Robert Calvin Boyette v. Eugene S. Lefevre, Superintendent, Franklin Correctional Facility
Docket: 99-2674
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; April 3, 2001; Federal Appellate Court
Robert Calvin Boyette appeals the denial of his habeas corpus application by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, claiming the Kings County District Attorney's office violated Brady v. Maryland by withholding exculpatory evidence. Initially, the New York Supreme Court for Kings County vacated Boyette's conviction after finding that material exculpatory documents were indeed withheld. However, the New York State Appellate Division reversed this decision, stating Boyette did not prove he was denied the materials, some of which were not Brady material, and even if they were, no prejudice resulted. This appeal addresses the challenge of applying the deferential review standards under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) to the state appellate court's unclear findings regarding the withheld materials.
The case revolves around a brutal crime on February 21, 1982, where Regina Ehrlich was attacked and left to die in her apartment. Ehrlich identified Boyette, her neighbor, as one of her assailants. Boyette asserted a defense of mistaken identity and alibi through two trials, with the first jury deadlocked, while the second convicted him. Key to Boyette's appeal is the contention that withheld documents undermine Ehrlich's identification of him. The background includes details of Ehrlich’s interviews with law enforcement, where she expressed uncertainty about her attackers' identities and requested to see Boyette’s photograph for confirmation.
A male suspect, described as a tall Black teenager with missing teeth, attacked Ehrlich in her apartment on February 21, 1982. After the incident, she was unable to identify her attackers initially but later selected Boyette's photo from a lineup on October 25, 1992. During testimony at Boyette's second trial, Ehrlich stated she had seen Boyette frequently in her building and recognized him during the assault, despite the trauma. She described the attack in detail, noting that one assailant, identified as "Calvin," removed his ski mask and attempted to destroy fingerprints. Following the assault, Ehrlich was left unconscious and later found her apartment burning. On cross-examination, she clarified her earlier statements about Boyette's teeth, attributing the appearance of missing teeth to his underbite. A defense witness claimed that Ehrlich admitted to not seeing the attackers' faces directly. The defense presented alibi evidence from six witnesses, including family members, asserting that Boyette was in Virginia at the time of the crime, with testimony confirming his presence in Virginia from January 25, 1982, until early 1983.
Denise identified Melissa Smith as Calvin Boyette's girlfriend, stating they attended a dinner party at Lawrence Leo Hawkins' residence on February 14, 1982, where a picture of them was taken. Later that night, Melissa gave birth to a child. On February 20, 1982, Denise saw Calvin again when Hawkins took her, Jody, David, and Calvin to Bradlee's store to buy baby clothing. David Ruiz corroborated this, mentioning they bought clothes for Calvin’s newborn son and then returned to his mother’s house before going to Newport News.
Melissa testified that Calvin was the father of her son and confirmed their presence at Hawkins' house on February 14, stating that Calvin took her to his Aunt Ellen Walker's house and then to the hospital for the birth. She indicated that she saw Calvin almost daily the following week, including on February 21, when he and his cousins delivered baby clothing.
Ellen Ross Walker, Calvin's aunt, recalled seeing him frequently at Barbara Ruiz's house from late January 1982 until his departure for college in early 1983, mentioning she saw him around February 20 while he was borrowing money from her at her workplace.
Assistant District Attorney Kevin Murphy highlighted inconsistencies in the testimonies of Barbara and David Ruiz compared to earlier proceedings and questioned Melissa Smith's credibility regarding her prior statements to law enforcement, claiming she initially denied seeing Calvin in Virginia.
Calvin Boyette testified that he began a longer stay in Virginia on January 25, 1982, and maintained consistency with the alibi witnesses. His first trial in 1984 resulted in a hung jury, with jurors reportedly deadlocked 9-3 for acquittal. During the second trial, Attorney John Corbett did not challenge the credibility of key witnesses, leading to Boyette's conviction on multiple serious charges, including attempted murder and arson, and a sentence of 12.5 to 25 years in prison. Before sentencing, the judge noted the complainant's certainty about the identity of the perpetrator. Attorney Joel Dranove later revealed information about another potential suspect, which had not been pursued, and filed a motion in May 1986 to vacate Boyette's conviction.
Boyette alleged that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in the form of police report DD5 No. 26, which identified Bobby Mason as a potential suspect, thereby violating his rights under the Brady v. Maryland standard. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel from Corbett, who did not adequately prepare or call alibi witnesses. Supporting this, Dranove provided a letter from Corbett indicating uncertainty about having the Bobby Mason report during the trial, alongside affidavits from Sheila Boyette and others confirming that certain reports were missing from Corbett's file. Sheila stated that she received Corbett's file after the first trial, noted the absence of reports numbered twenty-six and thirty-three, and was eventually provided with the Bobby Mason report by Murphy, though not report thirty-three. Justice Thaddeus Owens denied Boyette's motion on September 3, 1996, expressing skepticism about the defense's ability to introduce the Bobby Mason report and declining to hold a hearing on the matter. The New York State Appellate Division later upheld Boyette's conviction, finding no abuse of discretion in the denial of the hearing request. In 1988, Dranove sought to preserve hair samples linked to the crime for future DNA testing, but the district attorney's office was unable to locate them. A subsequent motion in 1990 included an affidavit from Dwayne W. Johnson, who claimed to have seen Mason and Beale near the crime scene, suggesting they were responsible for the attack. Dranove alleged potential deliberate destruction of evidence by the district attorney, prompting Justice Moskowitz to order a hearing despite the district attorney's objections. During the hearing, Boyette's counsel requested access to Detective Ruiz's complete file, revealing discrepancies in the numbered reports provided by prior counsel.
Dranove asserted ignorance of specific documents (numbers 34 through 39) and claimed neither he nor his previous counsel were aware of certain fire marshal reports in Ruiz's file. He provided the court with a list of exhibits from Corbett, which ended at thirty-three. Assistant District Attorney Sean Courtney later offered to review his file with Dranove. On January 18, 1991, Courtney informed Justice Moskowitz about discovering a transfer box containing files pertinent to the Boyette case, prompting the court to expand the hearing to examine potential violations of Brady v. Maryland and People v. Rosario. The hearing primarily focused on several key documents:
1. Twenty-six fire marshal interview sheets, including one where the victim expressed a desire to see a photo of Calvin Boyette to confirm his identity.
2. Handwritten notes from police and fire personnel, including a note from Calvin Roland denying involvement and another noting no accelerant was used.
3. A typewritten interview sheet by Fire Marshal Mauro indicating the victim could not identify Boyette.
4. A telephone message pad entry suggesting to “Rule out Boyette.”
5. The Bobby Mason report.
Dranove denied receiving any of these documents from John Corbett, who had passed away in 1987. Boyette's first attorney, Selzer, acknowledged uncertainty about the completeness of his files from the first trial but was certain he had never seen the Mauro/Murphy interview sheet or the Rule out Boyette note. He first reviewed the fire marshal interview sheets and the Calvin Roland note shortly before testifying. Prosecutor Murphy, who handled Boyette's trials, testified he believed he turned over all relevant documents but did not maintain a record of what was provided and did not recall the Mauro report. He assumed he had turned over documents numbered thirty-four through forty, believing they contained no significant information.
Murphy's testimony regarding document disclosure revealed a lack of a log to track materials provided to defense counsel, leading to the court's conclusion that he failed to turn over critical evidence, including the Bobby Mason report and other documents. Justice Moskowitz determined that these omissions constituted both Brady and Rosario violations, as they deprived the defense of exculpatory information that could have influenced the trial's outcome. The court noted several reasons for these findings: Murphy's failure to maintain a disclosure log, the absence of documented in-court disclosures, his perceived lack of candor during testimony, and the implausibility of competent legal representation conducting inadequate cross-examinations without access to the relevant documents. The court classified certain documents as Brady material, with the potential to alter the trial's result, while others were identified as Rosario material, justifying vacatur of the conviction. The Appellate Division later remitted the case to Justice Moskowitz for evaluation of potential prejudice from these violations, ultimately upholding the significance of the undisclosed materials. However, the Appellate Division later reversed the findings, asserting that Boyette failed to prove the denial of materials and that any claimed Brady or Rosario violations did not result in prejudice. Boyette subsequently filed a petition in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York in April 1997.
Boyette raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and violations of Brady v. Maryland. On October 12, 1999, the district court, led by Judge Gleeson, denied Boyette's petition but granted a certificate of appealability specifically for the Brady claim. The court analyzed the suppression issue central to the Brady claim but did not decide which review standard under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 applied, as both pre- and post-AEDPA standards required a presumption of correctness for state court factual findings, dismissing the habeas petition if those findings were reasonably supported by the record.
The district court noted that while the Appellate Division claimed Boyette did not prove certain materials were withheld, this likely included all contested evidence. The court found the Appellate Division's conclusion unsupported regarding the Murphy/Mauro report, as Murphy testified he had never seen it. However, the court found evidence supporting that the prosecutor provided the Bobby Mason report, citing defense counsel's reference to a possibly related document during sentencing. It also supported the conclusion that the State did not withhold other evidence, as Murphy's office practices were adequately described.
The district court disagreed with the hearing court's assessment of Murphy's credibility based on his failure to recall certain details years later. It concluded that Boyette was not prejudiced by the absence of the Murphy-Mauro report, as Murphy's testimony aligned with other evidence. Even after considering the cumulative effect of withheld documents, the court determined Boyette would not have faced prejudice, as any disputed evidence would have been marginal compared to Ehrlich's strong identification of him at trial.
The appeal is limited to the Brady claims, and the standard of review for the district court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus is de novo, while deferring to state court findings. The Supreme Court recently clarified that AEDPA's standards apply to petitions filed after its effective date, including Boyette's case.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner only if the state court's adjudication of the claim was (1) contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. A state court's factual determinations are presumed correct, and the applicant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.
The district court's conclusion regarding the Appellate Division's findings on Boyette's claims was disputed, as it misinterpreted the court's statement about "certain materials" being unproven as a blanket statement about all materials. The Appellate Division did not clarify which documents were allegedly suppressed, leading to an absence of a specific finding of fact to which deference could be given, and thus no AEDPA deference is warranted without an adjudication on the merits. The appellate court also did not clarify which materials were not Brady materials, and the hearing court only ruled on three contested documents. Given this ambiguity, the federal court must conduct a de novo review of the issues.
Despite these findings, the appellate court concluded that even if all withheld documents were Brady materials, no prejudice resulted to Boyette. This conclusion must be affirmed unless it contradicts or misapplies established federal law. A true Brady violation comprises three components: the evidence must be favorable to the accused, suppressed by the state, and result in prejudice. The record supports the hearing court's finding that the prosecution withheld specific evidence, including various documents related to the case.
Murphy's inability to recall specific documents related to the case was not deemed suspicious. Evidence suggests that the prosecutor failed to disclose several materials, supported by testimonies from two defense attorneys who confirmed they did not receive them. Murphy's vague recollection of what he provided, incomplete logs of documents given to the defense, and the absence of crucial materials like fire marshal reports further support this conclusion. It is noted that competent defense counsel would have utilized various documents to challenge prosecution witnesses. In contrast, regarding the Bobby Mason report, two factors favor the prosecution: Dranove's admission of having a similar document before sentencing and its inclusion in the original log of documents. The district court reasonably concluded that defense counsel had received this report during the trial.
Under the Brady analysis, material must be favorable to the accused, either indicating innocence or impeaching a witness. The Appellate Division did not clarify which documents met this standard, and the hearing court found the "Rule out Boyette" note was not Brady material. The application of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) is limited here, as the Appellate Division's conclusions on the Murphy/Mauro report were unclear. The report is deemed non-Brady material due to its reliance on inadmissible hearsay and lack of independent exculpatory value.
Ehrlich's initial statements to Fire Marshal Bollman, suggesting Calvin may have been one of her attackers and her request to see a photograph for confirmation, contradict her later assertions of certainty regarding Calvin Boyette's identity as a perpetrator, qualifying these statements as Brady material. Additionally, an accelerant note indicating confusion about an oily substance smeared on her face and the Calvin Roland note, which implies Ehrlich did not initially identify her attacker clearly, further support this classification. Consequently, the fire marshal interview sheets, the accelerant note, and the Calvin Roland material are deemed Brady material, potentially aiding the defense in proposing an alternative suspect or impeaching Ehrlich and Ruiz.
However, the determination of materiality requires showing that the suppression of these documents likely affected the trial's outcome. The state appellate court concluded that Boyette was not prejudiced despite the potential Brady violations. Since this determination was made on the merits, it is reviewed under the standards set by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The appellate court's finding lacked indication of applying a standard contrary to Supreme Court precedents, allowing for a review only if it represents an unreasonable application of those precedents.
Materiality does not necessitate proving that disclosure would have ensured acquittal but rather that it affected the fairness of the trial. The defendant does not need to show that the remaining evidence post-disclosure is insufficient for conviction. Once constitutional error is established, further harmless-error analysis is unnecessary, and suppressed evidence must be evaluated collectively.
Applying these principles, the appellate court's conclusion that Boyette suffered no prejudice is found to be an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. The only evidence against Boyette was Ehrlich's testimony, which was compelling due to her familiarity with him and her identification of him as a perpetrator; however, this testimony did not lead to a conviction, as the first jury was deadlocked favoring acquittal.
The jury faced challenges reconciling conflicting testimonies regarding Boyette's alibi, particularly in light of Ehrlich's firm belief that Boyette was her attacker. Despite attempts to impeach alibi witnesses Smith and the Ruiz family, their consistent statements corroborated Boyette's presence in Virginia at the time of the crime. The timing of their recollections, shortly after the birth of Boyette's son, provided additional credibility. The Calvin Roland report had limited impeachment value, and the Appellate Division improperly assessed the materiality of remaining documents. A reasonable jury could only convict Boyette by discrediting the alibi witnesses in favor of Ehrlich's testimony, making her credibility pivotal. Additionally, fire marshal's notes from an interview suggested Ehrlich struggled to identify Boyette, which could have undermined her account. These notes could have bolstered the defense's argument that Ehrlich's identification evolved over time, exacerbated by her trauma. The combination of the notes and the delay in Boyette's arrest might have influenced jury perception, especially given the lack of other evidence linking him to the crime. The case's reliance on Ehrlich's credibility, alongside the cumulative impact of the undisclosed documents, justified a conclusion that the outcome could have been different. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial unless the state acts within ninety days.
The Honorable Miriam Goldman Cedarbaum, a U.S. District Court Judge, presided over the trial, where witnesses predominantly referred to the defendant, Boyette, as Calvin for clarity. Key testimony included Ehrlich's assertion that she observed Boyette's face for about 15 to 20 minutes. The case referenced the Bobby Mason report and a prosecutor's duty under state law to provide defense counsel with all pretrial statements from prosecution witnesses. Additional evidence consisted of testimonies from three eyewitnesses—Lawrence Leo Hawkins, Lowell Perry (the mayor of Kill Devil Hills, NC), and Audrey D. Boyd (a store clerk)—who supported Boyette's alibi.
The Appellate Division's lack of specific findings on withheld materials complicates the case, as it reversed the lower court's credibility determinations. Pre-AEDPA precedent indicates that deference is typically owed to state appellate court fact-finding. The cases of Sumner v. Mata and Ventura v. Meachum highlight that appellate courts may make findings on issues not addressed by trial courts. The question of the AEDPA's standard for reviewing such appellate determinations remains unresolved. The court rejected the State's claim that certain evidence was merely cumulative of impeachment evidence, emphasizing that the evidence fundamentally pertained to the reliability of Ehrlich's memory and her ability to accurately identify her attackers, contrary to the other evidence which focused on discrepancies in her description.
