Joseph H. Pyke, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Matthew Pyke May P. Cole Charles Benedict Patricia A. Benedict Julius M. Cook Beverly J. Pyke Edward Smoke Selena M. Smoke Margaret Pyke Thompson, on Behalf of Themselves and All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. Mario Cuomo Thomas A. Constantine Robert B. Leu Ronald R. Brooks

Citations: 258 F.3d 107; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16202Docket: 00-9399

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; July 20, 2001; Federal Appellate Court

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Plaintiffs, including Joseph H. Pyke and others, appeal a summary judgment from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, which favored defendants, state officials including Mario Cuomo. The plaintiffs allege a denial of equal protection under the law due to the defendants’ refusal to provide police protection on the Akwesasne Mohawk Indian reservation, arguing that this refusal was based on their Native American identity. They claim that during the 1980s, violent criminal activities, including attacks and extortion by a group called the Warrior Society, necessitated police intervention, which was denied. Defendants argue that police intervention was not warranted due to the tribe's self-governance and safety concerns for state police. The district court supported the defendants, asserting that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that similarly situated individuals were treated differently or to establish an express racial classification, which it viewed as necessary to prove equal protection violations. The appellate court found this reasoning erroneous and vacated the district court's judgment.

A plaintiff making an equal protection claim based on discriminatory application of the law or motivation behind a neutral policy does not need to demonstrate disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals. The Supreme Court case United States v. Armstrong establishes that claims of selective prosecution require plaintiffs to show that similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted, due to the deference courts give to executive prosecutorial decisions. However, since the plaintiffs in this case are not alleging selective prosecution, the Armstrong requirement does not apply. They only need to establish that police protection was discriminatorily denied based on their Native American status, without needing to show disparate treatment compared to non-Native Americans.

Finding similarly situated individuals to Native Americans on a reservation, who exercise self-governance independent of New York State, poses significant challenges, making it impractical to demonstrate different treatment. The ruling implies that if the district court's interpretation were accepted, it would enable law enforcement to neglect the needs of Native Americans based on discriminatory motives, which is not permissible.

The district court misinterpreted discussions from Brown v. Oneonta, which outlined multiple ways to plead intentional discrimination violating the Equal Protection Clause. These include identifying laws that classify individuals by race, showing discriminatory application of a neutral policy, or demonstrating that a neutral policy adversely affects a group due to discriminatory intent. In Brown, the plaintiffs aimed to establish a claim based on explicit racial classification, arguing against the requirement to show a similarly situated non-minority group was treated differently. The distinction was made that while such a demonstration may be necessary for selective prosecution claims, it is not required when challenging a law or policy with an explicit racial classification.

The district court may have misinterpreted a previous ruling regarding the necessity for plaintiffs to demonstrate the existence of better treated, similarly situated individuals when challenging laws or policies with express racial classifications. It is clarified that plaintiffs do not need to provide such evidence when alleging that a facially neutral law or policy has been applied discriminatorily or is motivated by discriminatory animus, as in the case of the Native American plaintiffs here. A plaintiff can establish a denial of equal protection through several means, including pointing to express racial classifications or demonstrating that a neutral policy has been applied in a racially discriminatory manner.

The plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that their claim involved the discriminatory withholding of police protection based on their Native American status, and they are not required to show an express racial classification or identify better treated individuals of a different race. However, the plaintiffs must substantiate their claims of racial discrimination, and as they have not yet presented evidence, the summary judgment for the defendants cannot be justified on that basis. The district court's stay on discovery limited the plaintiffs' ability to gather evidence regarding discriminatory motivation.

Following the vacating of the summary judgment on the federal claims, the dismissal of the pendent state law claims is also vacated, allowing for potential reassertion in state court. The court's judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.