Thomas Altman Kristen Larson Kenneth Yackly, - Appellants/ Cross v. Minnesota Department of Corrections, - Appellees/ Cross

Citations: 251 F.3d 1199; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 10968; 80 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 40,556; 85 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1300Docket: 00-1168, 00-1489

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; May 29, 2001; Federal Appellate Court

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Thomas Altman, Kristen Larson, and Kenneth Yackly, employees of the Minnesota Department of Corrections at the Shakopee facility (MCFS), were reprimanded for silently reading their Bibles during a mandatory training session on "Gays and Lesbians in the Workplace." The reprimands resulted in Larson and Yackly being ineligible for promotions. The employees filed a lawsuit claiming violations of their constitutional rights to free speech, free exercise of religion, and freedom of conscience, as well as equal protection under the law and Title VII. They sought a declaratory judgment, withdrawal of reprimands, promotion with back pay, rescission of a negative evaluation, compensatory damages, and attorneys' fees.

The district court dismissed their claims related to free speech, equal protection, and Title VII, but upheld their claims regarding free exercise and freedom of conscience. The court granted qualified immunity to individual defendants on damage claims and ordered the official defendants to withdraw the reprimands. The employees appealed the qualified immunity decision, the denial of promotions, and the refusal to award attorneys' fees. The defendants cross-appealed the relief granted on the free exercise and freedom of conscience claims.

The case background reveals that, prior to the training session, Altman expressed objections to the mandatory program, which led Warden Roehrich to issue a memo asserting the program's aim to foster respect in the workplace. The Appellants believed the training promoted lifestyles contrary to their religious beliefs and chose to read their Bibles as silent protest during the session, without disrupting the training. No complaints were made by supervisors present during the training regarding their actions. The appellate court found the Appellants raised triable issues concerning their claims of free speech, equal protection, and Title VII, leading to a reversal of the district court's summary judgment on these points.

Two trainers reported the Appellants' behavior during a mandatory training program, leading the MCFS Affirmative Action Officer to file a complaint. An internal investigation resulted in written reprimands, making the Appellants ineligible for promotion for two years. Witness testimonies indicated that prison officials had not previously disciplined other employees for inattentiveness during training. The Appellants raised claims under the First Amendment, equal protection, and Title VII, arguing they were punished for engaging in conduct they regarded as speech on a matter of public concern—specifically, reading their Bibles. The district court ruled their actions did not constitute speech of public interest, as they were seen as addressing internal policies. However, the summary pointed out that the Appellants' concerns about workplace treatment of LGBTQ+ issues are relevant to public duties, thus constituting a matter of public concern. Even if the speech is deemed of public interest, the government may still impose discipline if it disrupts workplace efficiency or employee responsibilities. Public employers have the authority to determine training parameters and require participation, and refusal to engage could be seen as hindering job performance.

Defendants argue that Appellants were disciplined for insubordination related to their refusal to be trained, not for their nonverbal speech. However, this argument lacks support from the undisputed facts, particularly since other employees who were similarly inattentive during training were not punished. The only employees disciplined were those who voiced opposition to the training, despite prior assurances that the training would not dictate personal beliefs. Appellants were specifically targeted for punishment after reading the Bible, raising questions about the motives behind their reprimand. Summary judgment dismissing Appellants' claims under the First Amendment, equal protection, and Title VII is inappropriate, as a trial could reveal that the discipline was based on their non-disruptive speech or religious expression, especially since other insubordinate employees faced no consequences. 

Additionally, Appellants assert that being reprimanded for reading the Bible during training violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. To succeed in this claim, they must demonstrate that the governmental action significantly burdened their religious practices. If they establish such a burden, the government must accommodate religious activities unless it would cause undue hardship. The district court found that the Bible reading did not disrupt training or negatively impact staff relationships, suggesting a violation of Appellants' rights. Defendants contest this ruling, claiming that the exercise of religion was not significantly burdened. Governmental action significantly burdens religion when it constrains expressions of faith or denies opportunities for fundamental religious activities. This issue is reviewed de novo.

Neither the district court nor the Appellants identified a significant burden regarding the Appellants' religious exercise. The Appellants did not claim that their religion necessitates Bible reading during work hours, and evidence showed that one Appellant, Larson, read her Bible during breaks without repercussions. The core issue centered on a training program opposed by the Appellants, who labeled it as state-sponsored propaganda promoting homosexuality, which they consider immoral. However, assurances from Warden Roehrich clarified that employees were not compelled to adopt any beliefs. Consequently, the only burden was attending a seventy-five-minute training that presented opposing views, which was deemed not substantial enough to infringe on their free exercise rights.

Moreover, the Appellants' state law freedom of conscience claims, based on Article 1, Section 16 of the Minnesota Constitution, similarly require a demonstration of excessive burden on religious beliefs. Since the Appellants failed to show such a substantial burden, their freedom of conscience claims were also dismissed.

The district court's judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to dismiss the Appellants' free exercise and freedom of conscience claims. Additionally, discussions on First Amendment claims raised by Judge Lay's dissent highlighted that motive analysis is pertinent, particularly in cases involving government actions. The dissent also underscored the need for evaluating the question of qualified immunity for the individual defendants, which the district court had not yet addressed. Lastly, it noted that an equal protection claim necessitates proof of discriminatory intent beyond mere different treatment. Judge Lay concurred with the majority's conclusion on the free exercise issue but acknowledged unresolved factual disputes regarding Title VII and equal protection claims.

Disagreement exists regarding the majority's handling of the free speech issue, with the assertion that the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment to MCFS. It is established that a group of employees, labeled "insubordinate," engaged in non-religious activities alongside plaintiffs who read Bibles. MCFS supervisors punished only those who engaged in religious reading, indicating a violation of free speech based on content rather than behavior. This is deemed unconstitutional, referencing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, which prohibits content-based discrimination. The discussion highlights that illicit intent is not necessary to establish a First Amendment violation. 

Regarding qualified immunity, the decision should be made as a matter of law, as the only disputed fact pertains to the defendants' motive, which is irrelevant to the qualified immunity defense. Citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the argument emphasizes that subjective intent should not influence the qualified immunity analysis and that assessing motives could disrupt effective governance. 

The conclusion advocates granting MCFS's cross-appeal on the free exercise claim while reversing the district court's judgment on free speech, Title VII, and equal protection claims. The author proposes granting judgment to the plaintiffs on the free speech claim as a matter of law and remanding only the Title VII and equal protection claims for further proceedings.