Donald Ruff Dan Glenn, Fletcher Carr Gary Herron Donald Taylor v. Marvin Runyon, Former Postmaster General of the U.S. Postal Service Tim Marshall Daniel Kuack Michael Sitter John Wacsak
Docket: 99-4074
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; July 25, 2001; Federal Appellate Court
Plaintiffs Fletcher Carr, Donald Taylor, and Gary Herron, all former African-American employees of the United States Postal Service, filed a lawsuit against defendants Marvin Runyon, Tim Marshall, Daniel Kuack, Michael Sitter, and John Wacsak. They alleged that the defendants improperly targeted African-American postal employees in a drug investigation while excluding white employees. The plaintiffs claimed constitutional violations under Bivens, citing the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Amendments, as well as asserting claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).
A magistrate judge dismissed the Bivens claims, ruling they were barred by the statute of limitations. However, the appellate court reversed this decision. The investigation, directed by defendants in 1991, involved hiring informants who fabricated evidence of drug purchases, leading to the indictment of the plaintiffs, who, despite their innocence, pleaded guilty to lesser charges. The plaintiffs later learned of the false evidence through a 1994 newspaper article, prompting them to seek to withdraw their guilty pleas, which resulted in new trials granted by the state court. By March 1996, all charges against them were dismissed.
In 1997, the plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit against the defendants in both official and individual capacities for constitutional torts and federal tort claims, including malicious prosecution and emotional distress.
Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' Bivens claims, contending they were barred by Ohio's two-year statute of limitations, asserting that the claims accrued in 1991 when plaintiffs were indicted or by April 4, 1995, when they attempted to withdraw their guilty pleas. Plaintiffs countered that their claims did not accrue until the charges were dismissed in March 1996. The magistrate judge sided with the defendants, determining the claims accrued in April 1995 when the plaintiffs became aware that the indictments were based on false information. Consequently, the claims were dismissed as time-barred due to the plaintiffs' failure to file within the two-year period.
The district court's dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is subject to de novo review. It is acknowledged that Ohio's two-year statute of limitations governs the claims, but the determination of when the statute begins to run is a matter of federal law, starting when plaintiffs knew or should have known of their injury. This involves assessing when plaintiffs could have reasonably discovered the injury, rather than merely the underlying facts.
Plaintiffs argued that the statute should not have commenced until March 26, 1996, when the charges were dismissed, citing the case of Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, which established that the statute of limitations does not begin until criminal charges are resolved. The court in that case emphasized that § 1983 actions cannot challenge the validity of criminal judgments unless the conviction has been overturned or invalidated through specific legal means, as outlined in the Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey.
A cause of action under § 1983 for damages is not recognized until the resolution of any pending criminal charges, as established in Shamaeizadeh. The statute of limitations for such an action does not begin to accrue until the criminal case reaches final disposition, ensuring that the validity of the pending charges is not compromised. The plaintiffs' claims did not accrue until their charges were dismissed, as they were unaware of their injury prior to that. Defendants argued that this principle does not apply to Bivens actions, but case law indicates that the rationale of Heck applies equally to Bivens claims. Various circuit courts have affirmed that the legal frameworks of § 1983 and Bivens are fundamentally similar, particularly regarding the accrual of the statute of limitations. Additionally, Spencer v. Kemna does not alter this conclusion; it indicates that the favorable termination requirement of Heck ceases to apply once a plaintiff is released from custody. Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Spencer noted that a plaintiff who becomes aware of their injury upon release can immediately pursue their claim, which aligns with the findings in Shamaeizadeh.
Defendants argued that plaintiffs' statute of limitations should not have started when the charges were dismissed since plaintiffs had already served their sentences. However, the court clarified that the statute of limitations begins only when plaintiffs "knew or should have known" of their injury. Unlike the Spencer case, where the plaintiff was aware of his injury before release, plaintiffs here did not recognize their wrongful conviction until the charges were dismissed. This situation aligns with malicious prosecution claims, where the statute of limitations commences upon dismissal of charges. The court noted that other circuits have similarly concluded that claims under Heck do not accrue until the charges are dismissed. Specific cases cited include Harvey, Covington, Beck, Uboh, Smith, and Abdella, all affirming that the accrual of a Bivens claim follows the dismissal of criminal charges. Shamaeizadeh was deemed decisive for the appeal, confirming that plaintiffs' Bivens claims accrued in April 1996 when the charges were dismissed, and since they filed their claims on August 28, 1997, they fall within the statute of limitations. Consequently, the magistrate judge's decision was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
The Honorable Avern Cohn, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, presided over the case. Former plaintiffs Dan Glenn and Donald Ruff settled their claims against the defendants. The magistrate judge dismissed the plaintiffs' Bivens claims as well as their claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress against all defendants, and for malicious prosecution and abuse of process against the United States Postal Service and Marvin Runyon, Postmaster. The case proceeded to trial on the plaintiffs' Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the United States, which was substituted as a defendant. The plaintiffs did not appeal these dismissals. Subsequently, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States on the remaining claims, which the plaintiffs also did not appeal. Under Kentucky law, applicable in this case, there is a one-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions. The record details the sentences of several individuals involved: Fletcher Carr and Gary Herron each received suspended sentences of six months for attempted sale of marijuana, while Donald Taylor was sentenced to 18 months for sale of heroin but served only three months before being placed on shock probation. Additionally, the magistrate judge determined that the plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims under the FTCA do not accrue until the related criminal charges are dismissed. Defendants presented alternative grounds for dismissing the Bivens claims, but the court chose not to address these, leaving them for consideration on remand.
