Timothy J. Grendell Gerald W. Phillips, Plaintiffs-Appellants/cross-Appellees v. The Ohio Supreme Court, Defendants-Appellees/cross-Appellants

Citations: 252 F.3d 828; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 11593; 2001 WL 603949Docket: 00-3022, 99-4513

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; June 5, 2001; Federal Appellate Court

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Timothy J. Grendell and Gerald W. Phillips filed a lawsuit against the Ohio Supreme Court and four justices, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Ohio Supreme Court Practice Rule XIV.5 was unconstitutional for not providing notice and opportunity to be heard, violating the Due Process Clause. The district judge, Edmund A. Sargus, ruled that Grendell had standing but upheld the constitutionality of the Rule, leading to the dismissal of the case. Grendell appealed, while the Ohio Supreme Court cross-appealed regarding standing. The Sixth Circuit Court reversed the lower court's ruling on standing but affirmed the dismissal of Grendell's claim. The background of the case involved sanctions from a prior case where Grendell and his wife challenged the removal of a provision from an appropriations bill aimed at funding the Geauga County Airport Authority. The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed that suit, asserting that it does not evaluate legislative compliance with internal rules unless a constitutional provision is violated, which was not the case here.

Respondents in the case State of Ohio ex rel. Grendell filed for sanctions under Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and Ohio Revised Code 2323.51, which Grendell did not contest. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that sanctions were appropriate, deeming the action frivolous due to reliance on joint rules of the General Assembly that lacked a factual basis or legal merit. The court criticized the relators' attorneys for their harassment and noted past instances of "unjustified delaying tactics." Grendell subsequently filed a federal lawsuit seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Ohio Supreme Court's sanctions, claiming due process violations for lack of notice and opportunity for a hearing. He later amended his request to challenge the constitutionality of the Rule, arguing it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by not requiring notice before sanctions. Grendell asserted that the imposition of sanctions forced him to withdraw from cases due to fear of unconstitutional penalties. The district court dismissed the case, affirming Grendell's standing but rejecting the merit of his due process claim. Grendell appealed, contending that Rule XIV. 5 is unconstitutional, while the Ohio Supreme Court cross-appealed, questioning his standing. The district court's dismissal was evaluated under a legal standard that accepts all factual allegations as true. To establish standing, Grendell must demonstrate actual or threatened injury, causation, and the likelihood that requested relief would address his injury. The court noted that a pre-enforcement challenge is viable, but the plaintiff must prove actual harm or a significant risk of future harm to justify such a review.

Grendell asserts three arguments for standing to challenge Rule XIV. 5's constitutionality. First, he cites past sanctions imposed without due process in State of Ohio ex rel. Grendell. Second, he claims ongoing adverse effects from the rule that "chill" his protected conduct. Third, he argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine grants him standing for his facial challenge. However, the court finds these arguments insufficient for standing.

Grendell's prior sanctions alone do not constitute a present injury necessary for injunctive relief, as established in *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*, where past exposure to illegal conduct does not indicate a current controversy without ongoing adverse effects. Historical sanctions lose their impact once served or paid, and Grendell's previous sanctions lack continuing effects. His situation is likened to *Lyons*, where speculative future harm failed to confer standing for injunctive relief. Additionally, in *Ashcroft v. Mattis*, the Supreme Court ruled that potential future risks were too speculative to establish standing. Consequently, Grendell has not demonstrated a sufficient injury in fact to warrant declaratory or injunctive relief against Rule XIV. 5.

Grendell has not demonstrated "actual present harm or a significant possibility of future harm" necessary for seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as established in Nat'l Rifle Assoc. of Am. 132 F.3d at 279. His claim of future injury is speculative, relying on a series of uncertain events. To establish the necessary standing for relief, Grendell must provide evidence that: 1) he is likely to file a lawsuit with the Ohio Supreme Court; 2) the lawsuit is allegedly frivolous, risking sanctions under Rule XIV.5; 3) the court would impose such sanctions at its discretion; and 4) the sanctions would violate due process. This sequence of events is too tenuous to establish the required injury in fact.

Grendell also claims that the Ohio Supreme Court's sanctioning power creates a 'chilling effect' on his actions, asserting that this fear led him to withdraw from two cases. However, the potential chilling effect from anticipatory attorney sanctions does not constitute a sufficient injury for standing. The overbreadth doctrine and related chilling effects are primarily associated with First Amendment issues, as noted in cases like City of Chicago v. Morales and United States v. Salerno. While some legal activities are protected under the First Amendment, these generally pertain to meaningful access to the courts and do not extend to sanctions for frivolous lawsuits under Rule XIV.5. Even if such sanctions raised First Amendment concerns, Grendell's fears do not constitute a chilling effect adequate for standing. The Supreme Court has ruled that challenges to statutes based on chilling effects must not be based on speculative fears, as clarified in Younger v. Harris.

In Steffel, a Vietnam War protestor successfully challenged an anti-handbilling statute, demonstrating he had been warned of prosecution for handbilling and that a companion had been prosecuted, which established a credible fear of arrest. Conversely, in Younger, plaintiffs failed to show an actual case or controversy against a state law restricting socialist advocacy, as they did not allege any threats of prosecution, relying instead on a general feeling of inhibition. Grendell's situation mirrors the Younger plaintiffs, as he claims fear of unconstitutional sanctions from the Ohio Supreme Court but lacks evidence of any actual or imminent threats. His subjective fears do not constitute a sufficient injury to establish standing. Furthermore, Grendell's argument invoking the Rooker-Feldman doctrine relates to Feldman’s challenge against a bar admission rule, where the federal court dismissed his case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after he lost in state court, illustrating the principle that federal courts cannot overturn state court decisions in similar contexts.

A federal district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over state supreme court proceedings deemed "judicial," with review of such matters available only in the United States Supreme Court, as established in Feldman. A "judicial inquiry" involves the court investigating and enforcing liabilities based on existing laws and facts. Consequently, Feldman could not pursue a collateral attack in federal court against the D.C. Court of Appeals' dismissal of his bar application, as it pertained to his qualifications under specific facts.

The Supreme Court differentiated between "judicial" state court determinations and those that are "legislative, ministerial or administrative." While a direct review of a state court's decision on a bar application could conflict with federalism, a general constitutional challenge to the bar admission rule would not, since it does not require reviewing a final state court judgment in a judicial proceeding.

Grendell initially sought a temporary restraining order against sanctions from the Ohio Supreme Court, but recognizing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s limitations, he amended his complaint to a general constitutional challenge of Rule XIV.5. The district court concluded that Grendell had standing based on Feldman's assertion of jurisdiction over such challenges. However, this interpretation is contested, as Feldman established that jurisdictional statutes prevent federal review of state supreme court judgments but do not restrict federal district courts from hearing general constitutional challenges to state court rules. The Supreme Court's comments on subject matter jurisdiction should not be interpreted as a determination of standing for litigants seeking relief.

The interpretation of the holding in Feldman aligns with prior Supreme Court precedent, which indicates that previous jurisdictional determinations made without explicit consideration do not bind the Court in future cases addressing those issues. Specifically, issues of standing are critical within jurisdictional doctrines. The Supreme Court's ruling in Feldman, addressing a federal district court's subject matter jurisdiction over a constitutional challenge without discussing litigant standing, should not imply that all constitutional challenges under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine automatically grant standing to litigants. Other circuit courts have clarified that compliance with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not exempt litigants from proving proper standing. For example, in Landers Seed Co. Inc. v. Champaign Nat'l Bank, the court ruled that seeking review of a state court ruling is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, while merely seeking declaratory and injunctive relief does not confer standing. Similarly, in Facio v. Jones, a litigant was found to lack standing for declaratory relief since he could not contest a final state court judgment against him.

The facts of Feldman differ from the current case, as the plaintiff in Feldman had a legitimate interest in practicing law, which provided him standing due to the adverse effects he faced from the bar admission rules. In contrast, Grendell cannot demonstrate ongoing adverse effects from the sanctions imposed by the Ohio Supreme Court, as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and 28 U.S.C. § 1257 prevent federal court review of those sanctions. Thus, even if Rule XIV. 5 were later deemed unconstitutional, the sanctions remain final and cannot be contested. Additionally, Grendell has not shown that he faces any current threat of sanctions from cases he withdrew from or any other cases before the Ohio Supreme Court, leading to the conclusion that he does not experience the continuing harm necessary for standing to pursue declaratory and injunctive relief.

The court expresses skepticism regarding Grendell's assertion that Rule XIV. 5 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, but decides the case based solely on the issue of standing. It affirms that the court will not provide advisory opinions, referencing Johnson v. Turner to support its stance on standing. The court concludes that the plaintiff-appellants and cross-appellees lack standing, resulting in a reversal of the district court's decision on that claim and an affirmation of the dismissal of the action due to lack of jurisdiction. Additionally, it notes the Honorable Ann Aldrich's designation as the sitting judge and provides context on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, citing its origins in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.