United States v. William M. Landham

Citations: 251 F.3d 1072; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 10795; 2001 WL 557987Docket: 99-5471

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; May 25, 2001; Federal Appellate Court

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William M. Landham was convicted on three counts: transmitting a threat to kidnap in interstate commerce (Count Three), transmitting a threat to injure in interstate commerce (Count Four), and making lewd interstate phone calls (Count Five). Landham appealed, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss Counts Three and Four, claiming his statements were not "true threats" and thus protected under the First Amendment. He also contended that the court erred in denying his motion for acquittal on all counts, asserting that his statements were not obscene and that the introduction of prior bad acts was prejudicial. Additionally, Landham alleged a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights due to comments made about his silence during closing arguments. The appellate court ultimately reversed all three convictions.

The background of the case reveals a tumultuous relationship between Landham and Belita Adams, which began in 1984. Adams characterized their relationship as fraught with substance abuse, although she noted that Landham never physically assaulted her. Their relationship was inconsistent and marked by significant events, including an incident where Landham fired a gun near Adams. After a period of no contact, they reconnected in 1995, following a family tragedy in Adams' life.

In spring 1995, Adams and Landham agreed to produce a low-budget erotic action film in Canada, funded by a $100,000 inheritance from Adams and her mother. Adams served as executive producer while Landham directed. During filming, Landham's heavy drinking became apparent. Their relationship rekindled, but in October 1995, Landham threatened Adams with a knife, referencing O.J. Simpson and Nicole Brown Simpson. Subsequently, Adams obtained a Domestic Violence Order (DVO) on October 31, 1995, prohibiting Landham from contacting her. He violated this order through repeated phone calls.

In November 1995, Adams became pregnant with Landham's child. On December 6, 1995, she moved to rescind the DVO, citing a need for communication due to their business relationship, and they married later that month. Their daughter, Priscilla, was born on August 8, 1996. 

On November 5, 1996, Adams secured a second DVO after Landham threatened her mother and made violent comments. Landham did not contest these allegations, and Adams filed for divorce. However, on November 22, 1996, they reached a reconciliation agreement, halting the divorce and granting Adams custody of Priscilla.

Adams obtained a third DVO on January 20, 1998, based on Landham's threats regarding Adams and their children, which included violent statements. This order prohibited Landham from any contact and awarded Adams temporary custody of Priscilla, along with a child support order. Despite this DVO, Landham continued to contact Adams and sent documents accusing her of fraud and child abuse to various individuals. 

Both Glenda Adams and Belita Adams acquired DVOs against Landham in 1996 and 1998, citing threats of violence. On August 8, 1998, for Priscilla's birthday, Landham sent gifts, but he was arrested two days later at his attorney's office in Kentucky. Adams did not see him again until the divorce hearing on August 13, 1998.

On August 26, 1998, a federal grand jury indicted Landham on four counts, which was later expanded to a six-count superseding indictment on October 21, 1998. The charges included: (1) crossing state lines to violate a domestic violence order (18 U.S.C. 2262), (2) crossing state lines to injure and harass (18 U.S.C. 2261A), (3) transmitting a threat to kidnap (18 U.S.C. 875(c)), (4) transmitting a threat to injure (18 U.S.C. 875(c)), (5) transmitting lewd communications with intent to abuse and annoy (47 U.S.C. 223(a)), and (6) making harassing interstate phone calls (47 U.S.C. 223(A)(E)). Landham pleaded not guilty and sought to dismiss the charges, claiming lack of federal jurisdiction, that the phone calls did not violate federal law, and that his accuser had a questionable character. The district court rejected his motion.

The Government sought to introduce evidence of Landham's prior bad acts under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), including prior domestic violence orders, firearm discharge in 1984, substance abuse issues, conduct in a divorce, and child support non-payment. Landham contested this evidence as inadmissible character evidence, particularly arguing against the firearms evidence due to its lack of relevance and temporal distance from the current charges. After a hearing, the court upheld the introduction of most 404(b) evidence, including the firearms evidence.

At trial, the Government presented evidence of Landham's prior bad acts and recordings of approximately fifty phone calls made to the victim between January and June 1998. While the specific dates of the calls were unclear, receipts indicated Landham traveled extensively during this period. Following the trial, Landham moved for acquittal on all counts; the motion was granted for Count Six, but denied for the others. The jury convicted him on Counts Three, Four, and Five, while a mistrial was declared on Counts One and Two. The district court subsequently sentenced Landham to 41 months in prison.

Landham's appeal challenges the district court's decision not to dismiss Counts Three and Four, asserting that his statements were not "true threats" and thus protected speech. Although Landham did not specify this issue in his appellate brief, the record indicates he previously filed a motion to "drop all charges," arguing that the alleged harassment did not violate federal law. The district court considered the merits of this motion, leading to the conclusion that the issue was preserved for review.

An indictment is constitutionally adequate if it includes the elements of the offense, informs the defendant of the charges, and allows for a plea of acquittal or conviction in future prosecutions. For an indictment to be legally sufficient, it must assert facts that constitute an offense and would establish a prima facie case of the defendant's crime if proven. The general principle is that the indictment can use statutory language as long as it clearly articulates all necessary offense elements. However, the Supreme Court emphasizes that while statutory language can describe the offense, it must also provide specific facts to inform the accused about the charged offense.

In evaluating motions to dismiss, courts do not assess the evidence supporting the indictment, as the validity of an indictment is not contingent on the evidence presented to the grand jury. This principle is complicated in cases involving 875(c), where the threatening nature of a statement is determined from the recipient's perspective, necessitating clear context in the indictment to support claims of threats unless they are direct.

The adequacy of the indictment's allegations is assessed through de novo review, with any legal deficiencies leading to dismissal. Counts Three and Four cite violations of 18 U.S.C. § 875, which criminalizes interstate communications containing threats to kidnap or injure another person. The statute outlines three necessary elements for a threat: (1) transmission in interstate commerce, (2) a communication that contains a threat, and (3) that the threat specifically aims to injure or kidnap another person. The definition of a "communication containing a threat" requires it to be perceived by a reasonable person as a serious intention to inflict harm, aimed at achieving a goal through intimidation, with both the mens rea and actus reus evaluated from the receiver's perspective.

True threats are not protected under the First Amendment, distinguishing them from political hyperbole or offensive speech that is protected. 

Count Three alleges that on February 7, 1998, William M. Landham transmitted a threat to kidnap via an interstate phone call to Belita Landham, claiming he would take their daughter Priscilla. The district court's failure to dismiss this count is deemed erroneous, as the statement does not constitute a direct threat to kidnap, nor would a reasonable person perceive it as such, especially given the context of an ongoing custody dispute and a domestic violence order against Landham. Furthermore, there are no allegations of any prior attempts to abduct Priscilla.

Landham cannot be charged with kidnapping under state or federal law due to his parental rights over his biological daughter, Priscilla, not being terminated. The January 1998 Domestic Violence Order (DVO) only granted temporary custody to Adams. Under Kentucky law, kidnapping requires unlawful restraint with specific intents, and a relative's assumption of custody is a defense against kidnapping charges. Landham's actions could at most be classified as custodial interference, which occurs when someone takes a person entrusted to another without legal right. This statute distinguishes family-related custody disputes from kidnapping, reflecting a need to protect parental custody rights. Moreover, federal law exempts biological parents from kidnapping charges unless their rights are permanently terminated. Thus, while Landham's actions may have violated the DVO, they do not constitute kidnapping under Kentucky or federal law, leading to the conclusion that he cannot be legally liable for making a threat to kidnap. Consequently, the claim fails due to the lack of two essential elements required for a threat under 875(c) and should be dismissed.

Count Four alleges that in March or April 1998, William M. Landham knowingly transmitted a threat via an interstate phone call to Belita Landham, stating, "It's over kid. Are you an idiot? I've done more to you with a Parker 51 than what happened to your father with a goddamn Taurus five-shot," in violation of Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 875. The argument presented asserts that this statement does not constitute a "communication containing a threat," as it pertains to past conduct rather than a present or future intention to cause harm. The reference to a Parker 51, identified as a fountain pen, suggests that the statement relates to prior damaging remarks rather than a violent threat. Consequently, it fails to meet the standard of a serious expression of intent to inflict bodily harm as defined in legal precedent. The indictment is deemed insufficient as it does not allege a violation of Section 875(c), leading to an error in the district court’s denial of Landham's motion to dismiss Count Four.

Additionally, Landham contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal on Counts Three, Four, and Five. Regarding Count Three, the court must determine whether a rational juror could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The government was required to show that Landham made a call outside of Kentucky. Though circumstantial, evidence presented indicated that Landham traveled from Kentucky to Georgia and subsequently to other states. This evidence supports the conclusion that he was not in Kentucky when the call was made, thus fulfilling the first element of the alleged violation of Section 875(c).

Landham contends that the statement in Count Three does not qualify as a 'true threat,' asserting that the district court should have dismissed this count due to its failure to establish a violation of 875(c). The analysis reveals that no reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Landham communicated a true threat of kidnapping. His communication in Call #10 is interpreted as relating to an impending custody dispute regarding Priscilla. In Call #21, Landham accuses Adams of being an unfit mother and warns her about the potential loss of custody, referencing third parties with legal authority rather than stating his intention to take the children directly. Call #22 reinforces this, where he mentions informing law enforcement about the custody situation. Additionally, while Call #10 includes a statement about coming to get Priscilla and making money, this is framed in the context of his custody rights, as he is her biological father. The January 20, 1998 Domestic Violence Order (DVO) granted temporary custody of Priscilla to Adams, and no evidence suggested Landham attempted to remove her from the residence. Notably, Adams did not report this call to the police, despite having an enforceable order against Landham, indicating that she did not perceive the communication as a true threat. Therefore, a rational juror could not have found Landham guilty of this count, and the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal.

Regarding Count Four, the statement in question also fails to constitute a threat and should have been dismissed. The Government's argument that context reveals a threat is unconvincing, as the statement does not express an intent to cause bodily harm. Moreover, Adams testified that Landham had previously libeled her, which suggests she could only interpret his statements as references to past actions rather than threats.

Count Five charges Landham with violating 42 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(A)(B) for transmitting lewd, indecent, obscene, and lascivious interstate communications between January and July 1998, with the intent to abuse, harass, and annoy. The statute criminalizes the transmission of any obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent communication intended to annoy or harass another. Landham contends that the Government did not prove the communications were "obscene," a requirement supported by the precedent set in Apollomedia Corp. v. Reno, which affirmed that § 223 is limited to obscene language despite also prohibiting other types of communication. The Apollomedia case emphasized that the terms used in § 223(a) align with those in 18 U.S.C. § 1461, which the Supreme Court has interpreted to only encompass obscenity. The district court's analysis noted that Congress is presumed to understand Supreme Court interpretations when enacting laws, and the legislative history supports this limitation. Although Apollomedia involved commercial communications, the ruling binds the current case, as obscenity is not protected speech under the First Amendment. Thus, the statute's application to private communications remains valid.

The determination of whether Landham's speech qualifies as obscene hinges on the Supreme Court's criteria outlined in *Miller v. California*. According to the Court, the criteria include: (a) whether an average person, using contemporary community standards, would find the speech appeals to prurient interests; (b) whether it depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner as defined by state law; and (c) whether it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The government did not prove that Landham's phone calls, which included derogatory terms directed at his wife, constituted obscene communications. Although his language was deemed lewd and indecent, it was characterized as emotional outbursts stemming from frustration in their relationship, not as expressions appealing to prurient interests. Previous case law indicates that indecent but not obscene sexual expression is protected under the First Amendment. Consequently, Landham's statements did not violate the statute in question. The court reversed Landham's convictions on Counts Three, Four, and Five, remanding the case for a judgment of acquittal on these counts. The court emphasized the need for careful legal analysis, avoiding personal dynamics in domestic disputes when determining the boundary between protected speech and true threats.

The Hamling standard consists of three key requirements for criminal pleading: (1) inclusion of the offense's essential elements, (2) adequate notice regarding the charge, and (3) protection against double jeopardy. The essential elements requirement serves a "judicial review" function, informing the trial court of the allegations' sufficiency for potential conviction. This function, while less frequently mentioned than notice and double jeopardy, is fundamental in both federal and state pleadings.

In the context of threats, Landham's argument against being classified as making "true threats" relies on the standard established in United States v. Kelner, which requires threats to be unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific. However, this standard is not applied in the relevant Circuit as per the ruling in Alkhabaz.

Evidence presented at trial included Landham's travel route between January 7 and August 6, 1998. The only substantiated proof of his whereabouts is his departure from Lexington, Kentucky, on January 12, 1998, with no definitive evidence regarding his presence in Kentucky on February 7, 1998.

Additionally, a phone call before the incident described in Count Four revealed Landham discussing known information about another individual, hinting at past legal troubles and actions, which may be relevant to the case.

The document also affirms that obscene speech lacks First Amendment protection, referencing Roth v. United States regarding the legality of mailing obscene materials. A three-judge district court is mandated to convene when the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) is challenged, as per 28 U.S.C. § 2284. The Supreme Court has consistently defined obscenity narrowly, focusing on patently offensive depictions of sexual conduct, as established in cases like Hamling v. United States and reaffirmed in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day. Lastly, the mention of § 223(a) suggests its applicability to both private and public communications, distinguishing between general and commercial prohibitions.