.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), inmates categorized as "three-strikers" can still file lawsuits by paying the full filing fee upfront, which does not inhibit their access to courts as established in *Lewis v. Casey*. Even frequent filers can pursue legal claims, although they are limited in their ability to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). An exception exists for indigent inmates facing imminent danger of serious physical injury, allowing them to file without prepayment. Courts have upheld the requirement for inmates to pay an initial partial filing fee if they have assets, confirming that such fees do not burden access to justice. Additionally, the statute allows dismissal of IFP actions that fail to state a claim, which aims to reduce costs associated with meritless lawsuits.
While some indigent inmates may struggle to pay fees and thus be effectively barred from valid claims, the Supreme Court has recognized that fee waivers in civil cases are exceptions, not standard practice. Consequently, there is no constitutional right for inmates to pay court fees by installments, as proceeding IFP is considered a privilege rather than a right.
The rational basis test applied to § 1915(g) confirms that the statute serves a legitimate government interest by deterring frivolous litigation, thus not violating equal protection. Classifications established by § 1915(g) between indigent inmates and non-inmates, as well as frequent-filer inmates and other indigent inmates, possess a rational basis supported by the premise that inmates, having more free time and resources, can pursue claims without the same financial burdens as non-inmates.
The court determined that Section 1915(g) of the statute withstands an equal protection challenge, leading to the conclusion that the District Court should have dismissed Higgins IV based on this provision. The court found that granting Higgins in forma pauperis (IFP) status for his appeal was erroneous, and thus Higgins IV's appeal is dismissed without merit consideration. Higgins did not assert imminent danger of serious physical injury and did not dispute that prior dismissals in Higgins II and Higgins III constitute "strikes." The court emphasized that the burden lies with the inmate to provide sufficient information to contest dismissals under the three-strikes rule. The affirmance of previous dismissals was determined to amount to four strikes due to their duplicative nature regarding claims and defendants. Additionally, the District Court in Early v. Harmon incorrectly rejected a motion to deny Early IFP status, as Early similarly had three strikes and was not in imminent danger. Consequently, the court dismissed Higgins's appeal and remanded the cases back to the District Courts with instructions to deny IFP status to both Higgins and Early under 1915(g).
