United States v. Sean Lamar Sanders, A/K/A Sean Lamont Sanders
Docket: 00-6281
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; April 13, 2001; Federal Appellate Court
Sean L. Sanders sought collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, contesting his conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine based on alleged violations of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed his motion as untimely, as it was filed over a year after his conviction became final. The court determined that Sanders' resentencing did not reset the § 2255 statute of limitations, and he had procedurally defaulted any remaining claims. Furthermore, the new procedural rule established in Apprendi v. New Jersey was deemed non-retroactive for collateral review. Initially, Sanders was sentenced to 328 months in prison after pleading guilty, but his sentence was later reduced to 188 months due to his cooperation with authorities. His collateral relief petition, filed nearly two years post-sentencing, included claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and violation of due process concerning the burden of proof on drug quantity, which the district court rejected as untimely. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Sanders' petition, agreeing with the lower court's findings.
Prior to 1996, federal prisoners had no time limit to file a § 2255 motion to challenge their convictions. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) established a one-year limitations period for such motions, starting from the latest of several specified dates, including when the judgment becomes final or when a right asserted is recognized by the Supreme Court.
In the case of Sanders, he argued his motion was timely under both § 2255 subsections (1) and (3). He acknowledged that if his conviction became final on January 15, 1998, his motion would be untimely, as he did not appeal. However, Sanders claimed the limitations period only began after he completed resentencing on April 16, 1999, filing his motion on December 27, 1999, which he argued was timely.
The court disagreed, stating that under established precedent, a federal prisoner's conviction becomes final when they do not pursue direct appellate review, which was January 15, 1998, in Sanders' case. The court emphasized that modifications made under Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 35(b) do not affect the finality of a conviction. According to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b), a judgment of conviction remains final despite subsequent modifications. Thus, Sanders' conviction was deemed final on January 15, 1998, initiating the one-year limitations period under § 2255 subsection (1).
Sanders contends that the limitations period for § 2255 motions should commence only after a Rule 35(b) sentence modification, arguing that this approach would streamline proceedings, foster cooperation between defendants and the government, and alleviate the burden of litigating ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In contrast, the government argues that this interpretation could lead to numerous stale claims, as Rule 35(b) motions can be filed long after sentencing, and suggests that the efficiency gains would be minimal since such motions rarely prompt § 2255 challenges. The government also warns that this construction could compel defendants to continue with ineffective counsel during Rule 35(b) proceedings. The court notes that it cannot weigh these policy arguments since Congress has addressed these issues in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b) and therefore must adhere to the statute's plain text. Consequently, it finds Sanders' motion untimely under § 2255 subsection (1).
Regarding subsection (3) of § 2255, Sanders claims his petition is not time-barred. However, he faces insurmountable challenges because he did not raise the jury determination issue regarding drug types or quantities during sentencing or on direct appeal. The Supreme Court has established that habeas review is not a substitute for direct appeal, and claims not raised on direct review may only be pursued if the defendant shows 'cause' and 'prejudice' or proves 'actual innocence.' Sanders attempts to establish 'cause' by arguing that the legal basis for his claim was not available to his counsel during the plea process, citing the Supreme Court's acknowledgment that novel claims could constitute cause for procedural default.
In Bousley, the Supreme Court clarified the definition of a novel claim within the context of collateral review. Bousley argued that his guilty plea for using a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) was not made knowingly and intelligently due to misinformation about the crime's nature, particularly after the Supreme Court's ruling in Bailey v. United States, which established that 'use' necessitates 'active employment of the firearm.' Despite recognizing the shift in legal interpretation, the Court deemed Bousley's claim non-novel since other defendants had previously contested their convictions on similar grounds. The Court also rejected Bousley's assertion that his failure to raise the claim on direct appeal should be excused due to futility, asserting that futility cannot constitute cause merely because a claim was previously unacceptable to the court.
Applying this reasoning, the analysis suggests that Sanders cannot demonstrate cause for not raising his Apprendi argument on direct appeal. The Seventh Circuit previously addressed this issue in United States v. Smith, ruling that a petitioner had procedurally defaulted his Apprendi claim by not presenting it during trial in 1992. The Smith court found that the foundation for Apprendi existed long before 1992, as similar arguments had been made regarding the Sentencing Guidelines. Additionally, the Smith petitioner claimed futility based on prior circuit court rulings that characterized drug quantity under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) as a sentencing factor rather than an element of the offense. This argument was also rejected, with the court emphasizing that 'cause' must stem from an external impediment, which was not demonstrated in Smith's case.
The Seventh Circuit's analysis supports the conclusion that viewing novelty as a cause for procedural default would allow defendants to circumvent traditional trial and appeal processes in favor of collateral review, potentially leading to a flood of claims that seemed more viable post-trial. The court emphasizes that the basis for Sanders' Apprendi claim existed at the time of his conviction, and he had the necessary legal resources to raise it then, resulting in a procedural default of his claim.
Sanders' attempt to assert that his claims are not barred under § 2255 subsection (3) is further complicated by his reliance on a new rule, which is contrary to the precedent set in Teague v. Lane, where new rules of constitutional criminal procedure are generally not applied retroactively on collateral review. Neither the Supreme Court nor other circuits have recognized Apprendi as retroactively applicable, with the Ninth Circuit explicitly stating the opposite.
Teague v. Lane establishes a three-step framework to assess the retroactivity of new rules on collateral review: determining the date of final conviction, evaluating whether the Supreme Court's ruling is a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure, and assessing if it falls within exceptions to the Teague bar. Sanders argues that Apprendi should not undergo this inquiry as it presents a substantive law rule; however, it is characterized as procedural because it pertains to fact-finding procedures necessary for a fair trial, indicating that the adequacy of New Jersey's procedure is what is at stake, not the substantive basis for its enhancements.
Apprendi established a new procedural rule in criminal law, necessitating a three-step Teague analysis. Sanders' conviction became final on January 15, 1998, prior to the Supreme Court decisions in Jones v. United States and Apprendi v. New Jersey, which defined this new rule. At that time, the leading case was McMillan v. Pennsylvania, which allowed states to treat firearm possession as a sentencing factor, not requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, reasonable jurists in January 1998 would not have felt compelled to adopt Apprendi's requirement that factors increasing maximum punishment must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Prior to Apprendi, federal circuit courts treated drug quantity as a sentencing factor determined by a preponderance of the evidence.
New rules of constitutional criminal procedure are typically not retroactive on collateral review, with two exceptions under Teague. The first exception does not apply as Apprendi did not eliminate the state's authority to prosecute drug conspiracies. For Apprendi to apply retroactively, it must meet the second Teague exception, which requires that the new rule significantly diminishes the likelihood of accurate convictions and alters the understanding of essential procedural fairness. The Supreme Court has indicated that only rules like Gideon v. Wainwright satisfy this second exception.
The Supreme Court has indicated that few undiscovered procedural rules remain, emphasizing that the second exception of Teague applies narrowly to fundamental rules critical for ordered liberty. It has reiterated the rarity of new bedrock procedural rules that could affect the determination of guilt or innocence. Since the Teague decision, no new retroactive rules have been recognized. For instance, the Apprendi ruling established that a jury, not a judge, must determine facts for statutory sentencing enhancements beyond a reasonable doubt, but these rules do not constitute watershed rules of fundamental fairness warranting retroactive application.
The distinction between a judge and a jury in fact-finding does not elevate the rule to fall under the second Teague exception, as demonstrated in Neder, where failure to submit a materiality finding to a jury was deemed harmless error. Circuit courts have consistently held that the Gaudin ruling, which shifted materiality determination from judge to jury, does not apply retroactively. The rationale suggests juries are unlikely to interpret materiality differently than judges.
Sanders argues that the reasonable doubt standard's implications for fairness and accuracy in criminal proceedings are paramount, drawing parallels to Cage v. Louisiana, which recognized a new rule regarding jury instructions that diluted the reasonable doubt standard. While this rule was deemed retroactive, Sanders contends that his case is similar and notes ongoing Supreme Court review on Cage's retroactivity.
The case at hand distinguishes itself from Tyler by focusing on the standard of proof for jury submissions rather than questioning the integrity of the entire conviction. Sanders’ argument centers on the district court’s failure to include drug quantity as an element of the offense, rather than a broader challenge to the conviction itself. The Supreme Court's rulings in Johnson and Neder suggest that a missing element does not inherently compromise the fairness of a trial, allowing for harmless-error and plain-error analyses.
While the requirement for certain sentencing factors to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt may enhance accuracy in verdicts, it does not fundamentally alter the essential elements of a fair trial, as established by the second Teague exception. The Apprendi rule, which applies only to cases where sentencing could exceed statutory limits due to a factor, lacks the comprehensive impact of Gideon v. Wainwright, which broadly guarantees the right to counsel in all felony cases.
Furthermore, Apprendi does not imply a systemic failure in the criminal justice system prior to 2000, as it acknowledges the historical discretion judges have held in sentencing within legislatively determined ranges. Thus, Apprendi’s allowance for judges to base sentences on facts not proven beyond a reasonable doubt challenges the notion that it establishes a fundamental procedural principle under Teague. It would be problematic to view this as a bedrock principle if numerous defendants have been sentenced based on a preponderance of the evidence standard.
Apprendi is not considered a watershed change in criminal procedure, as indicated by the majority of federal circuit courts applying harmless and plain error review to Apprendi claims. These courts have concluded that a criminal defendant can still receive a fair trial without the procedural protections introduced by Apprendi, and none have classified the failure to submit drug quantity questions to a jury as a structural error. Acknowledging that not all structural errors meet the criteria for retroactive application under Teague, it is emphasized that establishing a structural error is essential for a new rule to apply retroactively.
The Constitution provides fundamental rights for accused individuals, such as the right to counsel and trial by jury. However, many related issues, while potentially significant, do not constitute core guarantees and thus may not qualify for retroactive application. The Supreme Court has addressed various subsidiary questions arising from the Gideon ruling, but has not suggested these cases automatically apply retroactively based on their connection to Gideon. Upholding Teague's principle, only exceptional cases warrant retroactive application of new constitutional rules during collateral review.
Consequently, the Apprendi rule does not alter the fundamental elements essential to fair proceedings and cannot be used by Sanders to challenge his conviction retroactively. All of Sanders' arguments aim to challenge the finality of direct appeals, a notion the Supreme Court and Congress have consistently resisted, emphasizing the importance of direct review and establishing strict time limits for filing § 2255 petitions. As a result, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
The excerpt clarifies several points regarding the application of § 2255's statute of limitations and its interaction with § 3582. It notes that certain provisions of § 2255 are not pertinent to the appeal, specifically those related to governmental impediments and the discovery of claims. Sanders argues that § 3582 does not clarify when a judgment becomes final for § 2255 purposes, highlighting that a judgment remains final even if an appeal is possible. However, the text asserts that under § 3582, a conviction is deemed final for all purposes, and that modifications under Rule 35 do not alter this finality.
Additionally, Sanders invokes the 'Healy doctrine' to argue for a favorable interpretation of § 2255’s limitations period, but the document distinguishes between motions for reconsideration and Rule 35(b) motions, stating that they serve different purposes and thus do not warrant the same treatment under Healy.
The document further discusses the possibility of a circuit court declaring a new rule retroactive for initial § 2255 petitions, but notes that the specifics of this question are not pertinent to the current case since it is Sanders' first habeas petition. The text emphasizes that while a new rule may be recognized, this does not necessarily provide cause for failing to raise a claim on direct appeal. It concludes by addressing Sanders' reliance on Justice O'Connor's dissent in Apprendi, clarifying that the dissent does not engage with the Teague decision or its exceptions.
