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Wilkins v. State
Citations: 629 So. 2d 705; 1993 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 394; 1993 WL 143789Docket: CR-91-1758
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; May 7, 1993; Alabama; State Appellate Court
Thomas Carlton Wilkins appeals the circuit court's denial of his A.R.Cr.P. Rule 32 petition, which challenged the validity of his three 1990 convictions for first and third degree burglary, resulting in concurrent 16-year sentences as a habitual offender. The circuit court found the petition inappropriate for relief, citing that it had already been the basis of a prior post-conviction petition and that Wilkins was not entitled to relief on the merits. The state did not respond to the petition, but the attorney general argued it was filed outside the two-year limitations period set by Rule 32.2(c). Wilkins's petition, filed on June 26, 1992, was within this period, as the time for appeal lapsed on January 30, 1991, making the deadline January 30, 1993. The attorney general also claimed the petition was successive under Rule 32.2(b) because it did not present new grounds compared to the previous petition. However, the court determined that there was only one prior petition addressing the same three convictions, which had been denied without a hearing on June 28, 1991. The court referenced Blount v. State, which stipulates that a subsequent petition can only be deemed successive if the previous one was adjudicated on its merits. Because the first petition did not receive a merits consideration, the court ruled that Wilkins’s current petition cannot be barred as successive, diverging from the precedent set in Vintson v. State, where the petitioner had not been given a hearing on the initial petition. In McDaniel v. State, the court reviewed a petition for writ of error coram nobis that was deemed successive, rejecting the precedent set by Vintson. The court noted that prior petitions had not been fully adjudicated as they were dismissed based on the state's motions. Similarly, in Ellison v. State, the court ruled that Ellison's third petition was not successive because his previous petitions were dismissed without evidentiary hearings. The circuit court had previously dismissed Ellison's first petition on preclusion grounds without addressing the merits. The court emphasized that for a petition to be considered procedurally barred as successive, the state must demonstrate that the prior petition was adjudicated on its merits. The absence of a record on original convictions and extensive claims of ineffective assistance of counsel led the court to remand the case, directing the state to file a response per Ex parte Bice and requiring the circuit court to provide specific findings of fact on Wilkins' claims. The court mandated that the circuit clerk return the findings within 60 days. Additionally, the court acknowledged that the procedural bar does not prevent Wilkins from asserting claims related to the trial court's lack of jurisdiction or an unauthorized sentence. All judges concurred with the decision.